

# Deceptive by Design: The AI-Enabled Tools Fueling the Scam Industry

# Acknowledgments

## About C4ADS

C4ADS ([www.c4ads.org](http://www.c4ads.org)) is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization dedicated to data-driven analysis and evidence-based reporting of conflict and security issues worldwide. Our approach leverages nontraditional investigative techniques and emerging analytical technologies. We recognize the value of working on the ground, capturing local knowledge, and collecting original data to inform our analysis. At the same time, we employ cutting-edge technology to manage and analyze that data. The result is an innovative analytical approach to conflict prevention and mitigation.

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## About the Author

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## Executive Summary

Transnational criminal organizations operating scam compounds across Southeast Asia are leveraging artificial intelligence (AI)-powered tools to expand the scale and sophistication of their cybercrime operations. An ecosystem of opaque companies has integrated leading AI models—including ChatGPT, Gemini, and Claude—into software designed to enhance scam operations and circumvent platform restrictions. As reported losses to fraud in the United States more than doubled from US\$5.9 billion to US\$12.5 billion between 2021 and 2024, understanding how AI enables the scam industry has become critical for policymakers, law enforcement, and technology companies.

For this report, C4ADS worked with Associated Press reporter Erika Kinetz to investigate the misuse of AI in Southeast Asian scam compounds. Through interviews with scammers based in Myanmar and the Philippines, C4ADS examined two sets of AI-powered tools they used: the 007TG suite and KT Smart Translation. Analyzing these tools’ source code, corporate networks, and marketing operations, C4ADS found that:

- **AI tools enable scammers to operate globally and at scale:** KT Smart Translation integrates four large language model-powered translation services covering over 100 languages, while 007TG’s SCRM Champion allows users to manage communications across 15 platforms with AI-generated automated replies and lead management systems that enable scammers to track targets and pass victims from one scammer to another.
- **Sophisticated AI chatbots likely help scammers deceive targets:** KT integrated a GPT-4-powered roleplay chatbot that users can feed with specific industry knowledge, which may allow scammers of varying educational backgrounds to assume highly technical roles and develop convincing characters as they interact with targets.
- **AI-powered monitoring tools can control a workforce of trafficking victims:** 007TG’s CloudSeven integrates over 20 American-, French-, and Chinese-developed AI models to generate data reports analyzing employee behavior, with sentiment analysis tracking emotional shifts in target responses, likely to assess whether the scammers are meeting their quotas.
- **Opaque corporate networks and marketing operations target criminals:** The 007TG Suite was likely operated by Singapore-based company HiSeven Pte., Ltd., while KT’s ownership remains largely hidden with no registered entity matching its claimed incorporation. These companies marketed their tools extensively on Telegram, accepted cryptocurrency payments via platforms favored by organized crime (such as Tron), and featured capabilities that specifically allow for deception and identity obfuscation.


The report provides recommendations for policymakers, law enforcement, and the technology industry to address AI misuse within the cyber scam ecosystem and its implications for AI governance.

## Introduction

Emerging technologies allow criminal networks to expand the reach and efficiency of their activities. Criminal actors are increasingly weaponizing “dual-use artificial intelligence (AI)” –technologies with legitimate civilian use and potential military or malign applications—for cybercrime.<sup>1</sup> Across Southeast Asia, and rapidly expanding globally, transnational criminal organizations run compounds housing hundreds of thousands of scammers who defraud victims worldwide. These compounds serve as a nexus of illicit activity in which corruption, human trafficking, and cybercrime converge with AI-powered tools fueling the multibillion-dollar global scam industry.<sup>2</sup>

Workers in scam compounds—some voluntary, many of them victims of human trafficking—rely on emerging technologies to augment their effectiveness, including deepfakes, machine translation, screen monitoring, mass messaging, and other automation tools. Many of these technologies are created and marketed by opaque companies straddling licit and illicit spaces, often advertising on public messaging platforms like Telegram to sell their products. These companies’ products have enabled scammers to access and abuse AI, increasingly exposing people to scamming and human trafficking risks. Publicly available information provides some insights into the tools scammers use, suggesting how the scams themselves—and criminals’ methods—may evolve into the future.

