Hot Lines

Tracing Movements to and from Myanmar’s Scam Centers
Commentary
March 27, 2025
By: Michael Di Girolamo
The Bottom Line Up Front

Highly concentrated industrial-scale scam centers along the Myanmar border — staffed by victims of forced trafficking — generate trillions of dollars annually, propping up the Myanmar military junta and global crime syndicates alike.

Introduction #

From sleepy towns to entire cities, a stretch of land along Myanmar’s border has emerged as a hub for transnational crime syndicates that force people to conduct industrial-scale online scam operations responsible for trillions of dollars a year.[1] “Scam centers,” where individuals are trafficked, held against their will and subject to other horrific human rights abuses, and forced to scam people globally, have spread rapidly in the region. The area around Myawaddy, on the Myanmar-Thailand border, has one of the highest concentrations of these centers in the world. The fractured geopolitical landscape involving the Myanmar junta, rebel groups, and regional warlords has enabled their growth. These centers, ranging from small forest sheds to large urban compounds,[2] generate massive revenue that supports international crime syndicates and provides funding for the Myanmar junta’s atrocities.

Despite the junta’s public opposition, 2024 phone geolocation or “AdTech” data shows frequent movements between Myawaddy scam centers and the capital, Naypyidaw, as well as between different scam centers, revealing potential areas of crime convergence. In particular:

  • Phones often travel between known scam compounds like Shwe Kokko and KK Park and government buildings in the capital, suggesting a relationship between organized crime and the military regime.
  • Phones also travel between scam centers affiliated with different criminal groups, such as the Dongmei Zone and Taichang Park, indicating ongoing collaboration and consultation among these actors.

These findings indicate that, contrary to their public statements, there are frequent interactions between criminal groups and the junta, and between various criminal groups, which may stymie any future efforts to limit the operations and impacts of scam centers. If the nexus of the armed groups, Chinese criminal organizations, and the junta continues to converge, revenue derived from scam centers will likely increasingly fuel the conflict.

Background #

Since the February 2021 coup, Myanmar’s junta has lost control over large areas, allowing criminal groups, particularly Chinese organizations and their affiliates, to expand operations. These groups, which have collaborated with the Myanmar junta-affiliated Karen National Army (KNA) under Colonel Saw Chit Thu, other armed groups including the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), and various regional warlords, have transformed a strip along the Thai-Burmese border into one of the world’s highest concentration of scam centers.[3] Despite shifting loyalties over time, Saw Chit Thu’s relationship with the junta is well-known, and he has facilitated access for Chinese criminal organizations[4] to land and security for scam center operations in Shwe Kokko, a town directly north of Myawaddy and the home of KNA headquarters. He has directly met with junta chief Min Aung Hlaing and donated to associates, including Sitagu Sayadaw, a prominent monk close to Min Aung Hlaing.[5]

The scam centers emerged, in part, from the shortfalls of Southeast Asia’s would-be gambling industry.[6] Chinese criminal organizations, attracted to a laxer legal environment against gambling and, in response to increasing crackdowns on cross-border gambling and money laundering in China, invested significantly in casinos and hotels expected to attract millions of tourists to the region. However, the COVID-19 pandemic led to a collapse in tourism. This compelled these groups to diversify their casino businesses by incorporating scam operations, luring workers from around the world and forcing them into online scams targeting global victims.[7]

These centers are most active in Shan State (bordering China, Laos, and Thailand) and Karen State (bordering Thailand), where weak governance and conflict between the junta, its affiliates, and rebel groups have created a lawless environment.[8] Northern Shan State is largely under rebel control, while the Karen National Union (KNU) and its armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), have gained territory in Karen State.[9] In 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027 in Shan State,[10] capturing significant territory and prompting scam centers to relocate to areas around Myawaddy, a key border town and trade hub in Karen State.[11] In February 2025, China and Thailand, working with the junta, initiated a crackdown on these centers, aiming to shut them down and repatriate trafficked individuals.[12]

Despite denouncing and sporadically cracking down on these scam networks in the public domain, the junta has a symbiotic relationship with them. In exchange for tacit approval and security protections, the scam centers funnel some of their income to the KNA.[13] Reports indicate that the KNA shares revenue from scam centers with the military, and Min Aung Hlaing maintains ties with key scam operators in Karen and Shan States.[14]

Data and Limitations #

AdTech Data in Myanmar

Movements were identified via anonymized identifier IDs, random IDs which are connected to each device and allow for tracking the device’s movements. Mobile location data, sometimes referred to as Advertising Technology (adtech) data, is generated from applications installed on mobile devices where users have ‘opted in’ to share their activity and device data. Depending on the configuration and permissions of a given application, data may be transmitted when the user is actively using the application or when the application may be given permission to run in the background. Location information derived from Adtech data can be erroneous or inaccurate, depending on both the precision of the location information collected by the application, the accuracy of the device’s navigational hardware, and the authenticity of the data provided by the application (i.e. spoofed/falsified data). As a result, the devices outlined in this report likely represent only a portion of the activity occurring between the locations in question and should not be taken as comprehensive.

