INTRODUCTION #

Russian state-aligned military forces maintain opaque, interconnected aviation logistics networks to supply their deployments across the central Sahel, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where growing Russian presence has likely contributed to a deteriorating security situation and mounting humanitarian concerns.^[1] While aviation is not the only route for Russian military supply logistics in the region, it provides a more reliable and secure alternative to land routes in these landlocked countries.^[2] Tracking flights linked to Russian state-aligned military forces may offer partial visibility into Russia’s presence in the region, potential chokepoints in its logistics, and evolving relationships between Russian and central Sahelian actors. Flight route mapping may surface which third-country airports serve as rest and refueling stops, while changes in flight density and location may correspond to shifts in fighting intensity. The analysis that follows is preliminary, and is intended primarily to identify lines of future inquiry rather than resolve them.

The Africa Corps and its predecessor, the Wagner Group, have been the most prominent Russian-aligned military forces in the Sahel since the late 2010s.^[3] Both groups took advantage of military coups across the region during the 2010s and 2020s, capitalizing on the security needs of the newly formed governments to establish bases and logistical hubs throughout the Sahel.^[4] This presence also created opportunities for Moscow to extract economic resources and expand its political influence in the region.^[5] Despite persistent complaints of human rights abuses, resource extraction, and poor counterterrorism efficacy, junta leaders across the region have continued to favor these groups as partners.^[6]

Flight data from 2025 and the first half of 2026 show that Russian military-linked aircraft visited Burkina Faso most frequently, followed by Mali, and with Niger receiving few identified flights.^[7] The aircraft were primarily Soviet-era cargo and passenger models; the An-124-100 and the Il-76TD were the most common.^[8] Africa Corps also used a mix of state-owned airlines and private sector carriers, echoing the tactics first established by the Wagner Group in the late 2010s.^[9] Flight activity spikes appeared to correspond with developments on the ground – a May 2025 surge, for example, overlapped with an increase in insurgent attacks and travel by military and diplomatic leaders.^[10]

Cargo aircraft traveling from Russia to the central Sahel often stopped at one or two refueling sites along the way, introducing potential chokepoints for Russian supply operations in the region.^[11] Russian state-owned aircraft generally landed at Russia-controlled bases in Syria and Libya; private sector airlines tended to stop at commercial logistics hubs in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Algeria, and Türkiye.^[12] Cutting off access to these transit points might, over time, disrupt Russian military aviation resupply routes in the central Sahel.

METHODOLOGY #

To assess Russian military-linked flight activity in the central Sahel, C4ADS examined Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) flight transmissions between January 1, 2025 and July 31, 2026, for all Russian and Soviet-built aircraft models frequently used for military and government transport; these include mainly Ilyushin, Tupolev, and Antonov models.^[13] Consistent historical flight data prior to January 1, 2025 was not available for this analysis. C4ADS sourced the ADS-B data from FlightRadar24, a commercial live flight tracker.^[14] C4ADS also examined transmissions for aircraft registered to airlines that public reporting has previously linked to private military contractors (PMCs) or Russian military transport.^[15] C4ADS then filtered results to aircraft showing at least one flight originating from or destined for Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger in the study period. For flights lacking a listed origin or destination, common for military transport aircraft, C4ADS recorded the starting and ending coordinates of each flight to identify unlisted takeoffs or landings in the three countries of interest.

C4ADS then conducted a second-round assessment confirming that all identified aircraft showed evidence of Russian PMC or military linkages through past reporting, ownership records, and flight history. This step aimed to exclude civilian commercial aircraft from the analysis. With the dataset filtered, C4ADS examined the distribution of aircraft, flights, locations, airlines, and dates to identify trends in flight patterns.

Publicly available flight data imposes several limitations on the analysis. ADS-B coverage varies across the globe, and flight paths may show gaps in areas with poor coverage.^[16] At least five of the identified flights had likely signal losses at the beginning or ending of the voyage, indicating that the flights may have extended further before or after the available transmission data, and that the identified country of origin or destination may be inaccurate. This analysis assumes origin and destination locations are the countries of last transmission for these flights, as there is a high likelihood that the plane still landed or took off from the same country, and because providing an alternative start or end point unsupported by the underlying data would introduce further assumptions the analysis cannot verify.

Additionally, actors engaged in covert activities may violate international safety standards and manipulate their ADS-B transponders to conceal flight destinations.^[17] Commercial ADS-B providers may also remove or anonymize flights at the request of a limited number of owners or operators.^[18] Licensing restrictions further limit access to historical flight data beyond one year, constraining analysis of longer-term trends.

RUSSIAN MILITARY FORCES IN THE SAHEL #

The Wagner Group was the prominent face of Russian PMCs in the Sahel and Africa more broadly, ushering in a new era of expanded PMC activity on the continent.^[19] The group was co-founded in 2014 by Dmitry Utkin, a veteran of the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate), Russia’s foreign military intelligence service, and Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin, who served as its head and financier.^[20] While Wagner’s leadership and operational logistics depended on the GRU, it advertised itself as a wholly independent mercenary outfit, providing the Russian government with a level of plausible deniability.^[21]

The Wagner Group first entered Africa in 2017, establishing a presence in the Central African Republic (CAR) in an “advisory” capacity.^[22] Soon after, it expanded operations into Sudan in 2017, Libya in 2019, Mali in 2021, and Burkina Faso in 2022.^[23] While the footprint of Russian PMC forces in Africa grew dramatically in the early 2020s, their presence came with heavy costs. In exchange for providing security guarantees against Islamist groups like Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), the Wagner Group extracted significant natural resource concessions in many of the areas where it deployed.^[24] Local civilian populations have also suffered from many atrocities and human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, attributed to the Wagner Group.^[25] Despite the Wagner Group’s tactics, its efforts to maintain security and eliminate extremist groups were not especially effective, and its brutality may have instead contributed to extremist recruitment.^[26]

After a subset of Wagner’s forces led an attempted coup against the Russian government in June 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense introduced the Africa Corps in early 2024 as a restructured replacement for the Wagner Group in Africa. ^[27] Unlike the Wagner Group, the Africa Corps is formally under the command structure of the Russian military, allowing Russia to continue reaping the economic and geopolitical benefits offered by the Wagner Group, while tightening control.^[28] The transition from the Wagner Group to the Africa Corps did not occur simultaneously across the African continent, progressing much faster in Burkina Faso than in established strongholds like Mali^[29] or the CAR.^[30]

Personnel overlap has similarly clouded the functional distinction between the two groups. Media reporting suggests that 70% to 80% of Africa Corps members were originally from the Wagner Group.^[31] Africa Corps also appears to be using the same bases, supply routes, and resource extraction agreements.^[32] The flight data examined in this analysis offers a window into how that transition is playing out on the ground: which actors are moving, how often, and over which routes.

FLIGHT ACTIVITY TRENDS #

Breakdown by Country and Airport

Between January 1, 2025, and July 31, 2026, Russian military-linked aircraft conducted 75 total flights in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, with Burkina Faso seeing the greatest number of flights overall.^[33] 

Takeoffs and landings in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger by Russian state-aligned military forces (January 1, 2025 – July 31, 2026)

Source: FlightRadar24 data and Airbus 2025 satellite imagery via Google Earth.

The high number of flights to and from Burkina Faso can be attributed to several factors. Burkina Faso often acted as an intermediate stop for flights going to or from Mali and Niger, which increased its flight count.^[34] Because Burkina Faso is located directly between Mali and Niger, it serves as a logistics and rest hub between the two countries.^[35] In addition, Russian military-linked aircraft often conducted short flights within Burkina Faso.^[36] Mali also saw some internal flights, but to a lesser extent, and there were no recorded internal flights in Niger.^[37] Niger registered the lowest number of flights overall, with only six starting or ending there in the study period. ^[38]    

Burkina Faso’s high flight volume corresponds to the escalating extremist violence it faced in 2024, 2025, and 2026, as JNIM and ISGS launched attacks on government forces and civilians while maintaining their foothold in the country.^[39] This may have prompted Russian military-linked aircraft to fly more frequently in and out of Burkina Faso than its neighbors, resupplying arms, materiel, and personnel.

