Etch and Release
A single shipment of a used plasma etching tool underscores a critical vulnerability in global supply chains, demonstrating how Russia’s military-industrial complex continues to acquire Western-origin semiconductor manufacturing equipment despite sanctions and export controls.
This investigation was conducted in partnership with the Belarusian Investigative Center (BIC), 15min.lt, iStories, and the Ukrainian Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s project “Schemes.”
Belarus plays a complex role in facilitating Russia’s evasion of Western sanctions and export controls. Along with producing equipment and components for the Russian military,[1] Belarus facilitates Russian imports of critical dual-use technologies—including U.S. and E.U.-origin microchips.[2] Independent Belarusian media outlet Belarusian Investigative Center (BIC), supported by C4ADS, has uncovered evidence that a Belarusian company plays a key role in Russian military-industrial supply chains: Minsk-based Izovac Ltd (Izovac) and its surrounding network.
Who is Izovac? #
Izovac describes itself as a Belarusian manufacturer of industrial vacuum equipment used to produce thin layers of performance-enhancing materials for electronic displays, optical coatings, and microelectronics.[3] Records obtained by BIC indicate that between January 2022 and November 2024, two Belarusian companies affiliated with Izovac—Izovac Technology Ltd. and Internanotekhnologii Ltd.—made shipments worth nearly USD 10 million to multiple Russian defense industry entities.[4] According to customs records, the entities these companies shipped sensitive electronics to include JSC Central Design Bureau of Automatics, which reportedly manufactures ballistic missile guidance systems,[5] and military optics manufacturer JSC Central Design Bureau “Photon.”[6]
Izovac Group-affiliated companies have already been implicated in evading sanctions. In one case, Lithuanian authorities reportedly froze funds that Russian company Izovac Engineering LLC (now called Engineering Group LLC) attempted to transfer from a sanctioned Russian state-owned defense industry holding company to Lithuanian company Izovac Photonics UAB (now called I-Photonics UAB).[9] There is additional reporting that Izovac Group-affiliated companies have circumvented Western export controls on foreign-origin dual-use technologies. In August 2024, independent Russian media outlet The Insider reported that Engineering Group[10] had also imported U.S.-origin materials for semiconductor production from suppliers in China and Taiwan.[11]
Unraveling the Supply Chain: How Did This Tool Reach Russia? #
New analysis by BIC and C4ADS shines light on the Izovac Group’s apparent involvement in smuggling foreign technology to sanctioned Russian entities. Customs records obtained by BIC suggest that Engineering Group likely imported a used Applied Materials plasma etching tool, which can be used to make microelectronics like semiconductors by engraving integrated circuit designs onto wafers made of silicon or other materials,[19] on behalf of another sanctioned Russian microelectronics producer, NM-Tekh LLC (NM-Tekh).[20] Additional analysis indicates that Taiwanese companies affiliated with the Izovac Group likely played a role in facilitating the import of the plasma etching tool.[21] [22]
Analysis of available records point to a transnational arrangement behind the shipment. Russian trade records indicate that on December 1, 2023, Engineering Group imported a used plasma etching tool bearing an Applied Materials trademark from Hong Kong company Smart Kit.[23] While Smart Kit is a Hong-Kong-based company, Russian trade records indicate that the tool set off on its journey to Russia from Taoyuan, Taiwan,[24] suggesting the possible involvement of a Taiwan-based party. In Russian trade records, the Belarusian company Joint LLC Izotec-M (Izotec-M) was listed as the payee for the shipment.[25]
Analysis of customs records obtained by BIC suggests that a shipment with a correlating weight and description to the December 1, 2023 shipment may have transited through Belarus prior to its delivery to NM-Tekh.[26] Customs records indicate that several weeks later,[27] on December 26, 2023, NM-Tekh imported an Applied Materials-manufactured Centura Super-e plasma etching machine from Izotec-M.[28] Customs records obtained by BIC further indicate that this plasma etching tool had the same net weight as the unspecified Applied Materials-branded plasma etching machine purportedly imported by Engineering Group on December 1, 2023 in Russian trade records, suggesting that it may have contained the same tool as the December 1, 2023 shipment.[29]
Where Is the Supply Chain Leak? #
While available records do not name Taiwanese entities in connection to the Applied Materials tool shipment, analysis of Russian and Belarusian trade records and Taiwanese corporate records suggest that Taiwanese companies indirectly affiliated with Izovac may have facilitated the shipment of the plasma etching tool.