Phone and internet service in Myanmar is limited and, in some regions, actively restricted by the junta, potentially changing the volume of data availability in certain areas of the country over a given period of time.[15] However, the consistency of AdTech data analyzed for this report across multiple regions suggests that any lulls or spikes in movement should be attributed to other factors.

Scope

This investigation traces device movements detected between January and December 2024, that meet the following criteria:

  • Devices detected at least once at one of the four known scam center locations surrounding Myawaddy AND at least once in Naypidaw’s Ministry zone and surrounding ministry residences. Seven devices were identified that met this criteria.
  • Devices detected at least once at at least two of the four known scam center locations surrounding Myawaddy. 213 devices met this criteria. Only one device that was at Taichang Park met this criteria. 109 devices meeting this criteria were at the Dongmei Zone in 2024. The select eight devices were among the top 15 detected in the Dongmei Zone by number of identifier ID signal appearances (being detected in the Dongmei Zone and at least one of the other scam centers at least 200 times) and were selected to convey a range of detected device movements, exhibiting among the highest levels of activity.

We interpret movement among these restricted-access locations as a potential indicator of a broader network or operational role that links these otherwise distinct sites. Routine access to all three locations suggests a function or affiliation beyond the isolated activities of any single site. See Annex for details on each device’s movements.      

Naypyidaw Ministry Zone and surrounding housing. Devices (distinguished by color) were detected in at least eight government ministries in addition to the Central Bank of Myanmar, the Presidential Palace, and known ministerial housing.

Movements Between Scam Centers and Naypyidaw

The four scam center locations investigated in this report: Shwe Kokko, KK Park, the Dongmei Zone, and Taichang Park.

Movements were detected between Naypyidaw’s Ministry Zone and scam center compounds at KK Park and Shwe Kokko (home of KNA headquarters).[16] Devices were detected in a range of government ministries, as well as known ministerial housing and even the Presidential Palace.

Devices that had been in these scam centers were detected in Naypyidaw year-round, though there was a large spike in activity in July and August, followed by a smaller spike in November and December. Several political factors may have influenced these spikes. There was a lull in engagement in early 2024 when the KNA declared it no longer collaborated with the junta; however, in late April 2024, it supported the junta during the siege of Myawaddy and prevented the city from permanently falling under the KNLA, possibly accounting for the spike in movement between Shwe Kokko and Naypyidaw in the summer.[17]

Shwe Kokko

Shwe Kokko. A bulk of activity (where devices are distinguished by color) is found to the right of the city, near the Moei River. Activity is largely centered around the Yatai New City complex, though other sites of note include Colonel Saw Chit Thu’s suspected home near the center of the city.

Shwe Kokko is a city in the north of Myawaddy Township, which was largely built by Yatai International Holdings Group (Yatai), a Hong Kong-registered company formerly chaired by She Zhijiang, a Chinese-Cambodian national.[18]  Mr. She is currently in a Bangkok jail waiting for extradition to China, where he is accused of running illegal gambling operations across Southeast Asia.[19] Mr. She made a deal with Saw Chit Thu in 2016 for Yatai to transform Shwe Kokko from a small village to a resort city, protected by the KNA,[20]which later received approval as an investment project in 2018.[21] Yatai built beyond the limits allowed under its investment permit and started operating casinos before they were legalized in Myanmar, drawing scrutiny from the National League for Democracy government.[22]

Yatai’s close ties to the KNA have allowed it to continue scaling up.[23] Today, the city is home to so many scam centers it has been accused of being a city built on the industry,[24] with known compounds including Yatai New City (a high-rise project where scam operations and gambling proliferate) and the Kokko Resort.[25] Shwe Kokko is a key source of revenue for the KNA, which provides the Myanmar military with roughly 50% of the approximately US$192 million it earns from its scam operations within the city.[26]

Six identifier IDs—A, B, C, D, E, and F—were identified moving between Shwe Kokko and the Ministry Zone in Naypyidaw, the largest number of any center of scam activities investigated in this report, adding to evidence that the KNA likely continues to engage directly with the junta despite its claims of neutrality.