AI encompasses technologies that facilitate tasks associated with human intelligence, such as problem solving, decision making, and communication. It increasingly underlies consumer products and global infrastructure. In the United States alone, AI use has doubled in the last two years. The scam industry is no different.<sup>3</sup> AI’s proliferation coincides with increasing reports of fraud worldwide. Reported losses to fraud in the United States have more than doubled between 2021 and 2024 from US\$5.9 billion to US\$12.5 billion.<sup>4</sup> According to the Federal Trade




Commission, AI technologies are primed to “turbocharge” criminal enterprises;<sup>5</sup> the existence of these tools and the competitive nature of the scam industry suggest that many scam center operations are adopting them to stay ahead.

To investigate this issue further, C4ADS worked with the Associated Press (AP) to identify specific AI tools used in Southeast Asian scam centers. This report focuses on two sets of AI-powered tools used in Myanmar- and Philippines-based scam compounds: the 007TG suite and KT Smart Translation. It analyzes how these tools integrate leading AI models into their products, enabling real-time translation, automated communications, roleplay support, and workforce monitoring. The report also maps the corporate networks behind these tools, revealing how opaque, transnational entities develop and market these tools for likely criminal misuse.

Corporate data obfuscation, extensive marketing operations on Telegram, and product features suggest that developers may be designing these tools to deliberately target scammers. They likely exist as part of a broader underground economy providing scammers and criminal groups with the tools they need—including cyber infrastructure, SIM cards, anonymized payment channels, and more—to defraud individuals worldwide. Law enforcement authorities in China, the United States, and other countries have increasingly scrutinized this ecosystem. China’s Ministry of Public Security, for example, has proposed a Network Crime Prevention and Control Law targeting infrastructure providers supporting the cybercrime economy, indicating growing awareness of the breadth of this ecosystem.<sup>6</sup> Recent enforcement actions against scam industry facilitators, including scam boss Chen Zhi’s extradition from Cambodia to China, point to preliminary progress.<sup>7</sup> However, public knowledge of this ecosystem remains limited. This report highlights instances of AI misuse within the cyberscam ecosystem and its implications for AI governance.<sup>8</sup> It also provides a set of recommendations for policymakers, law enforcement, and tech industry stakeholders to address these issues.

## AI-Enabled Scam Tools

### AI Toolset Logos



Scammers leverage a variety of tools to more easily communicate with and deceive targets, while overseers use additional tools to monitor their workforce. Based on interviews with scammers in compounds located in Myanmar and the Philippines, this report focuses on two sets of these tools: the 007TG tools suite and KT Smart Translation. The entities behind these tools marketed their products as *chuhai* (出海, literally “go overseas”) applications, designed to help Chinese entrepreneurs set up companies and market products abroad.<sup>9</sup> Scam compounds, overwhelmingly run by Chinese organized criminal syndicates, represent fitting markets for such products.<sup>10</sup> Both KT and 007TG used Telegram as their primary marketplace—a platform that has become the preferred venue for criminal groups to set up channels and groups to advertise services and connect with clients.<sup>11</sup>

### The 007TG Suite

The 007TG suite is a software suite that Philippines-based scammers have used to optimize their operations. Provided by the now-defunct 007TG (also known as Global Social Traffic Navigation or 全球社交流量导航), the suite is a collection of products designed to enhance users’ ability to obfuscate their online identity.<sup>12</sup> Its product recommendations list consists of 13 products, including 007TG-developed tools as well as those developed by its affiliates.

Together, these tools provide two main services: scaling the user’s online presence and obfuscating the means of doing so. These tools enable users to market their products to large audiences, automate communications with targets, and set up batch social media accounts while circumventing platform restrictions. They also provide services such as generating randomized phone numbers that enable virtual card purchases for deposits and money transfers, as well as facilitating cryptocurrency payment options. By leveraging these tools together, a user can develop a massive social media presence and collect extensive information about their targets while concealing their true identity.



1. SCRM champion is an all-in-one tool that “combines marketing, customer relationship management, and customer service.” It aggregates social media platforms including WhatsApp, LINE, Telegram, Facebook Messenger, LINE Business, and Instagram in order to serve as a cross-border private traffic management tool. It is based in Malaysia and affiliated with HiSeven, which is introduced in the following section. While its contact information on the English page links to a HiSeven email, info@hiseven.com, its Chinese page includes a different contact email, support@scrmchampion.com. It also includes a link to a 007TG-affiliated Telegram bot to submit product-related complaints.
2. ElfProxy is an IP service provider, with its offerings including dynamic IP pools, static IPs, and mobile proxies. The platform’s page on the 007TG website specifies its value for data scraping, cross-border e-commerce, and managing social media accounts. The platform’s website specifies it works in 200+ jurisdictions, with the notable exception of Mainland China.
3. Promo Picasso is a customer acquisition and marketing platform that provides a centralized account management system and bulk messaging options, allowing users to simultaneously manage accounts across different social media platforms and send messages by batch with one click. Promo Picasso also allows users to locate their target audience and isolate each account with a separate IP address to reduce the risk of getting banned or blocked.
4. CloudSeven (also known as Cloud007) is a platform that allows employers to remotely monitor employees’ desktops and analyze their behaviors via AI-generated data reports. It also allows them to record employees’ working hours and commuting time automatically. The platform is able to generate random screenshots of employees’ desktops and use them to power its analysis.

