Bulldozed
In 2023, Lalith Ramyasiri began working on a deep tunnel irrigation project in Sri Lanka led by China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC), a state-owned defense enterprise with operations in the United States that was debarred in 2009 from World Bank projects.[1] Nine months later, CSCEC reportedly dismissed him for speaking out against the company’s mistreatment of local workers.[2] Ramyasiri was one of hundreds of workers in Sri Lanka’s North Central Province who publicly decried labor abuses and faced retaliation as a result. [3]
Executive Summary #
The United States has made countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) a top policy priority. Congress advanced legislation in 2023 including the BRIDGE and Belt and Road Oversight Acts that tightened the observation and study of Chinese strategic investments. In 2024, a series of “China Week” bills continued to hone U.S. policy against the “military, economic, ideological, and technological threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party,” while the STRATEGIC Act outlined a competitive strategy against China via U.S. investments in infrastructure, diplomacy, security, and sanction monitoring and assessment.[4]
Lost in the legislative noise are reports of costly outcomes for host countries on BRI investment projects. According to AidData, as of 2021, instances of financial, environmental, and labor crimes had been found in as many as 35 percent of BRI projects.[5] Several companies involved in BRI projects have been sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Commerce or identified by the U.S. Department of Defense as being involved in key military activities for the People’s Liberation Army, while many others have failed to live up to international norms for responsible capital investment.[6] Two Chinese companies debarred and suspended by the World Bank for corruption, China State Construction and Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) and China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), are now spearheading BRI investments globally.
This commentary uses three major implementers for China’s BRI to demonstrate the range of environmental, social, and political implications that have arisen from their investments:
- In Sri Lanka’s North Central Province, where China State Construction and Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) is constructing a deep tunnel irrigation system, local workers have reportedly spoken out about unfair wages, denial of meal breaks, and generally poor working conditions.[7] The World Bank previously debarred CSCEC in 2009 for corruption charges, blocking its access to World Bank Group financing for a period of six years.[8]
- Although China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) was subject to an 8-year debarment from the World Bank for corrupt activities in 2009, Western banks and investment companies like Norges Bank, Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley appeared as shareholders in CCCC’s financial reports between 2012 and 2015, temporarily raising the risk profile of those institutions.[9] Media reporting indicates that CCCC committed corruption again in 2024, when it was found guilty by a Kenyan court for using shell companies to evade US$8 million in taxes.[10]
- In 2021, CCCC subsidiary China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) was fined €200,000 for damaging riverbanks along the UNESCO-protected Tara River during a highway construction project in Montenegro.[11] Over the past decade, CRBC has been accused of environmental damage multiple times.[12]
Using Chinese trade and outbound investment data and official government reporting, we measured the reach of these companies to identify which BRI host nations may be subject to harmful business practices.[13] U.S. government agencies must leverage all data and enforcement mechanisms available to respond to increasing policy pressure to monitor and counter Chinese strategic influence. In parallel, in regions with significant Chinese economic influence, multinational corporations (particularly in the United States and European Union), as well as financial institutions, must carefully evaluate potential secondary sanctions risks.
Background #
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) like China State Construction Engineering Corporation (hereafter CSCEC) and China Communications Construction Company (hereafter CCCC) are spearheading numerous BRI infrastructure projects, leaving behind a widely reported track record of labor abuses, corrupt activity, and environmental harm in host nations. CSCEC and CCCC are large, publicly traded construction companies that are directly funded by the Chinese government.[14] CSCEC and CCCC are both designated by the U.S. Department of Defense as “Chinese military companies operating in the United States” and part of China’s military-civil fusion strategy.[15] In 2009, CSCEC and CCCC were debarred by the World Bank for six and eight years respectively following a corruption case in the Philippines.[16] In 2020, CCCC was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) for facilitating militarization in the South China Sea.[17]
The military emphasis of these enforcement measures allows these companies to act with wide latitude in other potentially sanctionable activities. CSCEC, CCCC, and CCCC’s majority-owned subsidiaries, like China Road and Bridge Corporation (hereafter CRBC), remain active on nearly every continent and are widely seen as violating labor, economic, and environmental regulations overseas.