Of the three countries of interest, Burkina Faso had the greatest number of recorded fatalities linked to extremist violence and armed conflict over the period of study (January 1, 2025 – July 31, 2026), with 7,894, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) data, followed by Mali (7,784) and Niger (3,313).^[40] Yet efforts by Russian state-aligned military forces and the Burkina Faso government to combat the violence do not appear to have succeeded, as JNIM launched a series of large-scale, coordinated attacks across eastern and northern Burkina Faso as recently as February 2026.^[41]

State and nonstate armed actors elsewhere in the Sahel have also inflicted significant harm on civilians.^[42] In Mali, JNIM has expanded its reach into the southern and western regions of the country and continued to disrupt supply chains in and out of Bamako.^[43] It recently coordinated with the Tuareg separatist group, Azawad Liberation Front, to force Africa Corps’ retreat from the city of Kidal.^[44] In Niger, the fighting is more localized – concentrated in the southwest, particularly the Tillabéri region – but still imposes significant hardship on civilians caught up in the conflict.^[45]

These flights usually traveled through each country’s primary airport: Ouagadougou Airport in Burkina Faso, Bamako Senou International Airport in Mali (also known as the Modibo Keita International Airport), and Niamey Diori Hamani International Airport in Niger.^[46] Local media outlets have published photos or videos of Russian military-linked aircraft and soldiers landing at or near these airports over the past three years, confirming the groups’ continued use of these sites.^[47] In Mali, the Bamako airport reportedly hosts a dedicated base where Russian forces are stationed.^[48] The Wagner Group originally operated the site, but Africa Corps has since taken over and appears to be making construction upgrades, according to media reporting and satellite imagery.^[49] Similarly, Africa Corps forces have taken over Airbase 101 in Niamey, directly neighboring the international airport, which was previously used by U.S. forces.^[50] In Burkina Faso, Africa Corps does not have a base directly adjacent to Ouagadougou airport, as it does in Mali and Niger, but media have reported on operations within close proximity to the airport.^[51]

Aircraft Models

The aircraft Russian state-aligned military forces use to support their logistics and troop transfers internationally tend to come from a limited set of models produced by three Soviet-era aircraft manufacturers: the Ilyushin Design Bureau (“Ilyushin”), Tupolev Design Bureau (“Tupolev”), and Antonov Design Bureau (“Antonov”). ^[52] While no Tupolev-manufactured aircraft appeared among likely Russian military-linked flights to Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger during the examined period, Ilyushin and Antonov aircraft did.^[53] All of these models are decades old, first developed under the USSR, often for explicit government or military purposes.^[54] Since their introduction, some have passed to commercial operators, while others remain in Russian government service. ^[55]

Distribution of aircraft model types used by Russian state-aligned military forces for flights to the Sahel (January 1, 2025 – July 31, 2026)

Source: FlightRadar24 data, open source archive websites, and commercial aviation pages.^[56]

Airlines

Russian-aligned forces’ flight logistics rely on two types of operators: state- and military-affiliated carriers, which maximize government control, and private operators, which complicate attribution of specific flights to Russia-linked military operations. During the height of the Wagner Group’s activity, this mix introduced a degree of plausible deniability that likely helped shield Moscow from accountability for the group’s actions.^[57] In the study period, Russian government entities and small private cargo airlines previously linked to Russian PMCs operated most flights of interest bound for Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.^[58] Africa Corps appears to have taken over this logistics infrastructure and likely continues to benefit from the opacity that private carriers provide.

The operator responsible for the greatest number of flights was Flight Unit 224, a Russian state-owned airline under the Ministry of Defense, widely reported as transporting troops and supplies around the world on behalf of Russian PMCs.^[59] The United States sanctioned Flight Unit 224 in May 2023 for providing material support to the Wagner Group and facilitating ballistic missile shipments between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).^[60] ADS-B data shows that aircraft registered to Flight Unit 224 regularly flew to areas where Russian forces operated across Africa between January 1, 2025 and July 31, 2026, and continue to fly what appear to be weapons shipments to countries such as the DPRK and Myanmar.^[61] 

Flights to or from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger categorized by airline (January 1, 2025 – July 31, 2026)

Source: FlightRadar24 data.

The second most-active operator was the Russian Special Flight Squadron, the state-owned entity responsible for transporting the president and high-level officials, with 14 flights.^[62] Its Sahel flights likely carried leaders of Russian state-aligned military forces, defense officials, or political delegations rather than ordinary soldiers.^[63]

Several high-level developments in Russian operations in the Sahel occurred in 2025, including the first Russia-Confederation of Sahel States meeting and the official replacement of the Wagner Group in Mali with the Africa Corps.^[64] These developments may have prompted the Russian Special Flight Squadron activity recorded throughout the year. For example, the RA-96023, a Russian Special Flight Squadron aircraft, visited all three central Sahel countries in quick succession in late July 2025,^[65] a period corresponding with a reported Russian intergovernmental delegation visit to the Sahel to negotiate greater defense and resource cooperation.^[66] RA-96023’s routing through Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in the same voyage also suggests that Russia may be viewing its interests across all three countries as intertwined and mutually reinforcing.^[67]

The Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) also conducted a number of flights (12) during the period of interest, particularly in the first half of 2026.^[68] EMERCOM’s mandate is emergency relief, and many of its operations are legitimately humanitarian; however, it has been accused of transporting military and PMC personnel and cargo to Mali, Syria, and Iran.^[69] Additional flights were attributed to other Russian state entities, including the Russian Air Force, which conducted three flights.^[70]

Russian military forces also use small private carriers, diversifying transport logistics and likely gaining access to alternate flight routes. For example, JSC Aviacon Zitotrans, a Russian charter cargo airline sanctioned by the United States in January 2023 for transporting weapons for the Russian military, has drawn links to Russian supply operations in Africa, per media reporting and flight path analysis.^[71] Media reports have also claimed that Kyrgyzstan-registered Sapsan Airlines and Belarus-registered Rubystar Airways facilitated Russian military activities by transporting Russian fighters.^[72] The United States sanctioned Rubystar Airways in August 2024 for transporting Wagner Group personnel and supplies to and from Africa.^[73] Sapsan Airlines remains unsanctioned, despite having consistently operated routes associated with Russian military activity along with its sister companies (ZetAvia Airline LLC, New Way Cargo Airlines, and Fly Sky Airlines LLC).^[74] For instance, the French armed forces alleged that Sapsan Airlines likely carried Wagner Group fighters aboard a flight that crashed in Mali in September 2023.^[75] Liz Aviation has not been sanctioned or directly linked to military facilitation, but journalists identified its aircraft XT-EBO as likely violating arms embargos in Bangui and documented a history of ownership by sanctioned PMC-linked entities.^[76]

Russian military-linked flights conducted by private carriers showed a slight increase in frequency within the study period.^[77] More historical flight data is needed to fully assess long-term trends, but an increase in private carrier usage would have two primary implications: reducing transparency, making it more difficult to differentiate military-linked flights from regular commercial flights, and creating more opportunities for sanctions enforcement and gradual route disruption, as private airlines rely on commercial hubs and services rather than those controlled by the Russian state.      

Activity Timeline

Russian military-linked flight patterns in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger offer indications and warnings of ground-level developments between January 1, 2025, and July 31, 2026. Flight spikes can indicate new political or military developments. Troughs can suggest reduced military activity or a lull in fighting. ADS-B data recorded at least one flight linked to Russian forces bound for the three countries in every month except March, April, and August 2025, and February 2026.^[78]  

Number of flights per month by flights linked to Russian state-aligned military forces to Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (January 1, 2025 – July 31, 2026)

Source: FlightRadar24 data.

Flight activity peaked in May 2025, with 13 individual flights – more than double any other month in 2025.^[79] The majority flew to and from Burkina Faso, with some also stopping in Mali.^[80] Activity surrounding Burkinabe junta leader Ibrahim Traoré’s visit to Moscow in early May 2025 to discuss military and economic cooperation likely contributed to the Burkina Faso spike.^[81] Major offensives by nonstate armed groups in Burkina Faso and Mali that month may also have contributed to the spike.^[82] The flights were primarily conducted by an An-124-100 heavy cargo transport aircraft and a Il-96-300 passenger aircraft, likely transporting military supplies and personnel, respectively.^[83] A second spike in March-April 2026 corresponded with heavy fighting that culminated in significant territorial losses by the Africa Corps in late April.^[84] Il-76TD heavy cargo transport aircraft conducted most of these flights, suggesting they may have carried ammunition, weapons, or other military equipment. ^[85]

Flight Routes from Russia to the Central Sahel

Russian military-linked aircraft traveling between Russia and the Sahel follow consistent routes, repeatedly using the same intermediate rest and refueling locations. The most common route goes from Russia to the Russian-controlled Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia, Syria, and on to Libya (primarily the Al-Khadim Air Base, as well as Al-Jufra and Matan al-Sarra), before arriving at Sahel airports.^[86] This route is especially common for state-owned aircraft, such as Flight Unit 224.^[87] The Flight Unit 224 aircraft RA-82030, responsible for the greatest number of individual flights to the region during the study period, consistently stopped at Russian overseas bases in Syria and Libya on each trip to the central Sahel.^[88]

Flight routes for aircraft linked to Russian state-aligned military forces traveling from Russia to Mali, Burkina Faso, & Niger (January 1, 2025 – July 31, 2026)

Source: FlightRadar24 data.