5. iMX System is a WhatsApp-based lead-generation and customer-acquisition application. Currently, iMX System has five features: account nurturing, lead generation, customer support, account management, and employee management. iMX System’s customer support includes targeted multi-account marketing, real-time AI-assisted translation, permanent data transfers from banned accounts, and automated replies. Account management includes managing accounts in bulk on a single platform, tagging accounts, and utilizing IPs to hide online identities; while employee management includes permission management, employee monitoring, and tracing customer support data.
6. WorkGram is Telegram-based marketing and customer acquisition software, which allows users to manage multiple Telegram accounts simultaneously, send messages to multiple groups with one-click, send automated real-time replies, and perform AI-assisted real-time translation.
7. EchoData is a data screening software designed to screen numbers across platforms, particularly WhatsApp and Telegram (though it emphasizes it can screen services on different platforms in more than 200 jurisdictions, explicitly bringing up its capacity to work in niche locales). It also allows users to generate randomized phone numbers across 200+ jurisdictions. Furthermore, EchoData can easily integrate with other 007TG products, allowing for data exchange across the platforms.
8. CtrlFire is an automated customer acquisition tool that operates on X. It can automatically operate multiple X accounts to engage in operations, product promotions, customer service, and customer screenings to enhance a client’s operational efficiency. While its Chinese page heavily emphasizes its use on X, its English page appears to advertise a different product entirely. The English language product is a fingerprint-based platform that helps users with multi-account management, using fingerprint simulation technology to prevent platform detection.
9. SkyPoly is an operational tool designed specifically for Telegram and specializing in group marketing and channel management. This includes allowing users to manage communities, aggregate messages from multiple accounts and reply in a unified way, assign customer service duties, and monitor various chats. It also provides a statistical analysis feature which users can use to analyze trends pertaining to Telegram group member data, channel followers, topic trackers, and so on.
10. Tiger SMS is a 007TG-affiliated platform on which users can purchase virtual phone numbers for registering accounts across various online platforms, both Western and Chinese. It emphasizes that its software automatically manages the process of sending and receiving text messages in order to “[make] earning money with text messages simple and efficient.”
11. e.PN is a 007TG-affiliated service which issues multiple virtual payment cards for a user at once without restrictions or blocks, facilitating deposits and money transfers. Each card comes with a service rate determined by the card type. The service is a trading name of Digital Waves Ltd., a Seychelles-based company. The site additionally states that “all services are provided outside the country (Japan),” implying its main seat of operations is somewhere in the country.
12. SMSBower is a 007TG-affiliated virtual and temporary phone number service platform. It specializes in helping users monetize their SIM cards, acting as a digital marketplace where they can both purchase SMS activations and rent numbers while also selling their own SMS activations.
13. BitSky is a 007TG-affiliated social networking platform designed for blockchain enthusiasts and cryptocurrency users, formerly listed as part of the 007TG tools suite. It uses a blockchain-based credit system that links to users’ digital wallets and assigns them ranks based on their digital behavior (likely their crypto activity) outside of BitSky. Users must link their crypto wallets with BitSky to get ranked. The platform appears to utilize AI as part of an internal content recommendation system and as part of the app’s communications interface, while integrated bots aid users in crypto trading and gathering blockchain-related updates.



# AI Scams in Action

KT and the two 007TG tools C4ADS analyzed—SCRM Champion and CloudSeven—each integrate AI models and market their AI capabilities as ways to boost customer engagement and streamline employee management. Competition between tool developers may amplify the harm these products cause. Scam centers increasingly use AI to stay competitive, incentivizing certain software developers to enhance their products for these users and ultimately escalating the scale and sophistication of cybercrime worldwide. The AI models these tools use demonstrate four broad capabilities.