Chinese SOEs heavily fund the BRI, and Western companies and banks have transacted with these SOEs despite enforcement and regulatory actions that publicly raised the SOEs’ risk profiles.[18] According to CCCC’s financial reports from 2012 to 2015, while its World Bank debarment was still in effect, CCCC’s shareholders, although no longer listed as such, included Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and other Western investment companies.[19] According to Deutsche Bank’s own social media, CSCEC’s Middle East subsidiary signed a cooperative agreement with Deutsche Bank in October 2024, nine months after CSCEC was added to the DOD’s 2024 list of PRC military companies.[20]
Companies and Commensurate Risks #
Below we discuss three BRI companies—China State Construction Engineering Company (CSCEC), China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), and China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) —and their reported human, financial, and environmental security violations. These case studies represent a subset of reported violations that these companies have been accused of in host nations.
Labor Mistreatment
Local media outlets have reported on CSCEC’s record of labor mistreatment, among other alleged violations, in multiple BRI host nations.[21] According to public reporting, 600 Sri Lankan workers on a CSCEC-led project came forward in 2023 to voice their concerns about wage disparities and poor working conditions.[22] Protests reportedly broke out in Sri Lanka’s North Central province and drew attention to their grievances, which included denial of meal breaks, deceptive insurance schemes, and even physical assault.[23] Local workers also spoke out against lower wages and fewer benefits than their Chinese counterparts, a common issue in BRI host nations.[24]
Photographs of the signing ceremony between Deutsche Bank and CSCEC Middle East in October 2024.
CSCEC continues to have a broad global reach: as mentioned previously, Deutsche Bank publicized its signing of a cooperative agreement with CSCEC’s Middle East subsidiary in October of 2024.[25] Chinese trade data suggests that, between 2019 and 2024, CSCEC sent the highest number of shipments to Algeria, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Bahrain.[26] According to outbound investment data from China’s Ministry of Commerce, CSCEC has been approved more than once by the Chinese government to conduct business in Algeria, Argentina, Hong Kong, Kazakhstan, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and the Maldives.[27] Weekly reports from China’s official BRI portal show that CSCEC has operated in numerous countries since 2021, including Egypt, Algeria, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, the UAE, and the Philippines.[28]
Due to CSCEC’s reported track record of abuse in BRI host nations, the countries noted above—along with any company or bank with investments or cooperative agreements with CSCEC and its majority-owned subsidiaries—are at risk of exposure to such illicit activity, as well as commensurate enforcement actions.
CSCEC led a high-rise construction project in Colombo via its wholly owned Sri Lanka branch.
Corruption and Fraud
Local media outlets have accused Chinese BRI companies of facilitating corrupt activities while conducting their business overseas, including fraudulent bidding, bribery, collusion, and predatory lending.[29] Media reporting flagged these companies’ alleged violations before the BRI even launched; CSCEC, CCCC, and others have been blacklisted for corruption as early as 2009.[30] Western companies’ previous investments in CCCC put them at risk of exposure to these illicit activities.
The World Bank debarred CCCC in 2009 for fraudulent activity in the Philippines.[31] Allegations of fraud surfaced again in August 2024, when the Kenyan Revenue Authority (KRA) won a case against CCCC and recovered 1.05 billion Kenyan shillings (US$8 million) in evaded taxes.[32] The KRA conducted an audit of CCCC in 2023 and concluded that CCCC avoided payments and transferred income through shell companies in a complex tax evasion scheme.[33] CCCC also claimed input value-added tax (VAT) for goods and services that were never supplied.[34] CCCC filed an appeal, but Kenya’s Tax Appeals Tribunal dismissed it, and CCCC was ultimately found guilty of evading taxes in Kenya.[35] This case illustrates CCCC’s history of fraudulent activity in BRI host nations, and how government agencies can effectively intervene.
Chinese trade data suggests that, between 2019 and 2024, CCCC sent the highest number of shipments to Djibouti, the Maldives, Malaysia, Kenya, and Ethiopia.[36] According to outbound investment data from China’s Ministry of Commerce, CCCC has been approved more than once by the Chinese government to conduct business in Brazil, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, South Africa, and the United States.[37] Weekly reports from China’s official BRI portal shows that CCCC has operated in several countries since 2021, including Malaysia, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria, Peru, Singapore, and the DRC.[38]
Due to CCCC’s past violations in BRI host nations, the countries mentioned above are at risk of exposure to illicit activity via dealings with CCCC and majority-owned subsidiaries like CRBC.
