The Internet increases the access, velocity and magnitude of information and promotes high levels of political engagement, agenda focus and network strength. Moreover, it permits greater interaction between like-minded, geographically dispersed political parties. Social media websites like Twitter, Facebook, and blog sites are now vital tactics in political activism. The 2012 U.S. Presidential election stands as the most-tweeted political event in history with 31 million tweets. In authoritarian regimes, social media activism has had the added effect of equalizing the playing field for political dissidents and their rivals in the political elite. The online personas of dissidents like Fatima Khalid Saad in Syria and Yoani Sanchez of Cuba engage an unlimited base of followers in real-time. In effect, the newest arena for propaganda warfare in authoritarian countries is social media websites.

Social media has shifted the balance of power away from the elite in authoritarian regimes by appealing to their audience on a new and growing frontier. In fact, 69% of online adults use social networking sites, as do 40% of cell phone owners. Politicized dissidents rooted in online identities increasingly supplement activist movements. These citizen journalists could not have existed before the Internet. Policies of isolationism are no longer feasible in a geopolitical environment saturated with information. Rather than engaging them on this front, governments retaliate with violence.

Authoritarian regimes kill or apply punitive measures in response to the threat of social media soldiers. However, many times this has the opposite effect and empowers the dissidents. Syrian blogger Fatima Khaled Saad died early this month after being tortured by Syrian General Intelligence loyal to Assad. Forces loyal to Assad set blogger Abu Hassan’s house on fire late September, killing him and 15 others in the city of Hama.  The death of these social media soldiers ricocheted through the web, and was recognized internationally by news outlets. The identity that Saad created will outlive her because it remains accessible online.

Yoani Sanchez’s anti-regime stance would have been considered a death-wish in Cuba a decade ago; however the wide audience of the internet has provided Sanchez with the opportunity to become an international icon protected by her network of concerned followers. This month, Yoani Sanchez and other activists were arrested for gathering at a police station in Havana to inquire about a fellow dissident who had criticized the Castro regime online.  Her linked twitter accounts, facebook profile and blogs are updated constantly and thus serve to bolster her political identity. This ensures that her political message is accessible to the masses in real-time. For example, Sanchez’s blog Generation Y and the social media accounts of her fellow activists serve to challenge the authoritarian government’s hold on information flow. In fact, the Cuban regime is said to be backing “el blog de Yohandry,” a pro-government blog, to oppose Sanchez’s more popular site. This may be only the beginning of a deepening Internet propaganda war as governments engage activists on the social media front.

Nevertheless, some accuse social media tactics of diluting political activism. Author Malcolm Gladwell argues that activism online does not necessarily translate into engagement and physical participation.  He argues that social media activism has led to broader and weaker political movements wherein participants do not make the personal bonds necessary to carry out the political movements in high-risk environments. Other theorists insist that online engagement is limited by “slacktivism.”  In other words, the dissemination of information is not enough and online engagement detracts from participation in political movements; social media can serve as a political release valve.  However, other experts argue that online engagement is often a “gateway drug” for participation in activist movements.  Therefore, they end up with more participants than they would have if they hadn’t leveraged their social media network. Social media’s role in today’s activist movements should not be devalued.

Today’s most successful activists leverage social media in a digital geopolitical environment. Political activists depend on social media as a tactic to upset their political opponents. This is especially effective against authoritarian regimes, which depend on being able to manipulate the control of information flow. Sanchez and Saad are examples of a 21st-century breed of dissidents who utilize the online frontier as the equalizing force to counter the weight of the political elites in their countries. These activists engage a wide base of supporters to form a multi-faceted political identity to personify their platform of ideas.

Author: Alex Friedfeld

As Syria continues to be embroiled in conflict, some feel that the rebel Free Syrian Army would be able to defeat Assad and end a bloody stalemate if only the rebels had more powerful weaponry.  America’s current policy is to not supply the Syrian rebels with weapons.  Instead, the United States assists its Arab allies to distribute light weapons such as rifles and grenades.  Several prominent American politicians, including former presidential candidate Mitt Romney and Senator John McCain, have called for the United States to supply the Syrian rebels with advanced arms and ammunition.  Those who agree with this view maintain that providing arms would avert a humanitarian crisis, limit the spread of extremism, and contain the spread of violence.   However, I believe that supplying such arms would exacerbate the spreading conflict and increase its human toll, and that it would not necessarily make the new regime more amenable to US interests.