## Real-Time Translations Enable Scammers to Operate Worldwide

Translation software is a critical tool for scam operations, which employ a labor force from dozens of countries and target victims worldwide. The increasing effectiveness and availability of AI-powered large language models (LLMs) have not only widened the number of targets scammers can reach but have also expanded their potential labor pool.<sup>31</sup> With AI overriding language barriers, scam operators can now recruit workers regardless of their language skills.<sup>32</sup>




KT’s flagship product, KT Smart Translation, integrates four LLM-powered machine translation services (Google Translate, DeepL, ChatGPT, and South Korea’s Papago).<sup>33</sup> These services collectively cover over 100 languages, allowing scammers to communicate with targets nearly anywhere in the world.<sup>34</sup> KT Smart Translation also allows scammers to communicate simultaneously with multiple targets across multiple languages. Chat logs, which are recorded within the platform, can be translated into Chinese at any time using these services, allowing Chinese-speaking overseers to monitor operations.<sup>35</sup>


The 007TG products also integrate AI-enabled translation tools. An anonymous poster (apparently affiliated with 007TG), in a 2024 job posting seeking to hire a freelance engineer to build the SCRM Champion platform, stated that the program should integrate translation APIs “such as ChatGPT, Google, DeepL, Microsoft, iFlytek, Youdao, etc.”<sup>36</sup> These APIs should automatically translate both text and audio messages, with the ability to also “translate image messages into text with one click.”<sup>37</sup> Notably, the posting requested the APIs also allow for reverse translation, likely meaning that communications are translated to a new language and back into the original, presumably to ensure quality, accuracy, and oversight. Prior to sending messages to targets, the posting requested the application allow for texts to be manually sent to “customer service” to ensure accurate translation (who runs the customer service is unspecified).<sup>38</sup>

# Roleplay Tools Enable Scammers to Dupe Victims

In addition to leveraging translation software, scammers have developed sophisticated insights into how to play tailored roles to build trust with their targets. This is particularly relevant for “pig butchering,” a hallmark scam type associated with the Southeast Asian scam industry. In these schemes, scammers build trust with their target over several weeks or months, culminating in convincing them to invest in a fraudulent cryptocurrency fund.<sup>39</sup>

## Roleplay Tool Chatbot





Screenshots of the KT Smart Translation roleplay chatbot reveal expected user interactions, including retained inputs to help users stay in character. The chatbot's system instructions are written in Chinese, indicating it was likely developed by Chinese speakers for a predominantly Chinese-speaking user base.

KT integrated four AI chatbots into its platform, which users can open while logged into their social media accounts. All four chatbots appear to default to replying in Chinese, even when users ask questions in other languages. This indicates Chinese-speaking developers likely built the platform and suggests KT expects its users to be predominantly Chinese speakers. One of these chatbots functions as a roleplay bot that users can feed with specific knowledge about professional industries. The bot retains these inputs over time, suggesting responses that allow the user to reply more skillfully in highly contextual conversations. Powered by OpenAI's GPT-4, this chatbot allows users of varying educational backgrounds to assume highly technical roles and develop characters more easily.<sup>40</sup>

In addition to the roleplay bot, KT includes a GPT-4-powered web search bot that allows users to ask questions without leaving the platform, a bug-reporting bot, and an integrated Gemini AI chatbot.<sup>41</sup> A KT user can easily switch between these four chatbots while communicating with a target. This setup allows scammers to develop tailored roles through the roleplay bot, ask technical questions via the web search and Gemini bots, and report platform issues in real time through the bug-reporting bot.

## Automated Communications Enable Scamming at Scale

Scammers working in forced labor conditions have reportedly faced torture and punishment for failing to meet quotas or refusing to target certain individuals.<sup>42</sup> As scammers seek to reach larger numbers of targets, they use AI tools to send messages across text, social media, and email, with the technology generating realistic language and enabling them to send these messages at scale.<sup>43</sup>

SCRM Champion allows users to send messages across 15 (mostly) social media platforms from the same dashboard, integrating an AI-powered smart assistant bot that creates automated replies and provides suggested follow-up responses.<sup>44</sup> The bot runs on OpenAI and Dify APIs.<sup>45</sup> The OpenAI API allows SCRM Champion direct access to OpenAI's models, while Dify is a platform that lets developers build applications on top of LLMs and simplifies integration with them. Dify provides SCRM Champion with additional capabilities when calling AI models, including the ability to switch between multiple models. Dify enables developers to create managed AI pipelines—automated frameworks that control how data flows through AI models and associated tools to produce final outputs, eliminating the need to code each step manually. Other uses include chaining multiple model calls into a single request and filtering data before it leaves the tool's infrastructure and reaches an AI model API. When AI models are called through the Dify API, they appear in SCRM Champion's API, though SCRM Champion's front-end application is encrypted and limits visibility into which, if any, additional models are called. In essence, the tool combines direct access to OpenAI's models with advanced workflow management capabilities through Dify's integration.