Network chart of CCCC subsidiaries that have operated in Kenya. [Wirescreen]
Environmental Degradation
The news media has repeatedly reported on allegations of Chinese BRI companies violating local environmental regulations and harming the environment in host nations.[39] This environmental damage ranges from air and water pollution to habitat destruction.
CRBC, a majority-owned subsidiary of CCCC, is under scrutiny for reportedly violating environmental regulations in BRI host nations. In 2021, CRBC was sued and fined €200,000 (US$236,600) for damaging riverbanks along the Tara River while constructing a highway in Montenegro.[40] The river, which runs through a UNESCO World Heritage Site, was polluted and visibly damaged, apparently as a result of the US$1 Billion CRBC project.[41] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that local environmental groups raised concerns of environmental damage to the Chinese builders.[42] Local news outlets documented the damage done to the Tara River after the fact.[43]
CRBC led the Bar-Boljare highway project through its wholly owned Montenegro branch.
Chinese trade data suggests that, between 2019 and 2024, CRBC sent the highest number of shipments to Mauritania, Mauritius, Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Croatia, Kenya, and Montenegro.[44] According to outbound investment data from China’s Ministry of Commerce, CRBC has been approved more than once by the Chinese government to conduct business in Hong Kong, Kenya, Mauritius, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Senegal, Serbia, and Turkey.[45] Weekly reports from China’s official BRI portal show that CRBC has operated in numerous countries since 2021, including Indonesia, Kenya, Cambodia, Cote d’Ivoire, Serbia, Kyrgyzstan, Senegal, Croatia, and the Philippines.[46]
Due to CRBC’s track record of abuse in BRI host nations, C4ADS finds that Indonesia, Senegal, and the remaining countries mentioned above are especially at risk of exposure to CRBC’s illicit activity.
Photographs of the Tara River damage caused by CRBC. Source: Nataša Kovačević, courtesy of Radio Free Europe
Conclusion and Recommendations #
Media reporting, Chinese trade data, outbound investment data, and official government reports indicate that negligent and sanctioned BRI companies continue to operate globally, despite ongoing international scrutiny. This indicates that sanctions imposed against them are ineffective in curbing their harmful footprint. More importantly, it alerts local governments and enforcement bodies, as well as private-sector actors, to a rapidly expanding threat to their stability.
These findings converge to expose a systematic approach to international business that fundamentally challenges existing global economic norms and frameworks of governance. Recent U.S. legislative efforts—including the STRATEGIC Act, the BRIDGE Act, and the Belt and Road Oversight Act—signal an increasingly robust stance toward Chinese economic expansion. However, the longer stakeholders wait, the more they compromise their ability to effectively respond.
The evidence presented here substantiates more aggressive responses, including:
Private sector: Prevention of inadvertent or indirect investment in malign BRI activity. Deutsche Bank’s recent agreement with CSCEC Middle East suggests that international investment in BRI companies remain a reputational concern. Banks risk exposure to BRI networks not only through direct investment but also via indirect channels, such as correspondent banking and cross-border transactions.[47] Inadvertent facilitation of malign activity could expose banks to future legal and compliance risks in the event of further public controversies or enforcement actions. While Western financial institutions have withdrawn significantly from the BRI in recent years, some companies remain invested.[48] Those continuing to engage must rigorously vet partners and clients to avoid reputational damage and mitigate the risks of doing business with BRI-linked companies.
U.S. and EU enforcement agencies: The creation of BRI-specific watchlists that account for labor, economic, and environmental violations in BRI host nations.
Multinational institutions: Further listing and debarring of companies with track records of illicit activity.
Host nation procurement and revenue authorities: Enhanced due diligence before allowing BRI companies, especially sanctioned ones, to participate in public bidding.
- Following agreements with BRI companies, revenue authorities in host nations should routinely conduct audits. CCCC’s recent negligence in Kenya shows that BRI-driven corruption remains a pervasive issue and that governments should continue leveraging accountability mechanisms.
Finally, civil society organizations (CSOs) in host nations play a crucial role by raising these issues with their local governments and advocating for local staff, economies, and environmental protection. In parallel with their efforts, foreign government stakeholders must continue to protect press freedom as CSOs bring these stakes to light.
C4ADS would like to thank Bright Data and Wirescreen for their support on this project.