Private airlines with suspected links to the Russian military were less likely than aircraft registered to government or military companies to stop at bases in Libya and Syria.^[89] Instead, they tended to stop at commercial logistics hubs in Türkiye, Algeria, and the UAE on the way to and from the Sahel.^[90]

Both state-run and private airlines appear to require one or more intermediate landings for most cargo trips from Russia to the Sahel. ^[91] The maximum range of the majority of cargo aircraft models before refueling is shorter than the distance they would need to travel for these journeys.^[92] Disrupting Russian forces’ access to intermediate transit hubs could, over time, degrade Russia’s ability to sustain troops on the ground in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. International pressure and targeted sanctions efforts could disrupt Russian fighters’ access to key regional commercial airports. With Russia’s foothold in Syria less certain under the new al-Sharaa government, Moscow increasingly depends on its relationship with Commander of the Libyan National Army Khalifa Haftar to maintain reliable supply routes to the Sahel.^[93] Libya could thus become a critical vulnerability for Russian logistics in the region. If Haftar lost power or chose to pivot toward other partners, such as Türkiye, Russia’s resupply capacity could be severely undermined.^[94]

KEY TAKEAWAYS #

Russian state-aligned military forces and their supporting logistical aviation networks have become a key mechanism for maintaining Russian influence across the Sahel. Tracking aircraft movements, operators, and flight paths reveals how Russia coordinates the  deployments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and may help identify opportunities for disruption. Knowledge of which airlines and intermediary airports are part of Russian logistics chains can help guide policymakers toward the most effective use of sanctions and diplomatic pressure campaigns.

• Currently, Africa Corps – successor to the Wagner Group – appears to be the most active Russian-aligned force in the Sahel, having developed supply pathways and influence networks that have expanded Russian influence in the region, extracted natural resources for the enrichment of Russian leaders, and imposed severe human rights abuses on local civilian populations.^[95] 
• Flight activity linked to Russian forces in the central Sahel was concentrated in Burkina Faso between January 2025 and July 2026, with lower levels in Mali and few flights in Niger.^[96] Flights were consistently conducted by Soviet-era Ilyushin or Antonov cargo and passenger models, with the Il-76 accounting for the greatest number of flights.^[97] 
• Both military and private aircraft appear to support recent Russian-aligned operations in the Sahel, echoing the mixed approach previously used by the Wagner Group.^[98] The most active operators included Flight Unit 224, the Russian Special Flight Squadron, JSC Aviacon Zitotrans, Liz Aviation, the Russian Air Force, Sapsan Airlines, the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations, and Rubystar Airways.^[99] Several of these operators already face sanctions; however, Sapsan Airlines, Liz Aviation, and the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations have not yet been sanctioned by the United States, the European Union, or the United Kingdom.^[100] While sanctions might not immediately halt these military-aligned operations, they impose additional costs and logistical barriers that may, over time, strain supply lines for the Russian forces on the ground.
• Most cargo flights identified in this research did not fly directly from Russia to Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger. Due to their technical limitations, cargo aircraft required rest and refueling stops along the way.^[101] Russia-controlled bases in Syria and Libya were the most common intermediate stops for state-owned aircraft; private sector aircraft tended to travel through the UAE, Algeria, and Türkiye.^[102]Disrupting access to any of these hubs could, over time, degrade the operations of Russian-aligned forces in the Sahel.

Opportunities for future research

• Spikes in flight activity to Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger appeared to correspond with significant  movements by political and military leadership, as well as conflict developments.^[103] Future research could examine whether tracking these aircraft could serve as an early warning indicator for developments related to Russian forces in the Sahel.
• Russian military-linked aircraft often paired flights to one central Sahel country with visits to the others.^[104] Flights between Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey were fairly common within the dataset.^[105] This suggests Russia likely manages logistics and diplomatic relationships with all three countries in a coordinated fashion. Future investigations could examine other African countries visited by these aircraft before and after Sahel flights to identify trends and predict Russia’s emerging relationships and future military expansion.^[106] For example, Togo and Algeria both saw a growing number of flights, often directly before or after a stop in Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger, indicating that these countries may warrant further examination.^[107]

 

ENDNOTES #

---

[1] Human Rights Watch, “Mali: Russia’s ‘Africa Corps’ Airstrikes Kill Civilians,” July 31, 2026, https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/07/31/mali-russias-africa-corps-airstrikes-kill-civilians; Joseph Siegle, “Russia’s New Frontier in Africa,” Spotlight, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July 8, 2026, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/russias-new-frontier-in-africa/; Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Mali,” accessed August 2026, https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/mali/.

[2] OECD/Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat, Roads and Conflicts in North and West Africa, West African Studies (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2025), https://doi.org/10.1787/77474489-en, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2025/02/roads-and-conflicts-in-north-and-west-africa_4892fa2e.html; Chaïma Jabbar, “Corridors of the Alliance of Sahel States: Logistical Vulnerabilities, Security Constraints, and Adaptation Dynamics,” Policy Brief PB-67/25, Policy Center for the New South, December 23, 2025, https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/2025-12/PB_67-25_Chaima%20Jabbar%20AN.pdf; RFI, “How Guinea Became a Gateway for Russian Weapons to Reach the Sahel,” June 20, 2025, https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20250620-guinea-conakry-a-gateway-for-russian-weapons-in-the-sahel.

[3] Joe Inwood and Jake Tacchi, “Wagner in Africa: How the Russian mercenary group has rebranded,” BBC News, February 20, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230; “The Wagner Group in the Central Sahel,” Counter Extremism Project, December 2023, https://www.counterextremism.com/wagner-group-sahel; and Christopher M. Faulkner and Raphael Parens, “Russia in Africa Private Military Proxies in the Sahel,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, March 24, 2025, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/global-governance/russia-in-africa-private-military-proxies-in-the-sahel/.

[4] Christopher Faulkner, Jaclyn Johnson, and Zachary Streicher, “Africa Faces the Unintended Consequences of Relying on Russian PMCs,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 30, 2024, https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/05/africa-russian-pmcs/; and Aja Melville, “Russia Exploits Western Vacuum in Africa’s Sahel Region,” Forecast International, Defense and Security Monitor, April 22, 2024, https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2024/04/22/russia-exploits-western-vacuum-in-africas-sahel-region/.

[5] Sarah Shoer, “Proxy Power and Precious Minerals Russia’s Growing Footprint in Africa Through the Wagner Group,” Interpopulum, 2024, https://interpopulum.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Proxy-Power-and-Precious-Minerals-Russias-Growing-Footprint-in-Africa-through-the-Wagner-Group.pdf; “Gold Wagner Nationalization and Great Geopolitics in Burkina Faso,” Metal Market, November 28, 2024, https://www.metalmarket.eu/en/blog/gold-wagner-nationalization-and-great-geopolitics-in-burkina-faso-1732793663; “How Russia’s MoD Secures and Exploits Sahel’s Strategic Minerals,” The Lansing Institute, August 15, 2025, https://lansinginstitute.org/2025/08/15/how-russias-mod-secures-and-exploits-sahels-strategic-minerals/