The 2024 posting seeking a freelance engineer to develop SCRM Champion revealed that, in addition to integrating AI and AI-powered translation tool APIs into SCRM Champion's unified messaging system, the company sought to develop a lead management system to allow users to monitor new conversations and friend requests across social media platforms, tracing cases where the target initiates contact with the user, whether through friend requests or conversation invites. According to the posting, 007TG designed SCRM Champion to let users check whether other SCRM Champion users in the same network have previously communicated with the target. Users can also share and export leads for others to review.<sup>46</sup> This process appears to run on AI as well, as SCRM Champion advertises its ability to facilitate automatic transfers and follow-ups with targets.<sup>47</sup> In essence, this system allows scammers to log and track their targets the same way companies track customers, seamlessly monitoring and passing victims from one scammer to another.

## Automated Monitoring Controls a Workforce of Trafficking Victims

Conditions in many scam centers are brutal. Trafficked scammers face long hours and are unable to leave the compounds, with managers monitoring their communications.<sup>48</sup> For the overseers running the compounds, AI-powered software makes monitoring operations more efficient and provides broader visibility into employee performance. As described by 007TG, CloudSeven integrates AI to generate data reports analyzing user behavior and feeds these reports to overseers who remotely monitor employee activity.<sup>49</sup>

CloudSeven has integrated an extensive array of AI models into its software. An analysis of CloudSeven's front-end application data revealed that the platform integrates over 20 American-, French-, and Chinese-developed AI models and LLM providers.<sup>50</sup> The code provides the ability to wrap around each of these models' APIs, meaning CloudSeven can call a given model, send it information, and feed the response back in a format that works between the CloudSeven application and the model it called. Since each model has its strengths and weaknesses, this allows the tool user to leverage the model they find best suited for their task, including choosing specific versions of it (such as Claude 3.7 Sonnet versus Claude 3 Opus). Such tools allow scammers to both customize their workflows and, if they lose access to a platform, easily switch to another. The source code calls a separate executable file that manages CloudSeven's computer monitoring capabilities, but C4ADS could not determine which specific AI models, if any, the monitoring file uses.

SCRM Champion also touts its monitoring capabilities that record interactions and develop performance reports (likely using the Dify and OpenAI APIs), with sentiment analysis tracking emotional shifts in target responses.<sup>51</sup> Sentiment analysis could enable managers to monitor and assess how effectively employees convince their target to interact with them. This could provide overseers with insights into whether scammers are meeting their quotas and successfully defrauding targets.

# Corporate Networks

Mapping the corporate networks of 007TG and KT shows the variety of licit and illicit actors that have contributed to the development of these tools and likely taken steps to obfuscate their global networks. Based on information provided on the companies' websites and in corporate registries, it is possible to identify who operates them, how

## CloudSeven's Source Code

```
6908312 const defaultModelsSettings = [
6908313   // Tencent Hunyuan
6908314   {
6908315     id: "hunyuan-t1-latest",
6908316     name: "Hunyuan T1 Latest",
6908317     temperature: 1,
6908318     contextLength: 26e3,
6908319     maxTokens: 62e3,
6908320     match: ["hunyuan-t1-latest"],
6908321     vision: false,
6908322     functionCall: false,
6908323     reasoning: true
6908324   },
6908325   {
6908326     id: "hunyuan-t1-20250403",
6908327     name: "Hunyuan T1 20250403",
6908328     temperature: 0.7,
6908329     contextLength: 26e3,
6908330     maxTokens: 62e3,
6908331     match: ["hunyuan-t1-20250403"],
6908332     vision: false,
6908333     functionCall: false,
6908334     reasoning: true
6908335   },
6908336   {
6908337     id: "hunyuan-t1-20250321",
6908338     name: "Hunyuan T1 20250321",
6908339     temperature: 0.7,
6908340     contextLength: 26e3,
6908341     maxTokens: 62e3,
6908342     match: ["hunyuan-t1-20250321"],
6908343     vision: false,
6908344     functionCall: false,
6908345     reasoning: true
6908346   },
```

**CloudSeven appears to integrate over 20 AI models and LLM providers, including the following:**

- Azure
- Claude
- DeepSeek
- Doubao
- Fireworks
- Gemini
- Gemma
- Grok
- Llama
- Minimax
- Mistral
- Moonshot
- OpenAI
- Phi
- PPIO
- Qwen
- Silicon Cloud
- Tencent Hunyuan
- Yi
- Zhipu

they develop their products, and what organizations they might engage with. While active, 007TG had substantial public information linking it to a front-facing company. By contrast, KT's ownership remains comparatively obfuscated.