  • Device A was found at Naypyidaw’s Nan Oo Pagoda on June 16, 2024,  a location right next to the Assembly of the Union (Myanmar’s legislature). This indicates the device owner has access to generally restricted government areas, as the complex containing the pagoda is housed within the outside gates of the Assembly of the Union. 
  • Device B visited the Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, multiple ministerial houses, and the Ministry of Health multiple times. This device also spent time at an unidentified structure just outside Shwe Kokko and under a kilometer away from Freedom Water Park (亚太Freedom旅游度假区, a Yatai Group property) and a roughly 76-acre clearing labeled in Google Maps as “Propose Industrial Zone,” which according to satellite imagery was deforested sometime between February and December 2024.”[27]
  • Device C, which visited the Ministry of Transport and Communications and ministerial housing in Naypyidaw, also visited the suspected home of Saw Chit Thu.[28] The device owner appears to be based out of Yangon, as it was mostly located within the city through 2024. However, the device continued to regularly visit Naypyidaw after its trips to Naypyidaw and Shwe Kokko in July. Based on these movement patterns, the device owner is likely in a position that allows access to secure areas managed by the Myanmar government.
  • Devices D, E, and F were all identified in Shwe Kokko in August 2024, following visits to other regions of the country.
    • Device D visited the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation roughly two weeks before visiting Shwe Kokko and was identified at the Ministry of Energy roughly two weeks after, indicating potential shuttling between the various locations. Device E experienced a flurry of activity in Naypyidaw right before traveling to Shwe Kokko: it was identified at the Ministry of Commerce, the Naypyidaw Department of Rural Road Development, and the Ministry of Ethnic Affairs.
    • Device E was in Naypyidaw at the same time as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who met with Min Aung Hlaing and other top junta officials and discussed bilateral relations, including cooperation in combating cybercrimes.[29]
    • Device F was found at the Central Bank of Myanmar, the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the Ministry of Sports and Youth Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce. Notably, Central Bank of Myanmar has reportedly been a principal actor in helping the junta evade international sanctions.[30]

KK Park

KK Park. A bulk of activity (in which devices are distinguished by color) was detected in the western part of the compound. In the bottom lefthand corner of the image, devices were detected on a road linking northern and southern Myawaddy Township.

KK Park is a notorious scam compound south of Myawaddy under the control of the KNA. It expanded rapidly from 2019 to 2024 to become one of the largest compounds in the region.[31] It is implicated in the harvesting and selling of trafficking victims’ organs when they refused to participate in scam operations.[32] In January 2025, the compound attracted global attention after Chinese actor Wang Xing was trafficked into and later rescued from the scam center, provoking widespread outrage in China.[33]

The European Union has sanctioned KNA members Lieutenant Colonel Mote Thun and Major Tin Win for their involvement in KK Park.[34] News media reported that one of the initial investors in KK Park was Wan Kuok-koi, a notorious Chinese crime boss of the 14K Triad[35] and reported owner of the Dongmei Zone scam center (discussed later), via overseas Chinese businesspeople, such as Wang Yicheng.[36]

One identifier ID, Device G, traveled between KK Park, two ministries, and the Presidential Palace in 2024. It also visited Son See Myaing township, home of the DKBA headquarters, as well as the Dongmei Zone, another scam compound linked to Wan.[37] Device G’s movements between Son See Myaing and the Presidential Palace in Naypyidaw indicate that the individual who owns this device may have met with leading officials in both regions. In March 2024, when Device G was first detected in Son See Myaing, the KNA had recently announced that it was changing its name from the Border Guard Force to the KNA to distance itself from the junta. The KNA declared it hadn’t communicated with the junta since its January 2024 announcement that it would no longer accept the junta’s financial support.[38] However, given that Device G was later found in Naypyidaw in December 2024, it is possible that some form of contact was reestablished.

Movements Between Scam Centers #

The relatively common and consistent movements between the Dongmei Zone, Taichang Park, and other scam center locations imply ongoing engagement between the various actors facilitating scam center operations locally. Devices were identified visiting at least two scam center locations a month for nine months during 2024, with no significant lull in activity during the year. While these compounds are affiliated with different criminal groups, there is frequent movement between them. Given the KNA and regional warlords’ role in supporting scam center operations and identifier ID’s regular visits to Shwe Kokko, it is also possible that the individuals carrying these devices are interacting with KNA affiliates while visiting other compounds or are KNA members themselves, though more evidence would be needed to confirm this phenomenon. In some cases, device owners’ frequent visits to cities like Bangkok, Hong Kong, and Taipei indicate potential affiliation with the international criminal groups operating these scam centers. These engagements suggest that some people can move between compounds with relative ease.

Taichang Park

Taichang Park. Devices H and I ((depicted in light blue and purple, respectively) showed up in this park, the southernmost location analyzed. Device H was detected crossing into and out of the scam center by crossing the river into Thailand. Device K (depicted in light green) was detected driving past the zone on the Thai side of the border.

Taichang Park, located in Kyaukhat town to the south of Myawaddy, is infamous for being one of the most violent scam compounds in all of Myawaddy.[39] The complex is heavily militarized and practices torture; Chinese media has reported that individuals have died in the facility, and testimonies describe victims hung by their arms in “dark rooms” where they are tased and denied food.[40] At least 160 victims have been trafficked from China, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Hong Kong.[41] Families in China seeking to rescue trafficked family members have had to pay upwards of 300,000 to 400,000 yuan (approximately US$41,000 to US$55,000) to local military personnel in Myawaddy Township, who have, in turn, paid off the compound owners to help them escape the facility.[42] These amounts far exceed China’s yearly per-capita gross domestic product.