[6] Isabella Currie, “Reinforcing Regimes: The Wagner Group and Russia’s Strategy in the Central African Republic and Mali,” International Code of Conduct Association Blog, February 19, 2025, https://blog.icoca.ch/reinforcing-regimes-the-wagner-group-and-russias-strategy-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/; Sarah Shoer, “Proxy Power and Precious Minerals Russia’s Growing Footprint in Africa Through the Wagner Group”; Government of the United States, “Treasury Sanctions Illicit Gold Companies Funding Wagner Forces and Wagner Group Facilitator,” Department of the Treasury, June 27, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1581; Joe Inwood and Jake Tacchi, “Wagner in Africa: How the Russian mercenary group has rebranded,” BBC News, February 20, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230; “Gold Wagner Nationalization and Great Geopolitics in Burkina Faso,” Metal Market; “Wagner Group Allegedly in Deal with Burkina Faso,” ABC News (Australia), December 16, 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-12-16/wagner-group-allegedly-in-deal-with-burkina-faso/101780006; Philip Obaji Jr., “Sudan: Russia’s Wagner Group and the grab for power and gold,” Deutsche Welle, April 26, 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/pmc-russias-wagner-group-in-sudan-gold-military-junta/a-65439746; “How Russia’s MoD Secures and Exploits Sahel’s Strategic Minerals,” The Lansing Institute; Government of the United States, “The Wagner Group’s Atrocities in Africa: Lies and Truth,” U.S. Department of State, Global Engagement Center, February 13, 2024, https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-wagner-groups-atrocities-in-africa-lies-and-truth/; Thomas Naadi, “Russian mercenaries accused of cold-blooded killings in Mali – BBC speaks to eyewitnesses,” BBC News, November 25, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crmx7x3yjyko; Shannon Bosch, “Outsourcing War: Holding Russia Its African Partners Accountable Wagner’s Crimes,” Lowy Institute, October 14, 2025, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/outsourcing-war-holding-russia-its-african-partners-accountable-wagner-s-crimes; Monika Pronczuk and Sam Mednick, “A Confidential Brief to the ICC Accuses Russia-Linked Wagner of Promoting Atrocities in West Africa,” Associated Press, June 23, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-videos-war-crimes-mali-burkina-icc-c4dc7d04846d02b014ed4c645d265475; “The Wagner Group in the Central Sahel,” Counter Extremism Project, December 2023, https://www.counterextremism.com/wagner-group-sahel; and Christopher M. Faulkner and Raphael Parens, “Russia in Africa: Private Military Proxies in the Sahel,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, March 24, 2025, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/global-governance/russia-in-africa-private-military-proxies-in-the-sahel/.

[7] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[8] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[9] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data retrieved periodically from January 01, 2025, to July 31, 2026; Jessica Seltzer, “Sanctioned Sector Analysis: Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs),” Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, March 14, 2024, https://www.wisconsinproject.org/sanctioned-sector-analysis-russian-private-military-companies-pmcs/; Government of Canada, “Russian Private Military Companies Grey Zones,” Canadian Security Intelligence Service, https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/publications/hybrid-methods-in-the-grey-zone/russian-private-military-companies-grey-zones.html; and Robin van der Lugt, “Revisiting Plausible Deniability: Putin’s Admission and the Wagner Group Paradox,” Armed Groups and International Law, June 3, 2025, https://www.armedgroups-internationallaw.org/2025/06/03/revisiting-plausible-deniability-putins-admission-and-the-wagner-group-paradox/.

[10] Government of Russia, “Meeting with President of Burkina Faso Ibrahim Traore,” The Kremlin, May 11, 2025, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76895; “Traore in Focus! Burkina Faso President Attends Victory Day Celebrations in Moscow,” Viory, May 9, 2025, https://www.viory.video/en/videos/a3482_09052025/traore-in-focus-burkina-faso-president-attends-victory-day-celebrations-in-moscow; “Burkina Leader Seeks Stronger Military Ties with Russia,” The Defense Post, May 11, 2025, https://thedefensepost.com/2025/05/11/burkina-faso-military-ties-russia/; “Burkina Faso’s President Ibrahim Traoré Arrives in Moscow as Special Guest of President Putin,” Azania Newswire, May 11, 2025, https://azanianewswire.wordpress.com/2025/05/11/burkina-fasos-president-ibrahim-traore-arrives-in-moscow-as-special-guest-of-president-putin/; “A Russian Assisted Failure: Violent Security Degradation in Western Africa in May 2025,” Defense Archives, June 10, 2025, https://defensearchives.com/news/a-russian-assisted-failure-violent-security-degradation-in-western-africa-in-may-2025/; and United Nations, “Mali Situation Report May 2025,” UN Population Fund, June 2025, https://www.unfpa.org/resources/mali-situation-report-may-2025.

[11] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[12] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[13] Keir Giles and Valeriy Akimenko, “Use and Utility of Russia’s Private Military Companies,” Queen’s University, January 28, 2019, https://www.queensu.ca/psychology/sites/psycwww/files/uploaded_files/Graduate/OnlineJournal/Keir_Giles_and_Valeriy_Akimenko-Use_and_Utility_of_Russias_Private_Military_Companies.pdf; Mathieu Olivier and Benjamin Roger, “Wagner in Mali AN Exclusive Investigation Into Putins Mercenaries,” The Africa Report, February 18, 2022, https://www.theafricareport.com/178331/wagner-in-mali-an-exclusive-investigation-into-putins-mercenaries/; Michael Simpson, Adam R. Grissom, Christopher A. Mouton et al., “Road to Damascus: The Russian Air Campaign in Syria, 2015–2018,” RAND Corporation, Research Report RRA1170-1, 2022, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA1100/RRA1170-1/RAND_RRA1170-1.pdf.

[14] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[15] Tim Lister and Sebastian Shukla, “Russian mercenaries fight shadowy battle in gas-rich Mozambique,” CNN, November 29, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/29/africa/russian-mercenaries-mozambique-intl/index.html; “Washington’s Secret War Against Wagner’s Planes,” Africa Intelligence, May 3, 2022, https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2022/05/03/washington-s-secret-war-against-wagner-s-planes,109782047-eve; “Kremlin Misinforms Macron: PMC Wagner Deployed in Mali by Russian Defense Ministry,” The Lansing Institute, February 9, 2022, https://lansinginstitute.org/2022/02/09/kremlin-misinforms-macron-pmc-wagner-deployed-in-mali-by-russian-defense-ministry/; Government of the United States, “Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization,” Department of the Treasury, January 26, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1220; Linus Höller, “Heavy Russian Cargo Plane Lands in Caracas Amid US Venezuela Tensions,” Defense News, October 28, 2025, https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2025/10/28/heavy-russian-cargo-plane-lands-in-caracas-amid-us-venezuela-tensions/; Dominik Sipinski, “OFAC Sanctions Russia’s Uzga, Aviacon Zitotrans,” ch-aviation, January 31, 2023, https://www.ch-aviation.com/news/124002-ofac-sanctions-russias-uzga-aviacon-zitotrans; Matthew Loh, “A senior Russian lawmaker says Moscow just delivered new air defense systems to Venezuela,” Business Insider, November 5, 2025, https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-lawmaker-send-pantsir-buk-venezuela-air-defenses-ilyushin-2025-11; Anton Sokolin, “Russian Wagner Group Linked Cargo Jet Makes Rare Flight to North Korea,” NK News, December 15, 2025, https://www.nknews.org/2025/12/russian-wagner-group-linked-cargo-jet-makes-rare-flight-to-north-korea/; “Prigozhin Was Killed, But His Work Lives on. This is Evident From the Flights of Associated Aircraft to Africa,” Eurasia, February 13, 2024, https://eurasia.ro/2024/02/13/prigozhin-was-killed-but-his-work-lives-on-this-is-evident-from-the-flights-of-associated-aircraft-to-africa/; “The hacking of a Russian IL-76 pilot revealed weapons supply schemes from Iran, South Africa, and Mali to Russia,” InformNapalm, November 20, 2023, https://informnapalm.org/52853-vzlom-pilota-il-76kubinskie-naemniki-prodolzhayut-popol/; Dada Lyndell, “Wagner chief Prigozhin is dead, but Wagner-linked planes are still flying to Africa,” The Insider, February 7, 2024, https://theins.ru/en/society/268960; Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson, “Africa File December 19, 2024,” Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-december-19-2024-russia-reinforces-libya-amid-syria-withdrawal-drc-rwanda-talks-collapse-ethiopias-counter-fano-campaign-issp-strangles-roadways-in-niger-ankara-declaration; “Putin Plans to Establish a New Military Base in Libya,” Middle East and North Africa Studies, March 27, 2025, https://mena-studies.org/putin-plans-to-establish-a-new-military-base-in-libya/; and Dominik Sipinski, “US Sanctions Belarusian Cargo Carriers, Lukashenko’s B767,” ch-aviation, August 12, 2024, https://www.ch-aviation.com/news/143582-us-sanctions-belarusian-cargo-carriers-lukashenkos-b767.