Analysis of publicly available information, including customs and trade records, indicates that Taiwanese entities indirectly affiliated with the Izovac Group operate out of Taoyuan:
- Izotec-M, the Belarusian company that paid for and delivered the plasma etching tool in question, is a joint venture between Izovac and Taiwan-based More Tech International Corporation (More Tech).[30]
- More Tech’s corporate website states that the company, which purportedly develops and produces vacuum deposition equipment, maintains technological ties with Izovac, thus indicating cooperation between More Tech and Izovac.[31] While More Tech’ registered address is in Taipei,[32] the company website indicates that More Tech operates out of Taoyuan.[33]
- More Tech shares management personnel with other Taiwanese companies, including one that has previously exported electronics to Izovac Group companies.[34]
- Taiwanese corporate records identify More Tech’s director as Lin Chenxing (Lin). Lin is also a director and 20.97% shareholder of another Taoyuan-based company, Green Science, Inc (Green Science).[35]
- Third-party corporate aggregators associate Green Science’s Taiwanese company identification number with another name, Green Sputtering, Inc (Green Sputtering).[36] Review of Taiwanese records indicate that Green Science used to operate under the name, Green Sputtering.[37]
- Green Science and Green Sputtering exported sensitive electronics equipment to Izovac and Engineering Group between 2022 and 2024 from the same Taoyuan address, per available Russian and Belarusian trade and transit records.[38]
- Open-source photography of Green Sputtering and Green Science’s address[39] reveals a building with Izovac logos.[40]
- Interviews with Izovac leadership in 2011 refer to Green Sputtering as part of the Izovac Group.[41]
Map Source: Google Maps[42]
While we cannot definitively state which Taiwanese entity sent the Applied Materials tool, the shipment’s location, established trade activity, and corporate ties suggest that one of the Izovac Group’s Taiwanese partners may have facilitated the shipment.
Call to Due Diligence #
Given limitations on data access, the present analysis cannot precisely account for how the Applied Materials plasma etching tool was diverted in Taiwan.[43] However, previous analysis by C4ADS observed a similar pattern of activity in a transnational procurement network that sourced used Japanese machine tools for a Russian military drone manufacturer from Chinese resellers via an Emirati intermediary.[44] The Izovac Group’s Taiwanese affiliates may have similarly exploited secondhand markets to obtain the plasma etching tool.
These examples demonstrate the need for more scrutiny of the actors and platforms involved in reselling dual-use technologies. Sanctioned entities’ defense industries may employ transnational networks to obtain dual-use goods from secondhand markets. These markets appear to be underregulated, possibly due to their trade in older technologies not perceived as being “cutting-edge.” However, these older technologies may perform at a level “good enough” for the needs and wants of the Russian defense industry.
Cover source: BIC. AI-generated image
[1] Kamenev, Pavel. “Could Russia’s Reliance on Belarus Be Its Soft Underbelly?” RUSI Journal (2023). https://static.rusi.org/could-russias-reliance-on-belarus-be-its-soft-underbelly.pdf.
[2] Dulneva, Marina, “Bypassing sanctions, Belarus sells Western Microchips for Fighter Jets and Missiles to Russia,” Belarusian Investigative Center, 26 November 2024, https://investigatebel.org/en/investigations/zapadnye-mikroshemy-v-rossii-cherez-belarus.
[3] “Компания Изовак,” Изовак, archived 17 January 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20220117084836/http://izovac.by/about/company/.
[4] Customs records obtained by BIC.
[5] “Микросхемы обхода санкций. Как Европа закрывает глаза на контрабанду комплектующих для российских ракет,” The Insider, 21 August 2023, https://theins.ru/politika/264391.
[6] “ОАО Центральное Конструкторское Бюро Фотон,” ЦКБ Фотон, archived 31 May 2013, https://web.archive.org/web/20130531190638/http:/ckb-photon.ru/; Customs records obtained by BIC.
[7] Snegovaya, Maria, Max Bergmann, Tina Dolbaia, and Nick Fenton, “Back in Stock? The State of Russia’s Defense Industry after Two Years of the War,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, April 2024, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-04/240419_Snegovaya_Backin_Stock.pdf?VersionId=rwHuy82sf7y5TEoD8sRJLGF3lYmeGAnL.