DKBA leader Sai Kyaw Hla founded Taichang Park with the TransAsia International Company, a company the United States Institute of Peace identifies as a front for a Chinese mafia group.[43] Chinese media also links the compound to two kingpins from China’s Fujian Province: Liang Zong and Liao Zong (Dong Qing).[44]

No movements between Taichang Park and Naypyidaw were identified, but one identifier ID, Device H, moved between Taichang Park and Shwe Kokko. In Shwe Kokko, it visited an unidentified multi-floor site on the western side of the city that appears in historical Google Earth imagery to be under construction, with the first building in the structure constructed at the same time as Yatai New City.[45] The device was later identified inside Yatai New City, visiting one of the high rises known to house scam operations.

Taichang Park is affiliated with different kingpins than She Zhijiang and Yatai International Holdings,[46] so this device’s movements suggest Taichang Park engagement or potential collaboration with Shwe Kokko kingpins. Several other devices besides Device H regularly traveled to Bangkok, and others were identified as traveling to Hong Kong and Taipei, known centers of Chinese organized criminal activity.

Dongmei Zone

The Dongmei Zone. A large concentration of devices (distinguished by color) were detected directly within the scam center, while many devices also passed the center as their owners presumably drove across Myawaddy Township. Devices were occasionally detected on the Thai side of the border.

The Dongmei Zone is a compound set up by Wan Kuok-koi, a Chinese crime boss from Macau and former leader of the 14K Triad organized crime group.[47] Wan was arrested in Macau for various crimes, including loansharking, intimidation of casino employees, and suspected involvement in Chinese organized crime, in 1998 and released in 2012.[48] Since his release, Wan has declared that he is no longer involved in crime, though the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned Wan’s World Hongmen History and Culture Association (founded in Cambodia in 2018)[49] in December 2020 for operating what U.S. authorities describe as a criminal network.[50]

Built between 2020 and 2022,[51] the Dongmei Zone is south of Myawaddy and close to KK Park. The compound originally targeted individuals in China for trafficking and scam operations, though it has more recently expanded to focus on international targets, including Americans.[52] It is also known to have tortured trafficking victims.[53] The KNA provided security during the Dongmei Zone’s foundation laying ceremony and KNA soldiers accompanied the Zone’s leadership in a likely visit to the site.[54]

No movements between the park and Naypyidaw were identified, though over 100 individuals traveled between the Dongmei Zone and the other three scam center locations investigated. Selected movements from devices with the highest number of identifier ID signal appearances demonstrate regular travel between all four scam center locations investigated. While movements between the Dongmei Zone and KK Park were the most common (which could be explained by the fact that both parks are likely affiliated with Wan Kuok-koi), devices I, K, N, O, and P also traveled to Yatai New City and Device I traveled to Taichang Park.

Device P is notable for being frequently detected abroad. During the first half of the year, when it was identified in several scam center locations, it also visited sites in Thailand, Malaysia, and Cambodia. Following its visit to the Dongmei Zone in July, it spent time in Hong Kong in August and September and Taiwan in September and October. In Hong Kong, it was primarily identified in Yuen Long District in the New Territories, as well as Kowloon.[55]

Future Implications #

In the politically fractured Myawaddy area, it can be difficult to parse the exact nature of the relationship between central power in Naypyidaw and the scam centers, including among the criminal groups who manage them and the armed organizations they transact with. Movement data suggests that some of these compounds, particularly Yatai New City in Shwe Kokko, routinely engage with the Myanmar junta. This contributes to a growing body of evidence that engagement between scam centers extends across the region and links local militant groups, criminal actors, and political officials.

The methodology of tracking identifier ID movements between scam centers and Naypyidaw may be valuable in tracing future movements of scam center operations in Myanmar. Law enforcement has often taken a reactive approach to the scam centers operating in Myawaddy. However, in the future, tracing devices of note and identifying patterns in their movements may be used to identify where future scam centers are moving or developing, contributing to the adoption of a proactive approach in targeting scam center activity. In parallel, investigations should continue into the actors engaging with these scam centers, not only in Napyyidaw but also throughout the rest of Myawaddy, Karen State, Myanmar, and the world.

Annex #

Device A

  • Device A was found in Shwe Kokko between July 13 and July 17, 2024. The device stayed predominantly in a nondescript shopping area, but it visited an intersection between Kokko Resort and Yatai Staff Housing. Prior to its visit to Shwe Kokko, the device was identified in Naypyidaw’s Nan Oo Pagoda on June 16.

Device B

  • Device B was at an unidentified structure in a clearing just outside Shwe Kokko between March 16 and March 28. It had previously visited the Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 26. Later in the year, it made several visits to sites of note in Naypyidaw between November and December. The device was identified as being inside known ministerial housing on November 15 and December 3. On November 15, it also visited the southernmost Ministry of Health complex in Naypyidaw’s Ministry Zone. It visited the Ministry of Health’s northern complex in the Ministry Zone three times between December 10 and December 30, and on December 29 it was identified in the Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs once more.

Device C

  • Device C was identified in ministerial buildings in Naypyidaw in early July before traveling to Shwe Kokko at the end of the month. The device visited the Ministry of Transport and Communications on July 2, and was identified in ministerial housing on July 3 and between July 9 and July 10. On July 23, Device C appeared inside Yatai New City within Shwe Kokko, where it visited the suspected home of Saw Chit Thu. The device owner appears to be based out of Yangon since the device was mostly located within the city for most of 2024. After its trips to Naypyidaw and Shew Kokko in July, it continued to regularly visit Naypyidaw.