[1] https://ceylontoday.lk/2023/11/25/chinese-company-dismisses-12-local-workers-for-protesting-over-their-rights/; https://www.dailymirror.lk/print/asia/Plight-of-Sri-Lankan-workers-in-Chinese-led-project-unveiled/81-272630; http://www.china.org.cn/business/news/2009-01/16/content_17143299.htm; https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/dem/release/menendez-raises-questions-after-chinese-state-owned-company-receives-multimillion-contract-for-trump-golf-club-; https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jan/31/2003384819/-1/-1/0/1260H-LIST.PDF
[2] https://ceylontoday.lk/2023/11/25/chinese-company-dismisses-12-local-workers-for-protesting-over-their-rights/; https://www.dailymirror.lk/print/asia/Plight-of-Sri-Lankan-workers-in-Chinese-led-project-unveiled/81-272630
[3] https://ceylontoday.lk/2023/11/25/chinese-company-dismisses-12-local-workers-for-protesting-over-their-rights/; https://www.dailymirror.lk/print/asia/Plight-of-Sri-Lankan-workers-in-Chinese-led-project-unveiled/81-272630
[4] https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/press-releases/china-week-recap-congress-passes-25-bills-combat-chinese-communist-party; https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/5131#:~:text=5131%20%2D%20STRATEGIC%20Act%20of%202024%20118th%20Congress%20(2023%2D2024)
[5] https://docs.aiddata.org/reports/delivering-the-belt-and-road.html
[6] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/22/2020-28031/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-revision-of-entry-on-the-entity-list-and-removal-of-entities#page-83420; https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jan/31/2003384819/-1/-1/0/1260H-LIST.PDF
[7] https://www.dailymirror.lk/print/asia/Plight-of-Sri-Lankan-workers-in-Chinese-led-project-unveiled/81-272630; https://ceylontoday.lk/2023/11/25/chinese-company-dismisses-12-local-workers-for-protesting-over-their-rights/
[8] https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/dem/release/menendez-raises-questions-after-chinese-state-owned-company-receives-multimillion-contract-for-trump-golf-club-; http://www.china.org.cn/business/news/2009-01/16/content_17143299.htm
[9] https://en.ccccltd.cn/tzzgx/dxbg/201601/P020210820520443729401.pdf; https://en.ccccltd.cn/tzzgx/dxbg/201312/P020210820520440892634.pdf; https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2011/07/29/world-bank-applies-2009-debarment-to-china-communications-construction-company-limited-for-fraud-in-philippines-roads-project
[10] https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/business/2024/08/kra-wins-sh1bn-vat-fraud-case-against-chinese-firm/
[11] https://support4partnership.org/en/news/a-chinese-company-was-fined-200000-euros-for-destroying-tara
[12] https://www.apricusjournals.com/index.php/jus-l-bulletin/article/download/66/26; https://sayari.com/resources/chinese-mining-company-affected-by-protests-in-kyrgyzstan-has-ties-to-major-soe/
[13] This dataset contains 17 million rows of Chinese trade data. It was purchased from a third-party trade data aggregator. This dataset covers shipments from January 2019 to December 2021, November 2022 to October 2023, and December 2023 to May 2024. It includes bills of lading collected from shippers. Chinese trade data is known to be inaccessible, as the Chinese government does not publish complete trade records. Given its incompleteness, it’s possible that some shipments used in this analysis were part of a transshipment.