[8] “Микросхемы обхода санкций. Как Европа закрывает глаза на контрабанду комплектующих для российских ракет,” The Insider, August 21, 2023, https://theins.ru/politika/264391.
[9] Juknevičiūtė, Rūta, “Belarus tech firm in Vilnius attempts to transfer sanctioned funds from Russia – LRT Investigation,” LRT, April 20, 2022, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1677278/belarus-tech-firm-in-vilnius-attempts-to-transfer-sanctioned-funds-from-russia-lrt-investigation
[10] Russian corporate records indicate that Engineering Group—sanctioned by the U.S. on August 23, 2024—previously operated under the name Izovac Engineering until June 5, 2023.
[11] “Businessman with interests in Germany bypassed sanctions by exporting U.S. lithography machines for microchip production to Russia,” The Insider, August 21, 2024, https://theins.ru/en/news/274045; As outlined in academic Chris Miller’s report, The Impact of Semiconductor Sanctions on Russia, supported by data and analysis from C4ADS, Izovac Engineering has also imported other used U.S.-origin plasma-etch tools. Source: Miller, Chris. “The Impact of Semiconductor Sanctions on Russia,” AEI, April 2024, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/the-impact-of-semiconductor-sanctions-on-russia/.
[12] “Russia revs up microchip production,” bne Intellinews, June 26, 2024, https://www.intellinews.com/russia-revs-up-microchip-production-331184/.
[13] “The U.S. Technology Fueling Russia’s War in Ukraine: How and Why,” U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Government Affairs, February 27, 2024, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/the-u-s-technology-fueling-russias-war-in-ukraine-how-and-why/; Faragasso, Spencer, “Russian Lancet-3 Kamikaze Drone Filled with Foreign Parts: Western Parts Enable Russian Lancet-3 Drone to Have Advanced Targeting and Anti-jamming Capabilities,” Institute for Science and International Security, December 18, 2023, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/russian-lancet-3-kamikaze-drone-filled-with-foreign-parts/.
[14] Feldstein, Steven and Fiona Brauer, “Why Russia Has Been So Resilient to Western Export Controls,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 11, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/03/why-russia-has-been-so-resilient-to-western-export-controls?lang=en.
[15] Miller, Chris. “The Impact of Semiconductor Sanctions on Russia,” AEI, April 2024, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/the-impact-of-semiconductor-sanctions-on-russia/
[16] Miller, Chris. “The Impact of Semiconductor Sanctions on Russia,” AEI, April 2024, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/the-impact-of-semiconductor-sanctions-on-russia/
[17] “На импортозамещение оборудования для производства электроники в России выделили больше 240 млрд рублей,” cnews.ru, October 1, 2024, https://www.cnews.ru/news/top/2024-10-01_na_importozameshchenie_oborudovaniya
[18] “Reusing semiconductor lithography systems to reduce waste,” Nikon, accessed April 3, 2025, https://www.nikon.com/company/sustainability/highlight/1902_reuse; “Revitalization through refurbishment,” ASML, November 29, 2023, https://www.asml.com/en/news/stories/2023/revitalization-through-refurbishment.
[19] Oehrlein, Gottlieb S., Stephan M. Brandstadter, Robert L. Bruce, Jane P. Chang, Jessica C. DeMott, Vincent M. Donnelly, Rémi Dussart, Andreas Fischer, Richard A. Gottscho, Satoshi Hamaguchi, Masanobu Honda, Masaru Hori, Kenji Ishikawa, Steven G. Jaloviar, Keren J. Kanarik, Kazuhiro Karahashi, Akiteru Ko, Hiten Kothari, Nobuyuki Kuboi, Mark J. Kushner, Thorsten Lill, Pingshan Luan, Ali Mesbah, Eric Miller, Shoubhanik Nath, Yoshinobu Ohya, Mitsuhiro Omura, Chanhoon Park, John Poulose, Shahid Rauf, Makoto Sekine, Taylor G. Smith, Nathan Stafford, Theo Standaert, Peter L. G. Ventzek, “Future of plasma etching for microelectronics: Challenges and opportunities,” Journal of Vacuum Science & Technology B, (42, 041501) (2024), https://pubs.aip.org/avs/jvb/article/42/4/041501/3297248/Future-of-plasma-etching-for-microelectronics.