Device D

  • Device D was identified at the Myanmar Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation on July 22, 2024. Two weeks later, it appeared inside Yatai New City on August 4. Shortly afterward, it returned to Naypyidaw and was spotted at the Ministry of Energy on August 13.

Device E

  • Device E visited several ministries of note in Naypyidaw in mid-August 2024. On August 12, it visited the Ministry of Commerce’s northern and southern complexes, repeating its visit to the Ministry of Commerce on August 15. It visited the Naypyidaw Department of Rural Road Development on August 14, and on August 15 it visited the department once more. On this same day, it also appeared at the Ministry of Ethnic Affairs. Less than one week later, Device E appeared at a known border crossing between Shwe Kokko and Mae Sot on August 20, repeatedly visiting Yatai New City and the Kokko Resort from August 20 through August 23.

Device F

  • Device F repeatedly showed up in Naypyidaw in May and July 2024. The device was found at the Central Bank of Myanmar on May 21 and was later identified at the Ministry of Transport and Communications, Ministry of Sports and Youth Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce on July 9. On July 29, it visited both complexes of the Ministry of Health, and on July 30, it revisited the Ministry of Sports and Youth Affairs. Nine days later, on August 8, the device was identified inside Yatai New City.

Device G

  • Device G appeared in Myawaddy year-round in 2024, except for a lull in activity in November. The device’s owner drove past KK Park several times over the course of the year and was confirmed to have entered the complex on February 17. It also visited Son See Myaing township on two occasions: March 9 and May 29. It visited Minletpan, the town closest to the Dongmei Zone, every month except January and November, and it was identified within the park on April 26. It ventured to Naypyidaw in July and December, including visits to the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation on July 11 and December 8, the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Development on October 18, and (most notably) the Presidential Palace on December 14.

Device H

  • While Device H never showed up in Naypyidaw, it showed up in several scam compounds in the region, indicating a potential tie to the criminal groups managing these complexes. It was found in Taichang Park on six occasions, often for several days at a time: February 12-19, February 28-March 3, March 10, March 13-18, April 22, and May 6. It visited Shwe Kokko on March 23, where it was at an unidentified multi-floor site on the western side of the city that appears to be under construction, with the first building in the structure constructed at the same time as Yatai New City. It was later identified inside Yatai New City itself on April 5.

Device I

  • Device I was found in the Dongmei Zone every month except July. It also visited the other three compounds investigated in this report in October, including KK Park on October 7 and October 10, Yatai New City on October 11, and Taichang Park on October 19. While the reason for this flurry of visits is unknown, it is notable that it traveled across all investigated compounds in a short timeframe.

Device J

  • Device J appeared inside the Dongmei Zone on May 18. This followed regular visits to KK Park in January and February 2024.

Device K

  • Device K first appeared in Yatai New City between June 26 and June 27, before reappearing in the complex on July 5. It was then identified for much of the remaining year between the Dongmei Zone and KK Park. Specific dates are provided below.
    • Dongmei Zone: August 27, August 29, September 9 to December 31
    • KK Park: July 16, August 1-11, August 20-27, October 17, December 30

Device L

  • Device L was found in the Dongmei Zone from November 3 through November 16. On November 15, it also showed up at KK Park.

Device M

  • Device M was found in the Dongmei Zone between July 19 and July 30 and between August 6 and August 25. In August, it also visited KK Park on August 10, August 12, and August 22.

Device N

  • Device N was found in the Dongmei Zone yearly, appearing within the park every month of 2024. It also visited KK Park on April 29, May 2, and May 5, and appeared at Yatai New City on May 3.

Device O

  • This device was found in the Dongmei Zone from June 29 to July 12. Previously, it was at Yatai New City from May 19 to May 22.

Device P

  • Device P appeared in several scam centers in early 2024, including KK Park from January 4 to January 10 and Yatai New City from January 10 to February 13. From July 13 to July 28, it appeared in the Dongmei Zone.

Saw Chit Thu’s suspected home in Shwe Kokko.

Mytel cellphone coverage in Myanmar, 02/25/2025. Mytel is Myanmar’s largest telecommunications provider.[56]

On March 27, 2025, this article was updated to clarify regional borders and AdTech definitions.

[1]  Yantoultra Ngui, “Southeast Asia human trafficking now a global crisis, Interpol says,” Reuters, March 27, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/southeast-asia-human-trafficking-now-global-crisis-interpol-says-2024-03-27/.

[2] Jonathan Head, “Casinos, high-rises and fraud: The BBC visits a bizarre city built on scams,” BBC, February 06, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c04nx1vnw17o.