[14] https://www.cscec.com.cn/; https://www.ccccltd.cn/
[15] https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jan/31/2003384819/-1/-1/0/1260H-LIST.PDF; https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/article/3661985/dod-releases-list-of-peoples-republic-of-china-prc-military-companies-in-accord/
[16] http://www.china.org.cn/business/news/2009-01/16/content_17143299.htm; https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/dem/release/menendez-raises-questions-after-chinese-state-owned-company-receives-multimillion-contract-for-trump-golf-club-; https://www.reuters.com/article/oukwd-uk-worldbank-corruption-idAFTRE50E0GX20090115/; https://www.csis.org/analysis/corruption-flows-along-chinas-belt-and-road; https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2011/07/29/world-bank-applies-2009-debarment-to-china-communications-construction-company-limited-for-fraud-in-philippines-roads-project
[17] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/22/2020-28031/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-revision-of-entry-on-the-entity-list-and-removal-of-entities#page-83420; https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-imposes-restrictions-on-certain-prc-state-owned-enterprises-and-executives-for-malign-activities-in-the-south-china-sea/
[18] https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/no.225.pdf; https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2023/02/04/2003793675?utm_; https://www.wsj.com/world/as-exxon-pumps-guyanas-oil-china-is-winning-battle-for-influence-9a8b657c
[19] https://www.ccccltd.cn/tzzgx/dqbg/yjbga/2015A/202209/P020220907597949431901.pdf; http://www.ccccltd.cn:8080/tzzgx/dqbg/yjbga/2014A/202209/P020220907598207134495.pdf; https://en.ccccltd.cn/tzzgx/dxbg/201312/P020210820520440892634.pdf; https://en.ccccltd.cn/tzzgx/ggl/202410/P020241030627110301718.pdf
[20] https://www.linkedin.com/posts/deutsche-bank_globalhausbank-construction-middleeast-activity-7260115184952696832-_YYs/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop; https://news.goalfore.cn/topstories/detail/73048.html; https://web.archive.org/web/20241112205025/https://news.goalfore.cn/topstories/detail/73048.html; https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jan/31/2003384819/-1/-1/0/1260H-LIST.PDF
[21] https://www.dailymirror.lk/print/asia/Plight-of-Sri-Lankan-workers-in-Chinese-led-project-unveiled/81-272630; https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3264778/world-bank-finds-chinese-company-committed-violations-bolivian-infrastructure-project; https://nation.africa/kenya/news/chinese-contractor-sued-over-delays-impropriety-3691752; https://civicidea.ge/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/CSCEC-IN-GEORGIA.pdf
[22] https://www.dailymirror.lk/print/asia/Plight-of-Sri-Lankan-workers-in-Chinese-led-project-unveiled/81-272630
[23] https://ceylontoday.lk/2023/11/25/chinese-company-dismisses-12-local-workers-for-protesting-over-their-rights/; https://www.dailymirror.lk/print/asia/Plight-of-Sri-Lankan-workers-in-Chinese-led-project-unveiled/81-272630
[24] https://www.dailymirror.lk/print/asia/Plight-of-Sri-Lankan-workers-in-Chinese-led-project-unveiled/81-272630; https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/4D317CDC8A2AE2B55BA5C0A211B12542; https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/01171968231209857?icid=int.sj-abstract.citing-articles.29
[25] https://www.linkedin.com/posts/deutsche-bank_globalhausbank-construction-middleeast-activity-7260115184952696832-_YYs/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop
[26] Chinese Trade Data
[27] Chinese MOFCOM Outbound Investment Data
[28] https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/project; https://www.cscec.com/zgjz_new/gyzj/zzjg_new/hwbsc_new/ofdq/202411/3828127.html; https://www.cscec.com/zgjz_new/gyzj/zzjg_new/hwbsc_new/ofdq/201712/2633104.html; https://www.cscec.com/zgjz_new/gyzj/zzjg_new/hwbsc_new/ytdq/201712/2630400.html; https://www.cscec.com/zgjz_new/gyzj/zzjg_new/hwbsc_new/ytdq/201712/2630331.html; https://www.cscec.com/zgjz_new/gyzj/zzjg_new/hwbsc_new/ytdq/201712/2609115.html; https://www.cscec.com/zgjz_new/gyzj/zzjg_new/hwbsc_new/ytdq/201712/2630395.html; https://www.cscec.com/zgjz_new/gyzj/zzjg_new/hwbsc_new/ytdq/201712/2630332.html
[29] http://www.china.org.cn/business/news/2009-01/16/content_17143299.htm; https://civicidea.ge/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/CSCEC-IN-GEORGIA.pdf; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-09-19/a-chinese-company-reshaping-the-world-leaves-a-troubled-trail?sref=OrVjKRhh; https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/2129493/bangladesh-blacklists-chinese-construction-firm-cancels-highway; https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/kenya-revelations-shine-a-light-on-chinas-predatory-lending-practices/; https://www.cgdev.org/article/new-study-shines-light-beijings-secretive-international-lending-program