The rebel opposition is not a unified entity.  It consists of many militias along with foreign fighters from Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon.   These rebel militias compete for arms and resources and as more foreign fighters join the fray, imported weapons are more likely to end up in the wrong hands.  Though these militias share a desire to remove Assad from power, groups have rival visions of a post-Assad Syria.  More secular groups, such as the Ghouta Revolutionaries brigade, advocate for a more liberal society; others, like the Liwa al-Islam, argue for a society based in a conservative interpretation of the Sharia.

The United States does provide limited support to the Syrian rebels through Saudi Arabia and Qatar.  However, the New York Times reports that most of the arms shipped into Syria by Saudi Arabia and Qatar have ended up in the hands of conservative foreign jihadists and not in the control of more secular groups.  These jihadists obstruct the path to peace in Syria.  They are not interested in forming a strong Syrian state.  Instead, they perceive the crisis through a Shi’ite versus Sunni perspective.  American officials are concerned that if Assad is ousted and there ensued a new battle for control, the hard-line Islamic soldiers would be the best armed.

Furthermore, if the United States increases its support to Syria then this could encourage Russia and Iran – who are both currently aiding the Assad regime – to expand their assistance.  This could create an arms race that would only multiply casualties and increase destruction without bringing the conflict closer to resolution.

Finally, even if the United States provides arms, the emerging Syrian government would not be more likely to remain loyal to America.  The United States has been involved in conflicts – including the Soviet war in Afghanistan – where supplying weapons did not result in a pro-American government.  In several cases, the weapons were eventually turned against the United States.  American officials have expressed concern that anti-Western militias in Syria could do the same.

The United States has other options available to encourage a new Syrian state to cooperate with America.  As Dalia Dassa Kaye notes in the Los Angeles Times, in the event of a rebel victory the United States is in a unique position to become Syria’s most important aid provider because Iran and Russia have both firmly supported the Assad regime.  Once the conflict is over, America could use this financial aid to garner some influence in the formation of the new Syrian regime without needing to supply advanced weapons.

If the United States decides to provide advanced military assistance to the Syrian rebels, it would increase the scope and efficiency of the violence without affecting the duration of the conflict.  America should continue its current arms policy towards Syria and focus its efforts on using its diplomatic power to form a coalition in search of a political solution.

Date: October 31, 2012

Category: Political, Social

Actors: Ennahda, National Constituent Assembly, Tunisian Security Forces

In 2011 elections, Tunisians empowered the moderate Islamist party Ennahda, which won control of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) with a 37% plurality of votes.  Although Ennahda has pledged to protect women’s rights, activists worry that its core (rural, conservative) constituency may support an erosion of the extensive freedoms to which Tunisian women have been entitled since shortly after the country’s independence.  Although there has been little direct indication that the governing body intends to use its legislative power to roll back the rights of Tunisian women, recent violence and increasing hostility against women in Tunisia suggest that women’s status in the country may be in jeopardy.

Women’s rights have been protected since the 2011 Jasmine Revolution by acts such as the April 2011 gender parity decree-law, which required political parties to nominate equal numbers of male and female candidates for the first NCA elections.  More recently, women’s equal status was upheld in Article 22 of the draft constitution recently proposed by the NCA, which states that all citizens of Tunisia hold the same rights and duties before the law. However, Article 28 of the same draft has come under scrutiny for its alleged denigration of women’s status.  English translations of Article 28 state that a woman’s role is “complementary” to that of a man, although analyses have explained that given the context of the article and Ennahda’s view of citizenship (which focuses on the family and the community), this is a mistranslation.  These analyses propose that Western organizations’ criticisms of this mistranslation stem from a willful prejudgement of the NCA’s (and by extension Ennahda’s) intentions.