[16] “How It Works,” FlightRadar24, https://www.flightradar24.com/how-it-works.

[17] Linus Höller, “Investigation: Russian Shadow Airlines Use Algeria as Base for Secretive Missions,” Defense News, April 30, 2026, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/04/30/investigation-russian-shadow-airlines-use-algeria-as-base-for-secretive-missions/; “Prigozhin’s Life on the Run: Wagner Chief Used Jets to Evade Tracking for Years,” The Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/prigozhin-wagner-jets-evade-tracking-61ba91e7; and Martin Plaut, “Strange Flights from UAE via Uganda and on to the Central African Republic and Chad. What’s Happening?” Martin Plaut (blog), July 1, 2023, https://martinplaut.com/2023/07/01/strange-flights-from-uae-via-uganda-and-on-to-the-central-african-republic-and-chad-whats-happening/.

[18] “How It Works,” FlightRadar24, https://www.flightradar24.com/how-it-works.

[19] Alexis Arieff, “Russia’s Security Operations in Africa,” CRS In Focus IF12389, Congressional Research Service, January 2, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12389; and R. Kim Cragin and Lachlan MacKenzie, “Russia’s Escalating Use of Private Military Companies in Africa,” National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, November 24, 2020, https://inss.ndu.edu/news/Article/2425797/russias-escalating-use-of-private-military-companies-in-africa/.

[20] “Wagner Group,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Wagner-Group; Serge Schmemann, “Prigozhin and the Long and Infamous History of Failed Russian Rebellions,” The New York Times, June 26, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/26/opinion/international-world/putin-russia-uprising.html; Paul Kirby, “Wagner boss Prigozhin’s years of living dangerously,” BBC News, August 23, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66590919; Andras Racz, “Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 21, 2020, https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state; and Patrick Reevell and Patricio Chile, “Wagner Group Leader Yevgeny Prigozhin Rose with Putin, Then Turned on Him,” ABC News, August 23, 2023, https://abcnews.com/International/wagner-group-leader-yevgeny-prigozhin-rose-putin-turned/story?id=100407645.

[21] Andras Racz, “Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 21, 2020, https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state

[22] Alexis Arieff, “Russia’s Security Operations in Africa,” CRS In Focus IF12389, Congressional Research Service; and Federica Saini Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Influence, Commercial Concessions, Rights Violations, and Counterinsurgency Failure,” Brookings Institution, February 8, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/.

[23] William Rampe, “What Is Russia’s Wagner Group Doing in Africa?,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 23, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/articles/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa; Sama Abdalla, “Emerging Stage for Great Power Competition: Russia’s Influence in Sudan Amid Political Turmoil,” Security in Context, 2024, https://www.securityincontext.org/posts/emerging-stage-for-great-power-competition-russias-influence-in-sudan-amid-political-turmoil; “Hundreds more Russian mercenaries flee western Libya: GNA forces,” Al Jazeera, May 25, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/25/hundreds-more-russian-mercenaries-flee-western-libya-gna-forces; Ilya Barabanov and Nader Ibrahim, “Wagner: Scale of Russian mercenary mission in Libya exposed,” BBC News, August 11, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58009514; Jared Thompson, Catrina Doxsee, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Tracking the Arrival of Russia’s Wagner Group in Mali,” CSIS, February 2, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali; Antonio Giustozzi, “A Mixed Picture: How Mali Views the Wagner Group,” RUSI, March 27, 2024, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/mixed-picture-how-mali-views-wagner-group; Alexis Arieff, “Burkina Faso: Conflict and Military Rule,” CRS In Focus IF10434, Congressional Research Service, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10434; and John Lechner and Sergey Eledinov, “Is Burkina Faso Edging Closer to the Wagner Mercenaries?,” openDemocracy, September 25, 2023, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/burkina-faso-wagner-sahel-security-jihadist/.

[24] Isabella Currie, “Reinforcing Regimes: The Wagner Group and Russia’s Strategy in the Central African Republic and Mali,” International Code of Conduct Association Blog, February 19, 2025, https://blog.icoca.ch/reinforcing-regimes-the-wagner-group-and-russias-strategy-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/; Sarah Shoer, “Proxy Power and Precious Minerals Russia’s Growing Footprint in Africa Through the Wagner Group,” Interpopulum, 2024, https://interpopulum.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Proxy-Power-and-Precious-Minerals-Russias-Growing-Footprint-in-Africa-through-the-Wagner-Group.pdf; Government of the United States, “Treasury Sanctions Illicit Gold Companies Funding Wagner Forces and Wagner Group Facilitator,” Department of the Treasury, June 27, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1581; Joe Inwood and Jake Tacchi, “Wagner in Africa: How the Russian mercenary group has rebranded,” BBC News, February 20, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230; “Gold, Wagner, Nationalization and Great Geopolitics in Burkina Faso 1732793663,” Metal Market, November 28, 2024, https://www.metalmarket.eu/en/blog/gold-wagner-nationalization-and-great-geopolitics-in-burkina-faso-1732793663; “Wagner Group Allegedly in Deal with Burkina Faso,” ABC News (Australia), December 16, 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-12-16/wagner-group-allegedly-in-deal-with-burkina-faso/101780006; “Sudan: Russia’s Wagner Group and the grab for power and gold,” Deutsche Welle, April 26, 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/pmc-russias-wagner-group-in-sudan-gold-military-junta/a-65439746; “How Russia’s MoD Secures and Exploits Sahel’s Strategic Minerals,” The Lansing Institute, August 15, 2025, https://lansinginstitute.org/2025/08/15/how-russias-mod-secures-and-exploits-sahels-strategic-minerals/; “JNIM expanding geographic reach and staging coordinated attacks in the Sahel,” The Soufan Center, June 5, 2025, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-5/; “Global Conflict Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel; United Nations, “West Africa and the Sahel,” Security Council, Report, November 2025, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-11/west-africa-and-the-sahel-15.php; “The Wagner Group in the Central Sahel,” Counter Extremism Project, December 2023, https://www.counterextremism.com/wagner-group-sahel; Wassim Nasr, “How the Wagner Group Is Aggravating the Jihadi Threat in the Sahel,” CTC Sentinel 15, no. 11 (2022), Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/how-the-wagner-group-is-aggravating-the-jihadi-threat-in-the-sahel/; and “Jihadi Blowback: the Wagner Group’s Hidden Downside,” War on the Rocks, June 23, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/jihadi-blowback-the-wagner-groups-hidden-downside/.

[25] Government of the United States, “The Wagner Group’s Atrocities in Africa: Lies and Truth,” Department of State, Global Engagement Center, February 13, 2024, https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-wagner-groups-atrocities-in-africa-lies-and-truth/; Thomas Naadi, “Russian mercenaries accused of cold-blooded killings in Mali – BBC speaks to eyewitnesses,” BBC News, November 25, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crmx7x3yjyko; Shannon Bosch, “Outsourcing War: Holding Russia Its African Partners Accountable Wagner’s Crimes,” Lowy Institute, October 14, 2025, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/outsourcing-war-holding-russia-its-african-partners-accountable-wagner-s-crimes; and Monika Pronczuk and Sam Mednick, “A Confidential Brief to the ICC Accuses Russia-Linked Wagner of Promoting Atrocities in West Africa,” Associated Press, June 23, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-videos-war-crimes-mali-burkina-icc-c4dc7d04846d02b014ed4c645d265475.

[26] “The Wagner Group in the Central Sahel,” Counter Extremism Project, December 2023, https://www.counterextremism.com/wagner-group-sahel; and Christopher M. Faulkner and Raphael Parens, “Russia in Africa: Private Military Proxies in the Sahel,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, March 24, 2025, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/global-governance/russia-in-africa-private-military-proxies-in-the-sahel/.

[27] Karen Philippa Larsen, “The Rise and Fall of the Wagner Group,” Danish Institute for International Studies, January 9, 2025, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-wagner-group; Jacob Zenn, “Russia’s Africa Corps Set to Replace Wagner in Niger,” U.S. Army Operational Environment Enterprise (TRADOC G-2), April 12, 2024, https://oe.t2com.army.mil/product/russias-africa-corps-set-to-replace-wagner-in-niger/; Jacob Zenn, “Revisiting Russian Africa Corps Organizational Structure,” U.S. Army Operational Environment Enterprise (TRADOC G-2), September 11, 2024, https://oe.t2com.army.mil/product/revisiting-russian-africa-corps-organizational-structure/; and “Moscow’s New Puppet in Africa: the Transition From the Wagner Group to Africa Corps,” Center for Journalism and Foreign Policy, February 3, 2026, https://www.cjfp.org/moscows-new-puppet-in-africa-the-transition-from-the-wagner-group-to-africa-corps/.