[20] Customs records obtained by BIC; “U.S. Treasury Imposes Immediate Economic Costs in Response to Actions in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, February 22, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0602.
[21] Customs records obtained by BIC.
[22] Russian trade records.
[23] Russian trade records; Available records indicate that the machine in question had a net weight of 5,932 kilograms. Source: Russian trade records.
[24] Russian trade records.
[25] Russian trade records.
[26] Customs records obtained by BIC.
[27] Apparent discrepancies in the timeline of the December 2023 shipment may be due to differences in reporting requirements, with the earlier date reflecting the date of an electronic declaration submission versus the later import date.
[28] Customs records obtained by BIC; Available records refer to this machine as an AMAT Centura Supere. This likely refers to an Applied Materials-manufactured Centura Super-e plasma etching machine, an older model previously listed on Applied Materials’ corporate website between July 2000 and June 2002. Source: https://web.archive.org/web/20250000000000*/http:/www.appliedmaterials.com/products/supere.html
[29] Customs records obtained by BIC; Russian trade records, Customs records obtained by BIC.
[30] Customs records obtained by BIC; Russian trade records; Belarus corporate records, provided by BIC.
[31] “關於特懋實業,” 特懋實業有限公司, accessed April 3, 2025, https://22253.web66.tw/web/Comp?command=Intro.
[32] Taiwanese corporate records.
[33] “關於特懋實業,” 特懋實業有限公司, accessed April 3, 2025, https://22253.web66.tw/web/Comp?command=Intro.
[34] Taiwanese corporate records.
[35] Taiwanese corporate records.
[36] “綠色科技股份有限公司,” TaiWanOpenData.com, accessed April 3, 2025, https://taiwanopendata.com/company/OD1BBGcU6Ajk43fs5q5s63304.html.
[37] “Exporter/Importer Basic Registration Data,” TITA, accessed April 7, 2025, https://fbfh.trade.gov.tw/fb/web/queryBasicf.do
[38] Russian trade records; Belarus transit records.
[39] As listed in available trade records and in Taiwanese corporate records for Green Science.
[40] “Taoyuan City, Taiwan [map],” Google Maps, accessed April 3, 2025, https://www.google.com/maps/@25.0218873,121.2381346,3a,65.6y,46.62h,98.51t/data=!3m7!1e1!3m5!1seiTzjRPqLwZcGR7I8pLfeA!2e0!6shttps:%2F%2Fstreetviewpixels-pa.googleapis.com%2Fv1%2Fthumbnail%3Fcb_client%3Dmaps_sv.tactile%26w%3D900%26h%3D600%26pitch%3D-8.507658781116717%26panoid%3DeiTzjRPqLwZcGR7I8pLfeA%26yaw%3D46.61565195073312!7i16384!8i8192?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI1MDQwMS4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D.
[41]Фотоника, “Изобретения в вакууме: Гибкость и прозрачность,” Фотоника (3, 2011), https://www.photonics.su/files/article_pdf/2/article_2842_525.pdf
[42] “Taoyuan City, Taiwan [map],” Google Maps, accessed April 3, 2025, https://www.google.com/maps/@25.0218873,121.2381346,3a,65.6y,46.62h,98.51t/data=!3m7!1e1!3m5!1seiTzjRPqLwZcGR7I8pLfeA!2e0!6shttps:%2F%2Fstreetviewpixels-pa.googleapis.com%2Fv1%2Fthumbnail%3Fcb_client%3Dmaps_sv.tactile%26w%3D900%26h%3D600%26pitch%3D-8.507658781116717%26panoid%3DeiTzjRPqLwZcGR7I8pLfeA%26yaw%3D46.61565195073312!7i16384!8i8192?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI1MDQwMS4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D.
[43] Outside of mirrored trade records, C4ADS does not have access to Taiwanese import or export records. While US export records are publicly available, C4ADS could not identify with certainty whether a shipment contained the tool in question due to limited information collected in the available records.
[44] Maggard, Allen, “War Machine: The Networks Supplying & Sustaining Russia’s Precision Machine Tool Arsenal,” June 18, 2024, https://c4ads.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/War-Machine-C4ADS-Report.pdf.