[3] Aidan Jones, “‘Scam city is growing’: how Myanmar’s cyber fraud hubs outfox efforts to shut them down,” myNews, January 13, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3294577/scam-city-growing-how-myanmars-cyber-fraud-hubs-outfox-efforts-shut-them-down; and Jason Tower and Priscilla A. Clapp, “China Forces Myanmar Scam Syndicates to Move to Thai Border,” United States Institute of Peace, April 22, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/04/china-forces-myanmar-scam-syndicates-move-thai-border.

[4] Yi Ni, “How the Game Is Changing for Scam Centers on the Myanmar-Thai Border,” The Irrawaddy, February 20, 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/in-person/interview/how-the-game-is-changing-for-scam-centers-on-the-myanmar-thai-border.html.

[5] Thet Htar Maung, “Myanmar Junta’s Hands Are Tied in Scam Center Crackdown,” The Irrawaddy, February 21, 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/myanmar-juntas-hands-are-tied-in-scam-center-crackdown.html; and Maung Kavi, “Myanmar Junta Boss Has Well Documented Ties to Cyber Scam Kingpins,” The Irrawaddy, February 28, 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-boss-has-well-documented-ties-to-cyber-scam-kingpins.html.

[6] Emily Fishbein, “‘A global monster’: Myanmar-based cyber scams widen the net,” Myanmar Frontier, August 24, 2024, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/a-global-monster-myanmar-based-cyber-scams-widen-the-net/.

[7] Clara Fong and Abigail McGowan, “How Myanmar Became a Global Center for Cyber Scams,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 31, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-myanmar-became-global-center-cyber-scams; and Sasha Jesperson, Henrik Alffram, Lisa Denney, and Pilar Domingo, “Trafficking for Forced Criminality: The Rise of Exploitation in Scam Centres in Southeast Asia,” ODI, produced in partnership with ASEAN-ACT (December 2023), https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/The_rise_of_exploitation_in_scam_centres_in_southeast_asia.pdf.

[8] Jason Tower and Priscilla A. Clapp, “Myanmar Scam Hubs Revive Fast After China Eases Pressure on Junta,” United States Institute of Peace, September 26, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/09/myanmar-scam-hubs-revive-fast-after-china-eases-pressure-junta.

[9] Andrew Nachemson, “Myanmar’s rebels liberate territory – administrating it is the next battle,” Al Jazeera, January 11, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/11/myanmars-rebels-liberate-territory-administrating-it-is-the-next-battle.

[10] The Three Brother Alliance, an ethnic armed organization alliance consisting of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, launched Operation 1027 to capture significant territory in northern Shan State along the Myanmar-China border. Yun Sun, “Operation 1027: Changing the tides of the Myanmar civil war?,” Brookings, January 16, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/operation-1027-changing-the-tides-of-the-myanmar-civil-war.

[11] Yun Sun, “Operation 1027: Changing the tides of the Myanmar civil war?,” Brookings, January 16, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/operation-1027-changing-the-tides-of-the-myanmar-civil-war/; and “Myanmar Junta Hails Scam Center ‘Crackdown’,” The Irrawaddy, February 08, 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-hails-scam-center-crackdown.html.

[12] Jintamas Saksornchai and Huizhong Wu, “Over 7,000 workers from scam centers in Myanmar are awaiting repatriation after a regional crackdown,” Associated Press, updated February 26, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/thailand-myanmar-online-scam-centers-repatriation-133efbf0529fafacf91a4aee27d48a87.

[13] Japhet Quitzon, “The Latest on Southeast Asia: Junta Recapture of Myawaddy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, blog post, April 25, 2024, https://www.csis.org/blogs/latest-southeast-asia/latest-southeast-asia-junta-recapture-myawaddy.  

[14] Thet Htar Maung, “Myanmar Junta’s Hands Are Tied in Scam Center Crackdown,” The Irrawaddy, February 21, 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/myanmar-juntas-hands-are-tied-in-scam-center-crackdown.html; and Nectar Gan, “How online scam warlords have made China start to lose patience with Myanmar’s junta,” CNN, December 19, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/19/china/myanmar-conflict-china-scam-centers-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html.

[15] VOA Burmese, “In Myanmar, internet restrictions and surveillance increase,” VOA, August 07, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/in-myanmar-internet-restrictions-and-surveillance-increase/7733716.html. See the appendix for a map of the phone coverage under Mytel, one of Myanmar’s largest mobile operators and a close affiliate company of the junta.

[16] Andrew Nachemson, “The mystery man behind the Shwe Kokko project,” Frontier Myanmar, July 07, 2020, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/the-mystery-man-behind-the-shwe-kokko-project/.

[17] Caleb Quinley and Khun Kali, “A sanctioned strongman and the ‘fall’ of Myanmar’s Myawaddy,” Al Jazeera, May 01, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/1/a-sanctioned-strongman-and-the-fall-of-myanmars-myawaddy. 

[18] Yatai’s parent company, Jilin Yatai Group Co., Ltd., is chaired by Song Shanglong (宋尚龙). WireScreen dataset. Last accessed: 02/13/2025; and Jonathan Head, “Casinos, high-rises and fraud: The BBC visits a bizarre city built on scams,” BBC, February 06, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c04nx1vnw17o.