## 007TG

Malaysian national Yam Weng Cheong founded 007TG in 2017. By late 2025, it had expanded to branches in eight countries, though these branches were not publicly disclosed.<sup>52</sup> 007TG was likely one and the same as Singaporean marketing and digital media company HiSeven Pte., Ltd. (stylized as "HiSEVEN"), enabling 007TG to operate under a legitimate, public-facing business that facilitated access to licit business partners while shielding 007TG's operations from public scrutiny.<sup>53</sup> Data from GoDaddy WHOIS Domain Lookup and DomainTools describing domicile information and domain registration data for these entities confirmed shared registrants (Yam Weng Cheong or HiSeven) between associated websites. HiSeven described itself as an information technology company with offices in Singapore, Malaysia, and the United Arab Emirates.<sup>54</sup> HiSeven additionally appeared to operate an office in Hong Kong, though this was not disclosed on its website.<sup>55</sup> No company under the name "007TG" was or is registered in any of these jurisdictions. HiSeven did not appear to publicly disclose its ties to 007TG on its website or social media accounts.

Several HiSeven sites used to operate under 007TG's internet subdomain, but these sites are now defunct, suggesting potential efforts to obfuscate its ties to 007TG. HiSeven's main website, hiseven.com, operated as a proxy registered through Domains by Proxy, LLC; pages with nearly verbatim content were also hosted on tgbot-csr.007tg.com, which has been defunct since October 2025.<sup>56</sup> A webpage hosted at the subdomain "goldenland-staging.hiseven" also advertised the 007TG suite as of July 2025, with all hyperlinks on the website routing to 007TG-affiliated Telegram and WhatsApp bots. However, as of October 2025, the site was only accessible via login and described itself as "a leading property developer in redefining lifestyle."<sup>57</sup> Although these sites are now defunct, HiSeven's Malaysian branch remained the domain registrant contact for websites advertising two 007TG Suite tools, including CloudSeven, through December 2025.<sup>58</sup>

Through its operations, 007TG had ties to multiple Chinese businesses. Postings on BOSS Zhipin, a Chinese online recruitment platform, indicate that the Chinese marketing and advertising company Guangzhou Haichuang Future Network Culture Media Co., Ltd. (广州海创未来网络文化传媒有限公司) provided operational services to 007TG to support and facilitate its expansion.<sup>59</sup> HiSeven listed seven additional partners on its website, including Alibaba Cloud and Tencent Cloud.<sup>60</sup> Alibaba Cloud provided HiSeven with AI-driven cloud services through a 2024 memorandum of understanding signed in Kuala Lumpur.<sup>61</sup> Both SCRUM and CloudSeven, the 007TG tools highlighted in this report, were featured on Alibaba Cloud's digital marketplace.<sup>62</sup> CloudSeven's website specified that authorized Alibaba Cloud service providers were eligible for a special promotion on the platform.<sup>63</sup>

## KT

The lack of information about KT's operators, inconsistent claims about its location, and the apparent deliberate obfuscation of developer identities raise significant concerns about potential illicit activity. The company provides minimal corporate and contact information online. KT advertising claims it is operated by Singaporean company KT Technology (控天科技有限公司), but this company does not appear in the Singapore Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority BizFile Corporate Registry.<sup>64</sup> It primarily operates across a network of Telegram channels where it advertises its products and demonstrates how to use them. Both KT's main website, kttoke.com, and its clone site, ktfy999.com, include Hong Kong-based contact numbers reachable via WhatsApp.<sup>65</sup>

KT appears to have developed KT Smart Translation by relying on open-source frameworks and tools. KT Smart Translation was developed using Electron, a U.S.-developed open-source framework for building desktop applications. Both its front-end application data, which is stored in an ASAR file bundled within the software, and




Photo from the Alibaba Cloud-HiSeven Memorandum of Understanding Exchange Ceremony published on HiSeven's now-defunct website and a now-deleted posting on Alibaba Cloud's website. In the photo, from left to right: Dongliang GUO, Vice President of Product and Solution, Alibaba Cloud International; Kun Huang, General Manager of Malaysia, Alibaba Cloud Intelligence; and Jason Lin, HiSeven CEO. This graphic also includes partners HiSeven listed on its website.

