Gao, Mali: Photography by C4ADS
The Counterproliferation Cell works to expose how illicit state and substate actors exploit global systems of trade, finance, and transportation to procure goods or raise funds in support of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons programs. As a secondary question, we examine how illicit actors use emerging technologies to drive nuclear instability or degrade situational awareness. Currently, thematic priorities are maritime sanctions evasion, chemical weapons procurement, and global trade in dual-use goods with jurisdictional emphases on North Korea, Iran, and Syria.
December 12, 2017
THE FOREX EFFECT
Recent United Nations Security Council resolutions 2371 and 2375 and United States Executive Order 13810 have dramatically increased restrictions on North Korean overseas economic activity. Though North Korea has employed an array of overseas networks to counter international sanctions, the need to adapt had fundamentally changed the regime's international economic exposure. Today, the regime is dependent on the flow of hard currency to function. Maintaining this access and evading sanctions have required the regime's foreign exchange banks to offshore critical financial infrastructure overseas. The resulting illicit overseas networks play a vital role as proxies for the North Korean banking and foreign exchange systems. However, being integrated into the international systems of banking, commerce, and logistics leaves these networks exposed to international law enforcement actions.
June 12, 2017
North Korea employs a global array of overseas networks to circumvent international sanctions and continue its pursuit of nuclear weapons. These networks are engaged in schemes as diverse as cybercrime, military equipment sales, currency counterfeiting, narcotics, and even wildlife trafficking. They make up a complex overseas financing and procurement system designed to raise the funds and materials North Korea needs for its regime security and weapons programs. As sanctions have tightened, these networks have grown increasingly important to the regime. Moreover, they illustrate how North Korean officials have gained a deep understanding of international trade, finance, and transportation and how to nest their illicit activities within them. In this report, we conduct a system-level examination of the North Korean overseas financing and procurement system. Our paper finds that this system is centralized, limited, and vulnerable, and that its disruption should greatly increase the pressure on the Kim regime to return to the negotiating table.
IN CHINA'S SHADOW
September 19, 2016
North Korea’s overseas trading networks are evolving, and Pyongyang’s expansive business dealings with China, its biggest trading partner, are driving changes in the character, scope, and methods of these networks. As a result of these changes, North Korea and the entire Northeast Asian region face greater instability as regime elites in Pyongyang become increasingly willing and able to procure the strategic resources they need for regime security and weapons development.