[19] Poppy Mcpherson and Panu Wongcha-um, “Detained tycoon She Zhijiang, who says he spied for China, alleges abuse in Thai jail,” Reuters, January 26, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/gambling-tycoon-abused-thai-jail-after-saying-he-spied-china-lawyers-say-2025-01-24/.

[20] Head, “Casinos, high-rises and fraud,” BBC.

[21] Saw Kapi, “Shwe Kokko: How governance failures and political quagmire created Myanmar’s most notorious crime hub,” Myanmar Now, January 28, 2025, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/shwe-kokko-how-governance-failures-and-political-quagmire-created-myanmars-most-notorious-crime-hub/.

[22] “Scam City: How the coup brought Shwe Kokko back to life”, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/scam-city-how-the-coup-brought-shwe-kokko-back-to-life/

[23] “Scam City: How the coup brought Shwe Kokko back to life”, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/scam-city-how-the-coup-brought-shwe-kokko-back-to-life/

[24] Head, “Casinos, high-rises and fraud,” BBC.

[25] “A day in the life of a Shwe Kokko scammer,” Frontier Myanmar, June 01, 2023, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/a-day-in-the-life-of-a-shwe-kokko-scammer/; and Naw Betty Han, “‘Business is back’: BGF adapts under pressure,” Frontier Myanmar, April 08, 2024, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/business-is-back-bgf-adapts-under-pressure/.

[26] Jason Tower and Priscilla A. Clapp, “China Forces Myanmar Scam Syndicates to Move to Thai Border,” United States Institute of Peace, April 22, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/04/china-forces-myanmar-scam-syndicates-move-thai-border.

[27] Google Maps, Google Earth

[28] While the exact address of Saw Thit Thu’s home, popularly referred to as “Kokko Villa,” is not publicly available, PAI suggests this location. Kokko Villa is described as an “incongruously opulent home” in Shwe Kokko. In Google Earth imagery of Shwe Kokko between 2009 and 2017, one structure, visibly the largest in the city, is gated and flanked by a café bearing Saw Chit Thu’s name. In that same Google data, the structure is labeled “Government building.” C4ADS found no other structures in Shwe Kokko which corresponded in size and security protections to the description of Saw Chit Thu’s home in local news media. Google Earth; https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/scam-city-how-the-coup-brought-shwe-kokko-back-to-life/

[29] Grant Peck, “China’s foreign minister meets with Myanmar’s military boss as civil war strains their relations,” Associated Press, August 14, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-china-foreign-minister-civil-war-277613b65eae72e7e1dbd442232b6481.

[30] Sean Turnell, “How Myanmar’s Central Bank Facilitates the Junta’s Oppression,” United States Institute of Peace, July 11, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/07/how-myanmars-central-bank-facilitates-juntas-oppression.

[31] “Who powered the expansion of cyber scams in Myawaddy?,” Justice for Myanmar, March 04, 2025, https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/who-powered-the-expansion-of-cyber-scams-in-myawaddy.

[32] Priscilla A. Clapp and Jason Tower, “A Criminal Cancer Spreads in Southeast Asia,” United States Institute of Peace, June 26, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/06/criminal-cancer-spreads-southeast-asia.

[33] Koh Ewe, “How a viral post saved a Chinese actor from Myanmar’s scam centres,” BBC News, January 09, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd606l1407no.

[34] Mote Thun is the deputy general secretary of the KNA and rivals Saw Chit Thu in power (especially south of Myawaddy), while Tin Win is a direct subordinate of Saw Chit Thu’s support and benefits from revenue derived from KK Park and other scam center compounds. Council of the European Union, “Implementing Regulation (EU) No 401/2013 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Myanmar/Burma,”October 22, 2024, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11972-2024-INIT/en/pdf; and Tower and Clapp, “China Forces Myanmar Scam Syndicates to Move to Thai Border,” United States Institute of Peace, April 22, 2024.

[35] The Hong Kong-based 14K Triad is one of the most successful Chinese criminal groups. Triads, criminal syndicates which trace their roots to secret societies and trade associations in Qing Dynasty China, and many engage in a wide range of illicit activities including drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal gambling, and racketeering. Vanda Felbab-Brown, Diana Paz García, and Vibha Bajji, “Chinese crime and geopolitics in 2024”, Brookings, January 29, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinese-crime-and-geopolitics-in-2024/; and Austin Ramzy, “What Are the Triads, and What Is Their History of Violence?”, The New York Times, July 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/world/asia/hong-kong-triads-protests.html

[36] Wang received tens of millions of dollars of cryptocurrency from scams conducted at KK Park (which moved to his account via a complex series of transfers between various crypto wallets). See Poppy McPherson and Tom Wilson, “Crypto scam: Inside the billion-dollar ‘pig-butchering’ industry,” Reuters, November 23, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/fintech-crypto-fraud-thailand/; Pulitzer Center, “Inside the Chinese-Run Crime Hubs of Myanmar that Are Conning the World,” July 22, 2023, https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/exclusive-inside-chinese-run-crime-hubs-myanmar-are-conning-world-we-can-kill-you-here.