its properties page (accessible by right-clicking on the application's icon) appear to have obfuscated information regarding the developer.<sup>66</sup> The platform lists the developer as Electron Vite, an open-source build tool for creating Electron-based desktop applications. It also lists the software copyright holder as Electron Vite's lead developer. This indicates the developer did not change the default metadata when packaging their application, possibly to avoid disclosing any identifying information about KT's actual development team.<sup>67</sup>

## Implications and Actions

As AI models are integrated into scammer technologies, it is likely that their role in augmenting the skill and scale of cybercriminals will only expand. Furthermore, AI regulatory frameworks are evolving, and the dual-use nature of the technology creates a legal gray area. The European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act does not explicitly address cybercrime, though it does cover AI-enabled manipulation and exploitation. For example, Article 5 prohibits the use of AI systems to manipulate people's behavior or exploit their vulnerabilities in such a way that may cause them significant harm.<sup>68</sup> However, Article 5 does not explicitly prohibit the AI-enabled tools scammers use, instead focusing on the AI systems themselves. Recital 29 of the Act acknowledges its potential to harm financial interests.<sup>69</sup> As noted by the Regional Support Office of the Bali Process and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, AI technologies' borderless nature presents a legislative challenge. Even if one jurisdiction develops a robust framework to combat the misuse of these technologies by criminals, regulatory gaps in another jurisdiction could reopen those vulnerabilities.<sup>70</sup>

As a rapidly emerging field, AI-enabled criminal activity has been pursued under preexisting domains of criminal law, such as those handling fraud and cybercrime, in such jurisdictions as the United States and the UK. This means the legal focus is on each criminal act, rather than the tool or systems used to enable it. Under this approach, scammers' activities are clearly crimes, but the legal liability of the tools that enable them is unclear. As criminal law evolves to keep up with AI capabilities, many countries are under pressure to deregulate the industry to spur innovation, creating competing incentives between curbing crime and coming out on top in the global race for AI leadership. Strategic plans like the UK's AI Opportunities Action Plan, for example, emphasize large-scale support for the AI sector and taking down barriers to growth, but do not address the potential criminal misuse of these technologies.<sup>71</sup> As pressures to integrate AI into administrative and legal frameworks increase, stakeholders will have a more complex task ahead of them to balance pro-innovation policies for the AI sector with accountability initiatives that ensure it remains safeguarded from misuse.

Policymakers, law enforcement, and the tech industry face significant challenges in addressing criminal misuse of AI technologies, especially within the constraints of existing policy and compliance frameworks. While more research is needed to develop policy solutions, several actions could help limit the spread of AI-enabled scams and merit further discussion:

- **Know-your-customer protocols for API access:** AI developers can implement identity verification measures before granting access to new APIs, helping to prevent anonymous or malicious use.
- **Risk indicators for law enforcement:** Authorities can develop formal criteria to assess whether software vendors are knowingly supporting scam operations. These indicators could aid in determining when legal action is warranted.
- **Tool integration tracking:** Law enforcement can require documentation of which development tools—such as APIs and cloud platforms—are embedded in the software under investigation. This would help track which technologies scammers exploit to build their tools.
- **Standardized abuse-reporting mechanisms:** Platform developers can introduce uniform systems for reporting misuse, enabling better monitoring and faster restriction of criminal access to their services.
- **Translation tool safeguards:** Developers of translation software should consider enhanced tracking of request volume and origin to detect activity consistent with scam operations.<sup>72</sup>

Next steps may include investigating how scammers acquire social media accounts to integrate into these applications and analyzing blockchain platforms to better understand the financial networks supporting the scam industry. Understanding all stages of the scam supply chain—including how scammers acquire, market, and purchase these tools—illuminates the increasing professionalization and sophistication of the scam industry.

# Endnotes

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13. C4ADS first identified these 13 channels in August 2025.

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15. C4ADS found these links on the website for Fengxiang Chuhai (风象出海in Mandarin), another private domain marketing software provider with a website layout nearly identical to the former 007TG website. Pages marketing 007TG and SCRM Champion on Fengxiang Chuhai refer to “haiwangapp.com” as the official website for 007TG products, which now redirects to a report into Haiwang SCRM. This report indicates that Chinese authorities determined that the platform was illegally built by an unnamed criminal group which likely

violated Articles 285, 286, and 266 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China. See the following sites for more information: <https://fengxiangchuhai.com/news/8979.html>, <https://fengxiangchuhai.com/news/8978.html>, <https://fengxiangchuhai.com/news/8978.html>

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21. “CloudSeven企业办公监控系统,” (“CloudSeven Enterprise Office Monitoring System”).