[30] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2011/07/29/world-bank-applies-2009-debarment-to-china-communications-construction-company-limited-for-fraud-in-philippines-roads-project; https://www.reuters.com/article/oukwd-uk-worldbank-corruption-idAFTRE50E0GX20090115/
[31] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2011/07/29/world-bank-applies-2009-debarment-to-china-communications-construction-company-limited-for-fraud-in-philippines-roads-project
[32] https://theinformer.co.ke/67747/kra-win-sh1-1billion-tax-evasion-case-against-chinese-firm-china-communications-construction-company/; https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/business/article/2001500865/chinese-firm-found-guilty-of-evading-over-sh-1-billion-in-taxes
[33] https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/business/2024/08/kra-wins-sh1bn-vat-fraud-case-against-chinese-firm/; https://www.citizen.digital/news/kra-wins-ksh1-billion-tax-evasion-case-against-chinese-firm-n347764
[34] https://www.citizen.digital/news/kra-wins-ksh1-billion-tax-evasion-case-against-chinese-firm-n347764; https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/business/2024/08/kra-wins-sh1bn-vat-fraud-case-against-chinese-firm/; https://theinformer.co.ke/67747/kra-win-sh1-1billion-tax-evasion-case-against-chinese-firm-china-communications-construction-company/
[35] https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/business/article/2001500865/chinese-firm-found-guilty-of-evading-over-sh-1-billion-in-taxes
[36] Chinese Trade Data
[37] Chinese MOFCOM Outbound Investment Data
[38] https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/project; https://www.enanyang.my/财经新闻/中国交建助力大马发展; https://www.sohu.com/a/820313813_121123712; http://www.xinhuanet.com/2021-10/16/c_1127964776.htm; https://xindemarinenews.com/china/16584.html; https://www.ccccltd.cn/news/gsyw/202411/t20241118_217359.html; https://www.ccccltd.cn/tzzgx/ggth/hg/202407/P020240726617261622993.pdf
[39] https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3264778/world-bank-finds-chinese-company-committed-violations-bolivian-infrastructure-project; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-09-19/a-chinese-company-reshaping-the-world-leaves-a-troubled-trail?sref=OrVjKRhh; https://support4partnership.org/en/news/a-chinese-company-was-fined-200000-euros-for-destroying-tara; https://www.apricusjournals.com/index.php/jus-l-bulletin/article/download/66/26
[40] https://support4partnership.org/en/news/a-chinese-company-was-fined-200000-euros-for-destroying-tara; https://en.vijesti.me/news-b/society/716076/imcg-Chinese-company-devastated-Tara-under-the-veil-of-secrecy-and-negligence; https://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-billion-dollar-chinese-highway/32217524.html; https://balkaninsight.com/2024/01/11/chinese-constructor-fails-to-repair-damage-to-protected-river-in-montenegro/; https://www.cdm.me/english/montenegro-sues-crbc-over-environmental-damage-to-the-tara-river/. Conversion uses average exchange rate in 2021 per https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/EUR-USD-spot-exchange-rates-history-2021.html.
[41] https://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-chinese-tara-canyon-damage-unesco-bridge/31256794.html
[42] https://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-billion-dollar-chinese-highway/32217524.html
[43] https://en.vijesti.me/news-b/society/716076/imcg-Chinese-company-devastated-Tara-under-the-veil-of-secrecy-and-negligence
[44] Chinese Trade Data
[45] Chinese MOFCOM Outbound Investment Data
[46] https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/project; https://www.crbc.com/site/crbc/78269/index.html; http://www.news.cn/silkroad/20250323/ad8f06c408714161a52f787db4ce82fa/c.html?page=7; http://www.news.cn/world/20241102/b89638b4023e4aa48ee0330859b08fe6/c.html; https://www.sohu.com/a/717303759_163278; http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2024/0502/c1002-40227963.html; http://www.siluxgc.com/static/content/jejsst/kgNews/2025-03-12/1349460216202674176.html; https://balkaninsight.com/2024/01/11/chinese-constructor-fails-to-repair-damage-to-protected-river-in-montenegro/; https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/82580.html
[47] https://www.theasianbanker.com/updates-and-articles/deutsche-bank-accelerates-correspondent-banking-and-rmb-payments; https://media.odi.org/documents/Financial_Architecture_Brief_Final.pdf; https://www.sanctions.io/blog/correspondent-banking-and-money-laundering-risks?utm_; https://www.moodys.com/web/en/us/kyc/resources/insights/money-laundering-risks-correspondent-banking.html?utm_
[48] https://en.ccccltd.cn/tzzgx/dxbg/202403/P020240430625761317276.pdf; https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2023/02/04/2003793675?utm_; https://www.wsj.com/world/as-exxon-pumps-guyanas-oil-china-is-winning-battle-for-influence-9a8b657c; https://www.csis.org/analysis/italy-withdraws-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative
