Mapping Russian Supply Routes in Africa
C4ADS has identified 12 vessels, most of them U.S.-sanctioned and Russian-flagged, that may have transported military equipment from Russian ports to West African and Libyan ports for ultimate delivery to Africa Corps personnel stationed in Libya, Syria, Mali, and elsewhere in the Sahel. Media reporting, social media data, vessel tracking data, and satellite imagery indicate that Russian military equipment moves through the ports of Tobruk (Libya), Conakry (Guinea), and Lomé (Togo). Pointe-Noire, Republic of the Congo (ROC) may act as a transit and logistics hub for shipments to Russian state-aligned military forces operating in Africa, though further data is required to make a definitive assessment.
These patterns are open to more than one reading. The AIS gaps, naval escorts, and reliance on a small pool of repeatedly designated vessels may indicate that sanctions impose real friction, raising the cost and complexity of each delivery even as the shipments continue. Naval escorts may also reflect protection against real threats rather than sanctions evasion; for example, drones – likely Ukrainian – attacked the LADY MARIIA in the Mediterranean in September 2026.
Nevertheless, the continued use of these routes to move military equipment to Africa Corps suggests that existing sanctions on the vessels are not preventing Russia from resupplying its forces in Africa. Sanctions coverage is notably uneven: while 10 of the 12 vessels are U.S.-sanctioned, only six (directly or via their owners) are designated by the United Kingdom (UK) and five by the European Union. Moreover, the United States designated Private Military Company Wagner (ЧВК “Вагнер”) as a transnational criminal organization in January 2023, but has not done the same for its de facto successor, Africa Corps. Of the three jurisdictions, only the UK has sanctioned Africa Corps directly, leaving enforcement largely reliant on the vessels’ status.
The spread of shipments across multiple ports points to a widening footprint that may require better tracking, more coordinated enforcement, and stronger engagement with port states along these routes, where possible.
Methodology and Scope
The map draws on publicly available information, including media reporting, social media data, Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, and satellite imagery. C4ADS chose the vessels in the sample based on existing media coverage of vessels that have reportedly transported Russian military equipment from Russian ports to African ports for ultimate delivery to Russian paramilitary actors and state-aligned military forces. The investigation identified vessels that shared owners and operators with the initial set of vessels and analyzed their patterns of life to determine which ships had traveled from Russian ports to Libya and West Africa between 2023 and 2026. C4ADS then supplemented the voyage data with available satellite imagery and social media reports to further assess the likelihood that a voyage was linked to Russian paramilitary entities operating in Africa. Included vessels and routes are not exhaustive, and are intended to illustrate the potential timeframe and volume of transfers.
This map shows selected voyages by these vessels overlaid with satellite imagery and other evidence demonstrating the movement of cargo. Tracks show AIS positions only; dashed lines mark periods when a vessel stopped transmitting and connect the last and next reported positions in a straight line.
Wagner and Africa Corps in Africa
Wagner was a state-linked Russian private military company that operated in multiple jurisdictions, including Libya, Mali, and the Central African Republic (CAR). After Wagner forces attempted a coup against the Russian government in June 2023, the company’s leadership was killed in a plane crash two months later. In early 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense created Africa Corps (Африканский корпус) to replace Wagner on the African continent, this time under the official command structure of the Russian military. The transition occurred at varying speeds across the continent, with Wagner branding lingering longer in Mali and the CAR than in Libya, so the voyages shown here likely span the existence of both entities.
Conakry, Guinea Route
Russian military equipment has moved through the port of Conakry and onward to Mali by road in multiple convoys since 2023, reportedly with the approval of Guinea’s leaders. Five U.S.-sanctioned Russian-flagged vessels sailed from Arctic and Baltic ports toward Conakry between December 2024 and March 2026. The ADLER and SIYANIE SEVERA unloaded there in early January 2025 and, within days, a convoy of roughly a hundred military vehicles, including Spartak mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) armored vehicles and T-72 heavy tanks, was filmed arriving in Bamako. Additional voyages followed similar patterns, though each with unique behavior. Shortly after the BALTIC LEADER and PATRIA arrived in Conakry in May 2025, videos depicting a convoy of Russian military vehicles, including Spartak MRAPs and BPM-97 Vystrel MRAPs, appeared online. However, this voyage is unique as the pair was accompanied from Russia by the SIYANIE SEVERA, which notably continued past Conakry to Bata, Equatorial Guinea and Lagos, Nigeria.[1] Additionally, the SABETTA, which was escorted through the English Channel by a Russian warship – arrived in Conakry in March 2026, where it likely unloaded military equipment, including Tigr infantry mobility vehicles.