[28] “Moscow’s New Puppet in Africa: The Transition from the Wagner Group to Africa Corps.”

[29] Nkechi Ogbonna, “Wagner to withdraw from Mali after ‘completing mission’,” BBC News, June 6, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3ve0e7ndzo; and “Burkina Faso Opens Door for Russia’s Africa Corps,” Africa Defense Forum, February 20, 2024, https://adf-magazine.com/2024/02/burkina-faso-opens-door-for-russias-africa-corps/.

[30] Alexis Arieff, “Russia’s Security Operations in Africa,” CRS In Focus IF12389, Congressional Research Service, January 2, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12389; Celine Clery and Anna Smolchenko, “Wagner Stronghold in CAR Holds the Line Despite Kremlin Shakeup,” Barron’s, January 9, 2026, https://www.barrons.com/news/wagner-stronghold-in-car-holds-the-line-despite-kremlin-shakeup-0c30cd1c; and “Remaining Wagner Group Mercenaries Build Opioid Fueled Criminal Empire in Central African Republic,” i24NEWS, July 12, 2026, https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/africa/artc-remaining-wagner-group-mercenaries-build-opioid-fueled-criminal-empire-in-central-african-republic.

[31] Niko Vorobyov, “Wagner vs Africa Corps: The Future of Russian Paramilitaries in Mali,” June 16, 2025, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/16/wagner-vs-africa-corps-the-future-of-russian-paramilitaries-in-mali.

[32] “Moscow’s New Puppet in Africa: The Transition From the Wagner Group to Africa Corps,” Center for Journalism and Foreign Policy, February 3, 2026, https://www.cjfp.org/moscows-new-puppet-in-africa-the-transition-from-the-wagner-group-to-africa-corps/; and Jacob Zenn, “Revisiting Russian Africa Corps Organizational Structure,” U.S. Army Operational Environment Enterprise (TRADOC G-2), September 11, 2024, https://oe.t2com.army.mil/product/revisiting-russian-africa-corps-organizational-structure/.

[33] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[34] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[35] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[36] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[37] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[38] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[39] “Global Conflict Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel; and Priya Sippy and Jacob Boswall, “How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups,” BBC News, July 6, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg4r5wylwq6o. 

[40] ACLED, “Explorer,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, accessed July 1, 2026, https://acleddata.com/platform/explorer.

[41] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger),” July 15, 2026, https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/mali/.

[42] ACLED, “Explorer,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, accessed July 1, 2026, https://acleddata.com/platform/explorer.

[43] United Nations, “West Africa and the Sahel,” Security Council, Report, December 2025, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-12/west-africa-and-the-sahel-16.php; and David Doukhan, “Conquest of Mali and Takeover of Bamako by the JNIM: Possible Scenarios,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, January 7, 2026, https://ict.org.il/conquest-of-mali-jnim/.

[44] “FLA Gains Ground in Mali After Peace Deal Falls Apart,” Africa Defense Forum, June 2, 2026, https://adf-magazine.com/2026/06/fla-gains-ground-in-mali-after-peace-deal-falls-apart/.

[45] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger),” July 15, 2026, https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/mali/.

[46] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[47] Morgane Le Cam, “Mouthpieces Close to the Kremlin Announce the Arrival of Russian Military Specialists in Burkina Faso,” Le Monde, January 28, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/01/28/mouthpieces-close-to-the-kremlin-announce-the-arrival-of-russian-military-specialists-in-burkina-faso_6472231_124.html; “Russia’s Secret Cargo in Burkina Faso: What Was Really Inside the Il 76,” Defense Magazine, December 17, 2025, https://www.defensemagazine.com/article/russias-secret-cargo-in-burkina-faso-what-was-really-inside-the-il-76; Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “Russian troops enter base housing US military in Niger, US official says,” Reuters, May 3, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russian-troops-enter-base-housing-us-military-niger-us-official-says-2024-05-02/; and “Russian Military Instructors, Air Defence System Arrive in Niger Amid Deepening Ties,” France 24, April 12, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240412-russian-military-instructors-air-defence-system-arrive-in-niger-amid-deepening-ties.

[48] “Tracking the Arrival of Russia’s Wagner Group in Mali,” CSIS, February 2, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali; Paul Melly, “Jihadist airport assault leaves Mali’s junta rattled,” BBC News, September 20, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz04ryym45eo; “Mali Jihadists Target Military Camp and Other Sites in Capital,” Stratfor Worldview, September 17, 2024, https://worldview.stratfor.com/situation-report/mali-jihadists-target-military-camp-and-other-sites-capital; and “Russian Mercenaries Failure in Mali Sparks Resentment,” Africa Defense Forum, September 16, 2025, https://adf-magazine.com/2025/09/russian-mercenaries-failure-in-mali-sparks-resentment/.

[49] Hanna Notte, “Russia is Shrewdly Playing the Long Game in Africa,” War on the Rocks, September 17, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/russia-is-shrewdly-playing-the-long-game-in-africa/; Planet Labs Imagery; and Vantor Imagery.

[50] “Russia’s Africa Corps: Wagner’s Successor in Africa (2022–2025),” The Lansing Institute, September 30, 2025, https://lansinginstitute.org/2025/09/30/russias-africa-corps-wagners-successor-in-africa-2022-2025/; Government of the United States, “First US Military Base in Niger Completes Withdrawal,” U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Africa, Official United States Air Force website, July 8, 2024, https://www.usafe.af.mil/Units/406th-Air-Expeditionary-Wing/News-and-Articles/Display/Article/3828524/first-us-military-base-in-niger-completes-withdrawal/; and Caleb Weiss, “Islamic State Video Details Extent of Attack in Niamey,” FDD’s Long War Journal, February 2, 2026, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/02/islamic-state-video-details-extent-of-attack-in-niamey.php.

[51] Morgane le Cam, Thomas Eydoux, Laureline Savoye, and Elisa Bellanger, “Au Burkina Faso, La Premiere Base Militaire Russe D’Africa Corps,” Le Monde, March 6, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/video/2024/03/06/au-burkina-faso-la-premiere-base-militaire-russe-d-africa-corps_6220477_3212.html.

[52] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026); Keir Giles and Valeriy Akimenko, “Use and Utility of Russia’s Private Military Companies,” Queen’s University, January 28, 2019, https://www.queensu.ca/psychology/sites/psycwww/files/uploaded_files/Graduate/OnlineJournal/Keir_Giles_and_Valeriy_Akimenko-Use_and_Utility_of_Russias_Private_Military_Companies.pdf; Mathieu Olivier and Benjamin Roger, “Wagner in Mali: An Exclusive Investigation Into Putin’s Mercenaries,” The Africa Report, February 18, 2022, https://www.theafricareport.com/178331/wagner-in-mali-an-exclusive-investigation-into-putins-mercenaries/; and Michael Simpson, Adam R. Grissom, Christopher A. Mouton et al., “Road to Damascus: The Russian Air Campaign in Syria, 2015–2018,” RAND Corporation, Research Report RRA1170-1, 2022, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA1100/RRA1170-1/RAND_RRA1170-1.pdf.

[53] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[54] “Ilyushin IL-76,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/technology/Ilyushin-Il-76; “Aircraft Guide,” Air Charter Service, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.aircharterserviceusa.com/aircraft-guide/cargo/antonov-ukraine/antonovan-124; and “Aircraft Guide: Antonov AN-124,” Air Charter Service, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.aircharterserviceusa.com/aircraft-guide/cargo/ilyushin-russia/ilyushinil-62.

[55] “Ilyushin IL-76,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/technology/Ilyushin-Il-76; “Aircraft Guide,” Air Charter Service, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.aircharterserviceusa.com/aircraft-guide/cargo/antonov-ukraine/antonovan-124; and “Aircraft Guide: Antonov AN-124,” Air Charter Service, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.aircharterserviceusa.com/aircraft-guide/cargo/ilyushin-russia/ilyushinil-62.