[37] Naw Betty Han, “Proxy land deals flourish near DKBA headquarters”, Frontier Myanmar, February 7, 2020, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/proxy-land-deals-flourish-near-dkba-headquarters/, and Jason Tower and Priscilla A. Clapp, “China Forces Myanmar Scam Syndicates to Move to Thai Border,” United States Institute of Peace, April 22, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/04/china-forces-myanmar-scam-syndicates-move-thai-border.

[38] Aung Naing, “Karen BGF to rename itself ‘Karen National Army’,” Myanmar Now, March 06, 2024, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/karen-bgf-to-rename-itself-karen-national-army/.

[39] Cordelia Lynch, “SCAM: Inside Asia’s Criminal Network,” Sky News, , https://news.sky.com/story/they-fall-in-love-with-me-inside-the-fraud-factories-driving-the-online-scam-boom-13234505, accessed February 12, 2025.

[40] “网友爆料：曝光泰昌园区 百亿集团 这个园区跟kk有的比,”December 23, 2023, https://www.bodu365.co/a/153882.html; and Cordelia Lynch, “SCAM: Inside Asia’s Criminal Network,” Sky News,  https://news.sky.com/story/they-fall-in-love-with-me-inside-the-fraud-factories-driving-the-online-scam-boom-13234505, accessed February 12, 2025.

[41] “遊泰注意丨比KK園更可怕的「泰昌園區」　男子被賣豬仔爆唯一可離開條件：無人成功過,”December 01, 2024, https://tinyurl.com/tz5zxte4.

[42] “重大爆料：妙瓦底泰昌园区最黑电诈集团老板！”June 13, 2024, https://www.wgi888.com/news/174152.html.

[43] Jason Tower and Priscilla A. Clapp, “China Forces Myanmar Scam Syndicates to Move to Thai Border,” United States Institute of Peace, April 22, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/04/china-forces-myanmar-scam-syndicates-move-thai-border.

[44] Their names are 连总 and 廖总（冬青）in Chinese. “重大爆料：妙瓦底泰昌园区最黑电诈集团老板！”June 13, 2024, https://cn.wgi888.com/news/174152.html All Chinese titles should be translated and follow in parens. Look at C4ADS’ Pangolins report from 2021 (or 2020). There should also be a writer and date, like any other FN.

[45] Google Earth

[46] Jason Tower and Priscilla A. Clapp, “China Forces Myanmar Scam Syndicates to Move to Thai Border,” United States Institute of Peace, April 22, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/04/china-forces-myanmar-scam-syndicates-move-thai-border.

[47] “Who powered the expansion of cyber scams in Myawaddy?,” Justice for Myanmar, March 04, 2025, https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/who-powered-the-expansion-of-cyber-scams-in-myawaddy.

[48] Bertil Lintner, “‘Broken Tooth’: The Face of Chinese Investment in Myanmar,” The Irrawaddy, July 17, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/broken-tooth-the-face-of-chinese-investment-in-myanmar-2.html.

[49] Feliz Solomon and Clarence Leong, “The Elusive Crime Boss Linked to Billion-Dollar ‘Pig Butchering’ Scams,” The Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-mafia-broken-tooth-wan-kuok-koi-online-fraud-scam-70c09afb.

[50] United Nations, Transnational Organized Crime and the Convergence of Cyber-Enabled Fraud, Underground Banking and Technological Innovation in Southeast Asia: A Shifting Threat Landscape (Vienna: UNODC, October 2024), https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2024/TOC_Convergence_Report_2024.pdf; and Solomon and Leong, “The Elusive Crime Boss Linked to Billion-Dollar ‘Pig Butchering’ Scams.”

[51] Isabelle Qian, “7 Months Inside an Online Scam Labor Camp,” The New York Times, December 17, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/12/17/world/asia/myanmar-cyber-scam.html.

[52] Qian, “7 Months Inside an Online Scam Labor Camp.”

[53] Qian, “7 Months Inside an Online Scam Labor Camp.”

[54] “The Karen Border Guard Force/Karen National Army criminal business network exposed,” Justice for Myanmar, May 22, 2024, https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/the-karen-border-guard-force-karen-national-army-criminal-business-network-exposed.

[55] Elson Tong, “Explainer: The Yuen Long mob attacks and Hong Kong’s triads – why do some consider the New Territories ‘lawless’?” Hong Kong Free Press, updated April 13, 2020, https://hongkongfp.com/2019/07/27/explainer-yuen-long-mob-attacks-hong-kongs-triads-consider-new-territories-lawless/; Austin Ramzy, “What Are the Triads, and What Is Their History of Violence?” The New York Times, July 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/world/asia/hong-kong-triads-protests.html

[56] “Mytel’s 3G / 4G / 5G coverage map in Martaban, Myanmar (Burma).” Accessed 02/25/2025. https://www.nperf.com/en/map/MM/1310460.Martaban/137098.Mytel/signal?ll=16.52834&lg=97.6157&zoom=12.

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