Lomé, Togo Route
Togo and Russia signed an agreement in 2025 establishing coordination on joint military exercises, training programs, and military equipment exchanges, which likely increased Russian access to the port of Lomé and to Mali through Burkina Faso. The U.S.-sanctioned, Russian-flagged general cargo ship MIKHAIL BRITNEV likely carried military vehicles and equipment from Kaliningrad, Russia to Lomé in June and July 2026. The vessel stopped transmitting via its AIS transponder while off the coast of France on June 23 and resumed transmissions on July 8 as it approached the port, in what may have been an attempt to disguise its route or behavior.[2] Media reports and independent investigators suggest a Russian naval landing ship likely escorted the vessel. Malian state television later broadcast footage of a convoy of 29 armored vehicles moving through Bamako, including BTR-82A armored personnel carriers and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, which reporters said had taken 10 days to travel from Lomé.
Tobruk, Libya Route
Tobruk is the main maritime entry point for likely Russian military shipments to Libya, and the port houses a naval base controlled by the Libya National Army that reportedly hosts a significant Africa Corps presence. Like shipments to West Africa, deliveries to Libya follow a recurring pattern: departure from Baltiysk Naval Base in Kaliningrad, a naval escort indicating high-value cargo, and frequent prolonged AIS signal gaps in the Mediterranean. The U.S.-sanctioned general cargo ship MYS ZHELANIYA sailed from Baltiysk at the end of December 2025 and entered Tobruk on January 15, 2026, where satellite imagery taken two days later showed likely military vehicles on the dock beside it.[3] Its companion SPARTA IV broke off short of the port, stopped transmitting, and continued to Tartus, Syria.[4] The ANASTASIIA and the YURIY ARSHENEVSKIY followed the same route in August and September 2026 before going dark east of the Strait of Gibraltar on September 6 and resuming transmissions on September 23 and 25, respectively.[5] The vessels reportedly delivered a shipment likely containing armored vehicles, rocket launchers, Ural trucks, and Tornado-U logistics vehicles to Tobruk on September 14, during the gap in their tracks. Some of that materiel reportedly traveled onward by road to other bases with a known Africa Corps presence.
Not every delivery is covert: the Cameroon-flagged BARBAROS sailed openly from Novorossiysk, Russia to Tobruk in 2024 without a naval escort or AIS gaps. When a European naval mission boarded the vessel en route, the inspectors found 115 Russian-built trucks. While militaries regularly use these trucks, the boarding party determined the ones in this shipment had not been modified for military use and therefore did not violate the UN arms embargo.
Potential Route: Pointe-Noire, Republic of the Congo
While the routes to Conakry, Lomé, and Tobruk have drawn significant media attention, C4ADS’ analysis shows that the flagged vessels have also made calls to other African ports. To highlight these potential alternative routes, the map includes Pointe-Noire.
Three U.S.-sanctioned, Russian-flagged roll-on/roll-off cargo ships made voyages to Pointe-Noire between 2023 and 2026, after likely loading at Russian ports: the ADLER in June 2023 and October 2024, the LADY MARIIA in February 2025, and the BALTIC LEADER in July 2026.[6] Each reported a draft increase on departure, indicating it may have loaded cargo.[7] MG-Flot owns and/or manages all three vessels,[8] and two of them have also made voyages between Russian and West African ports for which deliveries of Russian military equipment are better documented. Notably, these voyages likely originated from the Black Sea or Saint Petersburg area.
Moscow reportedly lobbied for Russian personnel–specifically Wagner–access to Pointe-Noire in 2022 to facilitate shipments to landlocked CAR. Later reporting alleged that France postponed that access through diplomatic efforts. If the vessels had carried military equipment, the intended end user is unclear: the cargo could have moved onward to the CAR, or it could have been destined for Russian forces in the ROC, where Africa Corps reportedly provides training for the Congolese Armed Forces. Further data is required to determine whether these voyages reflect military-equipment or dual-use transfers, or relate to other engagements.
[1] AIS data, retrieved via Windward Maritime AI™ platform.
[2] AIS data, retrieved via Windward Maritime AI™ platform.
[3] AIS data, retrieved via Windward Maritime AI™ platform.
[4] AIS data, retrieved via Windward Maritime AI™ platform.
[5] AIS data, retrieved via Windward Maritime AI™ platform.
[6] AIS data, retrieved via Windward Maritime AI™ platform.
[7] AIS data, retrieved via Windward Maritime AI™ platform.
[8] S&P Global.