However, Tunisians (men and women) have also protested the language of Article 28, presumably based on the original Arabic. Whether or not those protestors misinterpret the NCA’s intention in Article 28, they remain afraid that Ennahda (despite its promises) will facilitate an erosion of Tunisian women’s rights.  These fears are not without merit: while the party has stated to its more secular and progressive supporters in urban centers that it would uphold the country’s historically progressive civil rights, it has employed very different speech in appealing to its (largely rural) conservative base. An example is Ennahda’s conflicting rhetoric on a law proposed in 2011 that would have provided special protections for single mothers and their children. While Ennahda officials such as Ali al-Areed were pledging to protect both single and married mothers, other members of the party such as Souad Abdul Rahim decried the law as protecting behavior that was “unbecoming of Muslim women.” Another result of Ennahda’s ambiguous position on women’s rights has been a flourishing of anti-woman rhetoric from hard-line conservatives, who had neither the platform nor the legitimacy to do so during the former regime but who are now emboldened by the popular support for the ostensibly Islamist Ennahda.

There have also been instances of anti-woman violence that some groups are attributing to the Ennahda government.  The most recent is a controversial rape case involving three members of the security forces.  While police use of sexual intimidation is not a new phenomenon in Tunisia, the case is of note because – after being arrested and charged with rape – the police officers who allegedly raped the victim and attempted to extort her fiancé charged the alleged victim with indecency for having been found alone in her car with her fiancé. The indecency trial has sparked outrage amongst Tunisians and resulted in anti-judiciary rallies, but the Tunisian Justice Ministry has sustained its decision to pursue the charges.  According to Tunisian women’s rights activists, these events fit a broader trend of police harassment of women that has been forming since Ennahda came to power.  The lawyer for the victim has claimed that Ennahda’s contradictory rhetoric on the place of women in society is responsible for an environment that encourages such harassment.

Ennahda’s inability to take a strong stance on this issue, and the resultant contribution to the spread of extremism and violence in Tunisia, is part of a larger pattern of poor governance. As noted in a recent GSM blog, the Ennahda-led government has been heavily criticized by Tunisians for returning to the cronyism and poor governance that characterized the previous regime. A November 2011 poll by the influential website Nawaat is particularly illustrative of this dissatisfaction.  Respondents were asked what they thought the October 2011 NCA elections signified for Tunisia. A plurality (28%) of respondents answered, “One must not forget that 63% of voters said ‘no’ to Ennahda,” and only 16% of respondents said that bringing Ennahda to power was “a good thing for the country.”

Ennahda’s failure to lead decisively on the issue of women’s rights and the resulting unrest represent the proverbial canary in a coal mine. Where minority rights are threatened, threats to more universal rights are more likely to follow, and the government’s inability to rein in these threats portend further unrest and violence in Tunisia. Popular unrest in the birthplace of the Arab Spring would have far-reaching consequences in the Arab world, and would thus threaten United States security interests in the region.

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Raul Castro announced that Cuban citizens—excluding some professionals—will no longer have to apply for exit permits and will not need letters of invitation to travel abroad. This policy takes effect January 14th of 2013. Known locally as “a white card,” the permits cost $150, which is more than the average Cuban makes in 7 months. Raul Castro’s new policy is the latest move in a trend toward liberalization; yet, in many ways the policy is more symbolic than practical. The Cuban regime depends on public perception of its leaders as capable revolutionaries. Thus, Castro’s new exit permit policy serves as a display of control and a statement of Cuban sovereignty in the face of the memory of its manipulation at the hand of two superpowers during the Cold War. However, the 50th anniversary of the missile crisis should remind US and Cuban leaders that it is time to move past this bitterness and embrace more drastic changes.

U.S.-Cuban relations in the 1960’s was characterized by distrust and resentment in the context of ideological differences (Democracy-Communism) and conflicting loyalties (U.S.-Russia). In November of 1962, Fidel Castro escorted Russian diplomat Mikoyan to a crocodile farm near the Bay of Pigs. “As [Castro] fed fish to the crocodiles, he lectured Mikoyan and compared Cuba to a little fish, while the two large crocodiles were comparable, he said, to the U.S. and the USSR.  According to Castro, the relevant question was: which crocodile would devour the fish?” (James G. Blight 21) This resentment felt by members of Cuba’s old guard against countries manipulating its national sovereignty still stains US-Cuban decision making. However, sentiments have shifted after half a century.  Cubans want to leave their country for economic and academic reasons. The government and its citizens no longer view individuals desiring to leave as traitors.