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23. “KT Smart Translation,” accessed October 16, 2025, <https://en.kttuoke.com/>.

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25. A clone site refers to a website that mimics or replicates another website’s content, often operated by the same entity as the original website. C4ADS identified six such clone websites: <http://kttuoke.com>, <https://ktfy999.com/>, <https://free.ktai.love>, <https://ktapp.ktai.love>, <https://kt-translate.com/>, and <https://kt-smart-customer.pages.dev/>. The testimonials on these websites appear fabricated. These testimonials are attributed to “users,” whose headshots are sourced from LinkedIn accounts, but whose names and professional titles do not correspond to those listed on the websites. Moreover, the same headshots are reused across multiple sites but attributed to different users, with both names and images varying from site to site.

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35. Evidence indicates scam center operators closely follow their staff’s activities. Casinos, Cyber Fraud, and Trafficking in Persons for Forced Criminality in Southeast Asia (Vienna: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, September 2023), [https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2023/TiP\\_for\\_FC\\_Policy\\_Report.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2023/TiP_for_FC_Policy_Report.pdf).

36. “SCRM Project Requirements Checklist,” Freelancer (Freelancer Technology Pty Limited, 2024), <https://www.freelancer.com/projects/android/multi-platform-messaging-desktop>.

37. “SCRM Project Requirements Checklist.”

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39. Francesca Regaledo, “Americans Have Lost Billions to Online Scams. How Is That Possible?,” The New York Times, October 23, 2025, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/23/world/asia/scam-centers-myanmar-cambodia.html>.

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41. As with the roleplay bot, C4ADS confirmed the web search bot’s use of GPT-4 by downloading a trial version of the KT platform and asking the chatbot what AI model it uses. The bug reporting bot was restricted to submitting and tracking bug reports, preventing C4ADS from posing unrelated queries or model-identification questions; while the Gemini chatbot runs on Google’s eponymous AI model.

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System Launched: Bringing You a Brand New Experience”).

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53. The 007TG website includes an email address (service@007.tg), a Malaysia-domiciled WhatsApp number (+601120564337), a Telegram account (<https://t.me/GM007TGbot>), and a Telegram feedback bot (<https://t.me/vonkinbot>). See more at <https://007tg.com/contact-us/>. Information on its relationship to HiSeven can be found at <https://007hi.com/8148.html>.

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55. Registered in Hong Kong as HiSeven Technology Co., Ltd., the company was actively searching for employees in the city as recently as September 2025. Its job advertisements on OfferToday, a Hong Kong job advertisement site, emphasized HiSeven’s work promoting commercial applications for AI while clearly tying it back to its headquarters in Singapore. See the following links for more information: [https://www.cr.gov.hk/docs/wrpt/wk\\_new&changednamecoys\\_20250630.pdf](https://www.cr.gov.hk/docs/wrpt/wk_new&changednamecoys_20250630.pdf); and <https://www.offertoday.com/en/company/wQ9RZUY-8F-EuBnGbyglqg%3D%3D>.

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58. The other tool is CtrlFire, an automated customer acquisition tool that operates on X. <https://ph.godaddy.com/whois/results.aspx?domainName=ctrlfire.com;%20https://ph.godaddy.com/whois/results.aspx?domainName=cloud007.com>.

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63. “CloudSeven企业办公监控系,” (“CloudSeven Enterprise Office Monitoring System”).

64. “控天科技有限公司,” (“Kongtian Technology Co., Ltd.”).

65. These phone numbers are as follows: +852 6812 3063 (WhatsApp contact listed on kttuoke.com), and +852 7015 8242 (WhatsApp contact listed on ktfy999.com).

66. See endnote 27 for further information on ASAR files.

67. Because the app was built using the Electron framework and the Vite build tool, it appears the developer didn’t change the default metadata when packaging it. The default metadata would state that the author would be Electron Vite and the copyright holder would be an affiliate as well. In this case, it listed Electron Vite’s lead developer, Leo Wang (known professionally as cao xie mei hao 草鞋没号), as the copyright holder. Because this is a product KT seeks to sell, it would be expected that KT would ensure its copyright is listed on its platform. At best, it forgot to do so. At worst, it intentionally obfuscated any identifying information.

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