[56] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026); “Modified Ilyushin Il-76 Taken Out Of Storage After 17 Years,” Simple Flying, January 6, 2024, https://simpleflying.com/modified-ilyushin-il76-taken-storage-17-years/; Air Charter Service, “Ilyushin IL-76T and IL76-TD,” Aircraft Guide, accessed August 2026, https://www.aircharterserviceusa.com/aircraft-guide/cargo/ilyushin-russia/ilyushinil-76tandil76-td; “Russia Ramps Up Ilyushin Il-76 Production with 7 Aircraft Delivered in 2025,” Aerospace Global News, January 12, 2026, https://aerospaceglobalnews.com/news/russian-il-76-production-2025/; Airliners.net, “Ilyushin Il-96-300,” accessed August 2026, https://www.airliners.net/aircraft-data/ilyushin-il-96-300/253; Safe Fly Aviation, “Inside the Russian Presidential Aircraft: Power, Prestige, and Purpose in the Skies,” December 4, 2025, https://safefly.aero/inside-the-russian-presidential-aircraft/; SafeSmart Aviation, “Ilyushin Il-62 Access Solutions,” accessed August 2026, https://www.safesmartaviation.com/model/ilyushin-il-62/; SKYbrary Aviation Safety, “Ilyushin Il-62,” accessed August 2026, https://skybrary.aero/aircraft/il62; Air Charter Service, “Antonov An-124,” Aircraft Guide, accessed August 2026, https://www.aircharterserviceusa.com/aircraft-guide/cargo/antonov-ukraine/antonovan-124; KÜRE Encyclopedia, “Antonov An-124 Ruslan,” accessed August 2026, https://kureansiklopedi.com/en/detay/antonov-an-124-ruslan-c0bcf; Safe Fly Aviation, “The Antonov An-124: The Ultimate Guide to the World’s Heavy-Lift Aircraft,” April 11, 2025, https://safefly.aero/the-antonov-an-124-the-ultimate-guide-to-the-worlds-heavy-lift-aircraft/.

[57] Jessica Seltzer, “Sanctioned Sector Analysis: Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs),” Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, March 14, 2024, https://www.wisconsinproject.org/sanctioned-sector-analysis-russian-private-military-companies-pmcs/; “Russian Private Military Companies Grey Zones,” Canadian Security Intelligence Service, https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/publications/hybrid-methods-in-the-grey-zone/russian-private-military-companies-grey-zones.html; Robin van der Lugt, “Revisiting Plausible Deniability: Putin’s Admission and the Wagner Group Paradox,” Armed Groups and International Law, June 3, 2025, https://www.armedgroups-internationallaw.org/2025/06/03/revisiting-plausible-deniability-putins-admission-and-the-wagner-group-paradox/.

[58] Tim Lister and Sebastian Shukla, “Russian mercenaries fight shadowy battle in gas-rich Mozambique,” CNN, November 29, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/29/africa/russian-mercenaries-mozambique-intl/index.html; “Washington’s Secret War Against Wagner’s Planes,” Africa Intelligence, May 3, 2022, https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2022/05/03/washington-s-secret-war-against-wagner-s-planes,109782047-eve; “Kremlin Misinforms Macron: PMC Wagner Deployed in Mali by Russian Defense Ministry,” The Lansing Institute, February 9, 2022, https://lansinginstitute.org/2022/02/09/kremlin-misinforms-macron-pmc-wagner-deployed-in-mali-by-russian-defense-ministry/; Government of the United States, “Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization,” Department of the Treasury, January 26, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1220; Linus Höller, “Heavy Russian Cargo Plane Lands in Caracas Amid US Venezuela Tensions,” Defense News, October 28, 2025, https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2025/10/28/heavy-russian-cargo-plane-lands-in-caracas-amid-us-venezuela-tensions/; Dominik Sipinski, “OFAC Sanctions Russia’s Uzga, Aviacon Zitotrans,” ch-aviation, January 31, 2023, https://www.ch-aviation.com/news/124002-ofac-sanctions-russias-uzga-aviacon-zitotrans; Matthew Loh, “A senior Russian lawmaker says Moscow just delivered new air defense systems to Venezuela,” Business Insider, November 5, 2025, https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-lawmaker-send-pantsir-buk-venezuela-air-defenses-ilyushin-2025-11; Anton Sokolin, “Russian Wagner Group Linked Cargo Jet Makes Rare Flight to North Korea,” NK News, December 15, 2025, https://www.nknews.org/2025/12/russian-wagner-group-linked-cargo-jet-makes-rare-flight-to-north-korea/; “Prigozhin Was Killed, But His Work Lives on. This is Evident From the Flights of Associated Aircraft to Africa,” Eurasia, February 13, 2024, https://eurasia.ro/2024/02/13/prigozhin-was-killed-but-his-work-lives-on-this-is-evident-from-the-flights-of-associated-aircraft-to-africa/; “The hacking of a Russian IL-76 pilot revealed weapons supply schemes from Iran, South Africa, and Mali to Russia,” InformNapalm, November 20, 2023, https://informnapalm.org/52853-vzlom-pilota-il-76kubinskie-naemniki-prodolzhayut-popol/; Dada Lyndell, “Wagner chief Prigozhin is dead, but Wagner-linked planes are still flying to Africa,” The Insider, February 7, 2024, https://theins.ru/en/society/268960; Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson, “Africa File December 19, 2024,” Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-december-19-2024-russia-reinforces-libya-amid-syria-withdrawal-drc-rwanda-talks-collapse-ethiopias-counter-fano-campaign-issp-strangles-roadways-in-niger-ankara-declaration; “Putin Plans to Establish a New Military Base in Libya,” Middle East and North Africa Studies, March 27, 2025, https://mena-studies.org/putin-plans-to-establish-a-new-military-base-in-libya/; and Dominik Sipinski, “US Sanctions Belarusian Cargo Carriers, Lukashenko’s B767,” ch-aviation, August 12, 2024, https://www.ch-aviation.com/news/143582-us-sanctions-belarusian-cargo-carriers-lukashenkos-b767.

[59] Tim Lister and Sebastian Shukla, “Russian mercenaries fight shadowy battle in gas-rich Mozambique,” CNN, November 29, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/29/africa/russian-mercenaries-mozambique-intl/index.html; “Washington’s Secret War Against Wagner’s Planes,” Africa Intelligence, May 30, 2022, https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2022/05/03/washington-s-secret-war-against-wagner-s-planes,109782047-eve; and “Kremlin Misinforms Macron: PMC Wagner Deployed in Mali by Russian Defense Ministry,” The Lansing Institute, February 9, 2022, https://lansinginstitute.org/2022/02/09/kremlin-misinforms-macron-pmc-wagner-deployed-in-mali-by-russian-defense-ministry/.

[60] Government of the United States, “The United States Takes Action in Response to DPRK-Russia Ballistic Missile Transfers and Testing,” Department of State, January 11, 2024, https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-united-states-takes-action-in-response-to-dprk-russia-ballistic-missile-transfers-and-testing/.

[61] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[62] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026); Brandon J. Weichert, “Putin’s ‘Flying Kremlin’: Meet Russian Air Force One,” The National Interest, August 15, 2025, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/putins-flying-kremlin-meet-russian-air-force-one-bw-081525; “Russia’s VIP Fleet,” Key.Aero, https://www.key.aero/article/russias-vip-fleet.

[63] “Kremlin Misinforms Macron PMC Wagner Deployed in Mali by Russian Defense Ministry,” The Lansing Institute, February 9, 2022, https://lansinginstitute.org/2022/02/09/kremlin-misinforms-macron-pmc-wagner-deployed-in-mali-by-russian-defense-ministry/.

[64] Government of the Russian Federation, “Press release on Russia-Confederation of Sahel States (CSS) ministerial meeting,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 3, 2025, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2007055/; “Sahel Ministers Visit Moscow to Strengthen Ties with Russia,” Africanews, April 2, 2025, https://www.africanews.com/2025/04/02/sahel-ministers-visit-moscow-to-strengthen-ties-with-russia/; “Russia Hosts First Military Meeting with Sahel Juntas,” The Moscow Times, August 14, 2025,  https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/08/14/russia-hosts-first-military-meeting-with-sahel-juntas-a90221; Government of the Russian Federation, “Meeting with President of Burkina Faso Ibrahim Traore,” The Kremlin, May 11, 2025, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76895; “Mali’s Goita Visits Moscow as Africa Corps Replaces Wagner in Fight Against Jihadists,” Africanews, June 23, 2025, https://www.africanews.com/2025/06/23/malis-goita-visits-moscow-as-africa-corps-replaces-wagner-in-fight-against-jihadists/; and “Wagner Group Leaves Mali Replaced by Moscow Backed Africa Corps,” France 24, June 8, 2025, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20250608-wagner-group-leaves-mali-replaced-by-moscow-backed-africa-corps-russia.