Recent advances in U.S. policy towards Cuba reflect this positive change in sentiment.  In the last four years, the U.S has eased the restrictions on the amount of remittances Cuban Americans can send to their relatives as well as the amount of times Cuban Americans can visit their Cuban relatives.  However, one can question the sincerity of Castro’s new travel policy because the reform falls short of its claim to ease regulations and costs of travel abroad for its citizens.

Famous Cuban activists like Yoani Sanchez, view the policy change as hollow and fruitless.  “The Devil’s in the details” she says, referring to the stipulations that medical and military “human capital” and political dissidents are still restricted from leaving the Island. Furthermore, the policy shifts the burden of regulation from the cost and time spent acquiring the exit visas to the increasing cost and difficulty of acquiring a Cuban passport. Cuban passports have nearly doubled in price to $110.

Senator Marco Rubio of Florida called Castro’s new travel policy a “bait and switch” distraction.  When considered against a backdrop of frozen U.S.-Cuban politics, this policy is liberal; however, to Cuban Americans like Rubio, it’s not good enough. He points out that the Castro regime continues to have control over who exits the country through mechanisms such as passport issuance. Thus the change, if anything, symbolizes the slow rate of progress towards liberalization.

This year also marked the 50th anniversary of the U.S. trade embargo with Cuba. The goal of the trade embargo against Cuba was to destabilize the Castro regime.  Fifty years later, the embargo still fails to achieve any advances toward this cause.  Sanctions and travel restrictions are antiquated tactics, and are seen as tools of oppression that put the economic burden on the Cuban people. Next year, the U.S is bound to receive a wave of the visitor visa applications allowed by the new travel policy.  It will force the White House to reconsider both the “wet foot-dry foot” policy that provides a track to citizenship for Cubans that reach American soil, and the ban on U.S. citizen’s travel to Cuba.  This represents a great political opportunity to define a strategy for US.-Cuba relations.

Raul Castro should not let decades of political stubbornness continue to manifest itself in insubstantial policies like the travel ban.  If Castro wants to assert his national sovereignty, he’s going to have to pursue more drastic reforms such as press freedom and national elections. The 50th anniversary of the Missile Crisis and the trade embargo should serve as a reminder that political grudges still stand in the way of mutually beneficial progress. It is time to reconsider the economic and political relationship the US and Cuba.

Author: Anne Hobson
Date:  15 October, 2012
Category: Political, Military
Actors: United States, Yemen, AQAP

As the United States enters the twelfth year of the War on Terror, the counterterrorism effort has challenged the premises of international law. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) armed with Hellfire missiles with targeting capabilities have replaced special forces and manned aircraft as the U.S. tactic of choice against militants. According to the American Security Project, the U.S. military operates UAVs in declared combat zones—Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya—while the CIA operates covert UAV programs in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.  These programs raise concerns about oversight, international human rights, and international laws governing warfare. If the White House doesn’t address concerns regarding the most recent UAV attacks in Yemen, the U.S. risks setting a dangerous precedent for UAV warfare worldwide.

The Long War Journal estimates that the U.S. has carried out three times as many strikes this year as it has in previous years against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.  The increase of covert UAV activity in Yemen raises many important questions: How are the targets decided? Who authorizes the strikes? Are the strikes legal?

John Brennan, the White House counterterrorism adviser, argued that UAV warfare is legally justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter and militarily advantageous because it is low cost and limits casualties on both sides. He argues that capturing insurgents is impossible due to AQAP’s asymmetric tactics and Yemen’s difficult terrain. The U.S. military contends that UAV warfare is a moral necessity. UAVs are more precise and efficient than military alternatives like bombs, air strikes and ground troops.  In April John Brennan stated: “there is nothing in international law that bans the use of remotely piloted aircraft, or that prohibits us from using lethal force against our enemies outside of an active battlefield, at least when the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action against the threat.”

However, scholars argue that international law needs to be updated because UAVs, like gunpowder in the 1500’s, and military aircraft in the early 1900’s,  have changed the face of warfare. In 2001 the U.S. had less than 100 UAVs: now it has over 7,000. In April, the White House approved a policy to allow “signature strikes” in Yemen. Before this policy, viable targets were limited to individuals on “kill lists.”  Now any military-age males in the proximity of targets can be considered combatants. Critics of the policy argue that broadening the rules of engagement to include signature strikes justifies what would have previously been considered extrajudicial murders or war crimes.

Last week,Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi admitted that he signs off on UAV strikes committed by the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command and the CIA. The UAV strikes are a source of political contention for President Hadi. His political opponents criticize his complicity in U.S. UAV strikes. A September airstrike missed its target and hit a minibus in the town of Rada’a resulting in thirteen civilian casualties. When family members tried to lay the bodies of victims in front of interim President Hadi’s house, security forces sent them away. Given the public’s enraged response to covert UAV warfare in Pakistan, it is likely that Yemen will press for government accountability in the form of protests of increasing violence.

Protests mark the  beginning of political and social blowback from the secret war in Yemen.  The American Security Project insists that this is only the beginning of a deepening trend towards anti-Americanism. Another unintended consequence of U.S. covert actions in Yemen is the psychological effects UAV presence is having on the civilian population in Yemen. Two University professors argued that the U.S. is fighting terrorism with terrorism by intimidating civilians, “striking a blow against a powerful adversary, [and] evading punishment.” There are no checks and balances defined in international law about UAV usage in undeclared war zones.

Limiting the CIA to UAV-use for surveillance and transferring CIA armed UAV campaigns to U.S. military control would fix the problem of government accountability. The U.S. needs to allow for disclosure of congressional oversight to a degree that does not put intelligence operations at risk. Lastly, the U.S. needs to establish international “rule of the skies” to promote individual liberties and human rights. The Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International released a Drone Industry Ethics Code that insists on a framework for UAV testing and educating the public. These advancements need to be extended into an international standard.

Author: Alex Friedfeld

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The recent protests at US embassies in over twenty countries were widely attributed to anger against the inflammatory film “Innocence of Muslims.” While many protesters specifically stated that the video had incited them to protest, news outlets, attributing these protests to so-called “Muslim rage” over a derogatory film, are both erroneous and negligent of the larger societal issues that led thousands of Muslim youths to join in the protests. In her recent GSM article, Anne Hobson discussed the political and social grievances in Yemen underlying the protests at the US embassy in Sana’a. In this article, I will discuss the societal factors behind violent protests in Tunisia and Egypt, two countries at the heart of the 2011 Arab Spring. While evidence shows that these protests did not begin organically within the populations of Cairo and Tunis, widespread grievances over governance in Egypt and Tunisia did sustain them.

Before one can identify the social grievances that led some Tunisians and Egyptians to join in the protests, it is imperative to understand how these protests began. Egyptian Salafis manufactured protests, looking to arouse political violence against the US and challenge the US-allied Egyptian government. “Innocence of Muslims” was first introduced into the public consciousness in Egypt by Islamist newscaster Khaled Abdallah, who broadcast the the film’s trailer dubbed in Arabic on September 9, on the Salafi-supported television channel Al-Nas. A few hundred Salafis, who had reportedly been planning to protest at the US embassy on September 11 since before the video was broadcast, led the initial protests. Eventually, they were joined by approximately 1,700 others, mostly young men. Similarly, in Tunisia 300 hard-line Salafis led 1,000 protesters, again mostly young men, in an attack on the US embassy in Tunis.

One must note the limited scope of these protests: very few people in each city protested at the US embassies, as compared to the much greater popular support for the 2011 Arab Spring protests in these two countries. These two events clearly differ in scope, but the Arab Spring protests and the recent protests at US embassies in Tunisia and Egypt share a striking similarity: popular support and participation were driven by public dissatisfaction with governmental actions. We have heard the hypothesis that dissatisfaction with local governments resulted in the limited popular support for these recent protests from Arab government officials themselves, but this hypothesis is most compellingly shown by the correlation between these protests and anti-government unrest in recent months.

In Egypt, relations have been tense between the Egyptian populace and Egyptian security forces since Hosni Mubarak’s ouster. In a manifestation of this tension, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) dissolved the democratically elected (and moderate Islamist-dominated) parliament this past June. Also, in the past months Islamist extremist groups have launched a campaign of increasing violence against the secular Egyptian security forces. While Morsi has taken (largely popular) actions to check the SCAF’s power, his reactions to the US embassy protests indicate that he still walks a fine line by attempting to appease both the Egyptian people and his Western allies. Most recently, the Egyptian parliament has begun drafting a security bill that is reminiscent of Mubarak-era security laws in its repressiveness; the bill would give the interior ministry wide discretion to place citizens under arrest and detain them for an indefinite period of time.

Tunisians are even more disillusioned with their newly elected government, which is dominated by the moderate Islamist Ennahda party.  They have demonstrated visible unrest in reaction to the government’s regressive tactics and cronyism. In the central-western city of Kasserine, citizens have rioted, calling for the Ennahda-allied governor to step down for failing to provide the promised support for the families of victims of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. In the capital city of Tunis, protesters have accused Ennahda of repressing critics under the guise of eliminating elements of the old Ben Ali regime. These claims of repression are supported by the fact that the Ennahda-led government has not lifted the state of emergency under which Tunisia has remained since the revolution. Furthermore, Tunisia’s government is facing a debt crisis that has led it to pass a highly unpopular increase in oil prices, and will likely cause future anti-government discord in the country.

The recent protests in Egypt and Tunisia did not evolve organically from popular anger over an offensive video, nor were they particularly representative of pervasive anti-American rage in these two countries. However, that they garnered even some popular support is noteworthy. Given that these protests correspond with rising tensions in these countries and repressive tactics on the part of their new governments, we as observers should take pause at the state of democratic development in the birthplace of the Arab Spring.

Author: Alex Friedfeld

Reporters continue to blame the film Innocence of Muslims for the continuing protests in the Middle East. Because of the anti-Islam message of the film, religious intolerance has reentered international news dialogue. Rather than continuing to view the protest in Yemen as a consequence of the film and its religious message, it is important to consider social, economic and political conditions facing the protesters.  The violence suggests a deeper discontent, and indicates the involvement of extremists and political groups who benefit from unrest and media attention. I will evaluate the Thursday, September 13th protest at the U.S. embassy in Yemen to identify the real causes of the Middle East protests.

Analyzing the protests through a lens of religious and cultural intolerance is a shortsighted approach to a complex issue. Articles like Fouad Ajami’s “Why is the Arab World so Easily Offended?” characterize the message of the film as “anti-Islam,” and characterize the resulting violence as “anti-American.” A focus on religious and cultural animosity ignores the political or socioeconomic concerns motivating Yemeni protesters. Yemenis face economic decline, unemployment, extreme poverty, as well as a lack of government accountability.

Who benefits from these protests? The answer is simple: extremists and political parties who thrive in an anarchic environment. A leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen broadcast a sermon praising the embassy attacks in Egypt and Libya.  Al Qaeda in Yemen (AQAP) encouraged followers to kill other American diplomats in the Muslim world.  AQAP aims to replace the Yemeni government with an Islamic Caliphate. These groups seek to disrupt the status quo with appeals to violence.

These protests also reveal the willingness of President Hadi’s political opponents—ex-president Saleh and his followers, as well as Islamist groups—to promote violence for the purpose of distracting President Hadi from addressing socioeconomic concerns.  His opponents achieve this by accusing the Yemeni government of being weak and corrupted by U.S. and Saudi economic and military assistance.  AQAP and its affiliates openly decry Hadi’s government to advance their own political goals.

Political competition remains a source of strife. Anticipating the demonstrations last Thursday, Yemeni President Hadi sent the Central Security Forces to control the protesters. However, displaying loyalty to a relative of the former president Saleh, they stood by and watched as the protest turned into a riot. Yemenis bashed in the windows, destroyed the gate of the embassy and set fire to vehicles.  Video of the protest displayed one of the CSF forces greeting a protester with an embrace. The event exposed political tensions among groups still competing for power. President Hadi is part of the General People’s Congress (GPC).  GPC supporters are currently divided with the majority in favor of President Hadi and others in favor to ex-President and authoritarian ruler Ali Abdullah Saleh. The GPC is traditionally opposed by the Joint Meetings Party (JMP) made up of tribal elements from Northern Yemen, Islamist group Al-Islah, and several smaller Socialist parties.

The protests are motivated by the diverse socioeconomic and political grievances of Muslims across the Middle East.  The modern world is characterized by increasing ease and access to communication. Nothing short of a policy of media isolationism will prevent the distribution of similar publications disrespectful to Islam.   Last month, a popular Ramadan drama depicted the Prophet’s companions in a sexual manner.  Yesterday, a French magazine surfaced containing illustrations mocking Muhammad.  Blocking the film or censoring websites is only a short-term solution to a long-term and deeply engraved set of grievances. Yemen needs a strategy to address political and religious instability as well as social anxiety. This strategy will seek to unify the GPC with nationalist appeals and extend aid to alienated citizens in the far Northern provinces.

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On September 11, US Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens was killed in an attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, a tragedy which reveals the state of terrorist activity within Libya and suggests flaws in US diplomatic policy in that country. Initial reports implied that Ambassador Stevens’ death resulted from protests over an inflammatory movie that sparked earlier protests in Egypt. However, more recent reports have suggested that the rocket-powered grenade attack that resulted in the death of Ambassador Stevens and three other State Department employees was in fact a calculated attack against the United States, using the popular protest as a cover. Two main pieces of evidence suggest that this attack was premeditated: the advanced weaponry used in the attack and the fact that there were apparently two separate, coordinated attacks. Whether or not a militant group did commit a premeditated attack against the US consulate, the State Department must rethink its approach to diplomatic involvement in Libya.

While the FBI has launched an investigation into the identity of the militants behind the attack, at this juncture the sheer fact that this may have been a deliberate attack is significant. This assault on the US consulate signifies the risk of unchecked extremism in Libya’s eastern territory. After the revolution, extremist groups, freed from the Qaddhafi government’s repression, have reportedly settled in eastern Libya, near Benghazi, in an attempt to use Libya’s political vacuum as a platform for jihadist movements. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism has identified thirteen terrorist organizations operating (at least in part) out of Libya.  Yet extremist groups have not succeeded in influencing Libyan culture, as shown by protests in Benghazi and Tripoli against the killing of Ambassador Stevens.

A recent Global Security Monitor article explained the danger of treating Libya as a “resolved case” in the absence of strong governance.  This attack can be seen as a consequence of that complacency. The US was hasty in establishing a diplomatic mission in a country whose government is not considered fully legitimate throughout the country and is unable to check the activities of militant groups. Furthermore, as it has in the past, the State Department failed to provide adequate security for a consulate in a highly volatile territory.

Moving forward, the US and Libya have a difficult task in determining the right course of action, though both Libya and the United States have made strides towards ameliorating the situation.  The State Department is increasing security for the US facilities in Benghazi, and the National Congress of Libya is officially electing a new Prime Minister. The United States will need to aid the nascent Libyan government in establishing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and reinforcing its legitimacy in the eyes of the Libyan people. The US cannot pull back its diplomatic mission from Libya at a time when public diplomacy between Libya and the US is crucial for the continued strengthening of relations between the US and the Arab world; to pull back our diplomatic mission would seriously damage the strides that we have made made in strengthening these relations. However, the US must also recognize the real threat of extremist violence coming from Libya’s provinces, and cease overestimating the success of Libya’s popular revolution in establishing a peaceful and stable democratic country. As an important first step in achieving this goal, both the Department of Defense and the State Department have proposed millions of dollars in counterterrorism aid for Libya, which would be used to help build up the Libyan counterterrorism infrastructure. If approved, this aid package will contribute to eradicating extremist violence in Libya and to establishing the legitimacy of the Libyan government. It is imperative that this aid be approved, in order to help build a strong democracy in Libya and ensure the safety of Americans working there.