[65] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[66] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026); “Russia, US Compete in West Africa: Africa File, July 31, 2025,” American Enterprise Institute, Critical Threats Project, July 31, 2025, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russia-us-compete-west-africa-somalia-sudan-parallel-governments-deadly-attacks-in-burkinafaso-and-drc-africa-file-july-31-2025.

[67] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[68] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[69] Anton Sokolin, “Russian Wagner Group Linked Cargo Jet Makes Rare Flight to North Korea,” NK News, December 15, 2025, https://www.nknews.org/2025/12/russian-wagner-group-linked-cargo-jet-makes-rare-flight-to-north-korea/; “Prigozhin Was Killed, But His Work Lives on. This is Evident From the Flights of Associated Aircraft to Africa,” Eurasia, February 13, 2024, https://eurasia.ro/2024/02/13/prigozhin-was-killed-but-his-work-lives-on-this-is-evident-from-the-flights-of-associated-aircraft-to-africa/; and “The hacking of a Russian Il-76 pilot revealed weapons supply schemes from Iran, South Africa, and Mali to Russia,” InformNapalm, November 20, 2023, https://informnapalm.org/52853-vzlom-pilota-il-76kubinskie-naemniki-prodolzhayut-popol/.

[70] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[71] Government of the United States, “Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization,” Department of the Treasury, January 26, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1220; Linus Höller, “Heavy Russian Cargo Plane Lands in Caracas Amid US Venezuela Tensions,” Defense News, October 28, 2025, https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2025/10/28/heavy-russian-cargo-plane-lands-in-caracas-amid-us-venezuela-tensions/; Dominik Sipinski, “OFAC Sanctions Russia’s Uzga, Aviacon Zitotrans,” ch-aviation, January 31, 2023, https://www.ch-aviation.com/news/124002-ofac-sanctions-russias-uzga-aviacon-zitotrans; and Matthew Loh, “A senior Russian lawmaker says Moscow just delivered new air defense systems to Venezuela,” Business Insider, November 5, 2025, https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-lawmaker-send-pantsir-buk-venezuela-air-defenses-ilyushin-2025-11.

[72] Dada Lyndell, “Wagner chief Prigozhin is dead, but Wagner-linked planes are still flying to Africa,” The Insider, February 7, 2024, https://theins.ru/en/society/268960; “Prigozhin Was Killed, But His Work Lives on. This is Evident From the Flights of Associated Aircraft to Africa,” Eurasia, February 13, 2024; Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson, “Africa File, December 19, 2024,” American Enterprise Institute, Critical Threats Project, July 31, 2025, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-december-19-2024-russia-reinforces-libya-amid-syria-withdrawal-drc-rwanda-talks-collapse-ethiopias-counter-fano-campaign-issp-strangles-roadways-in-niger-ankara-declaration; “Putin Plans to Establish a New Military Base in Libya,” Middle East and North Africa Studies, March 27, 2025, https://mena-studies.org/putin-plans-to-establish-a-new-military-base-in-libya/; and Dominik Sipinski, “US Sanctions Belarusian Cargo Carriers, Lukashenko’s B767,” ch-aviation, August 12, 2024, https://www.ch-aviation.com/news/143582-us-sanctions-belarusian-cargo-carriers-lukashenkos-b767.

[73] Government of the United States, “Treasury Tightens Sanctions on Belarus’s Military Support to Russia and Lukashenka Regime,” Department of the Treasury, August 9, 2024, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2533; Government of the United States, “Sanctions List Search, entry ID 50222,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, accessed July 1, 2026, https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=50222; and Dominik Sipinski, “US Sanctions Belarusian Cargo Carriers, Lukashenko’s B767,” ch-aviation, August 12, 2024, https://www.ch-aviation.com/news/143582-us-sanctions-belarusian-cargo-carriers-lukashenkos-b767.

[74] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026); “Prigozhin Was Killed, But His Work Lives on. This is Evident From the Flights of Associated Aircraft to Africa,” Eurasia, February 13, 2024, https://eurasia.ro/2024/02/13/prigozhin-was-killed-but-his-work-lives-on-this-is-evident-from-the-flights-of-associated-aircraft-to-africa/; and Dada Lyndell, “Wagner chief Prigozhin is dead, but Wagner-linked planes are still flying to Africa,” The Insider, February 7, 2024, https://theins.ru/en/society/268960.

[75] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026); “Prigozhin Was Killed, But His Work Lives on. This is Evident From the Flights of Associated Aircraft to Africa,” Eurasia, February 13, 2024, https://eurasia.ro/2024/02/13/prigozhin-was-killed-but-his-work-lives-on-this-is-evident-from-the-flights-of-associated-aircraft-to-africa/; and Dada Lyndell, “Wagner chief Prigozhin is dead, but Wagner-linked planes are still flying to Africa,” The Insider, February 7, 2024, https://theins.ru/en/society/268960.

[76] “Wagner chief Prigozhin is dead, but Wagner-linked planes are still flying to Africa,” The Insider, https://theins.press/en/society/268960.

[77] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[78] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[79] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[80] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[81] Government of the Russian Federation, “Meeting with President of Burkina Faso Ibrahim Traore,” The Kremlin, May 11, 2025, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76895; and “Traore in Focus! Burkina Faso President Attends Victory Day Celebrations in Moscow,” Viory, May 9, 2025, https://www.viory.video/en/videos/a3482_09052025/traore-in-focus-burkina-faso-president-attends-victory-day-celebrations-in-moscow; “Burkina Leader Seeks Stronger Military Ties with Russia,” The Defense Post, May 11, 2025, https://thedefensepost.com/2025/05/11/burkina-faso-military-ties-russia/; and “Burkina Faso’s President Ibrahim Traoré Arrives in Moscow as Special Guest of President Putin,” Azania Newswire, May 11, 2025, https://azanianewswire.wordpress.com/2025/05/11/burkina-fasos-president-ibrahim-traore-arrives-in-moscow-as-special-guest-of-president-putin/.

[82] “A Russian Assisted Failure: Violent Security Degradation in Western Africa in May 2025,” Defense Archives, June 10, 2025, https://defensearchives.com/news/a-russian-assisted-failure-violent-security-degradation-in-western-africa-in-may-2025/; and United Nations, “Mali Situation Report May 2025,” United Nations Population Fund, June 2025, https://www.unfpa.org/resources/mali-situation-report-may-2025.

[83] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[84] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026); Makuochi Okafor and Hafsa Khalil, “Russian fighters confirm withdrawal from northern Mali city after separatist attacks,” BBC News, April 27, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3w3wyq4v14o; Nimi Princewill, “Rebels jeered Putin’s troops out of a key African town. Now his regional grip is slipping away,” CNN, May 10, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/10/africa/putin-africa-corps-kidal-mali-intl-cmd; and “FLA Gains Ground in Mali After Peace Deal Falls Apart,” Africa Defense Forum, June 2, 2026, https://adf-magazine.com/2026/06/fla-gains-ground-in-mali-after-peace-deal-falls-apart/.

[85] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[86] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026); Amelia Wojciechowska, “New Regime, New Order? Russian-Syrian Relations After One Year,” Defence24, December 22, 2025, https://defence24.com/geopolitics/new-regime-new-order-russian-syrian-relations-after-one-year; Georgy Poroskoun, “Is Russia Returning as a Security Actor in Syria?” INSS Insight No. 2077, Institute for National Security Studies, January 19, 2026, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/rusia-syria-2026/; “Al Khadim Airbase, an Essential Russian Outpost in Libya,” All Eyes on Wagner, March 18, 2024, https://alleyesonwagner.org/2024/03/18/al-khadim-airbase-an-essential-russian-outpost-in-libya/; and “With Eyes on Sahel, Russia Shifts From Syria to Libya,” Africa Defense Forum, July 22, 2025, https://adf-magazine.com/2025/07/with-eyes-on-sahel-russia-shifts-from-syria-to-libya/.

[87] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[88] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[89] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[90] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[91] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[92] ProCharter, “Ilyushin IL-76T and IL76-TD,” Aircraft Guide, accessed August 2026, https://procharter.com/aircraft/aircraft-guide/cargo-aircraft-guide/ilyushin-il-76t-and-il76-td/; Air Charter Service, “Antonov An-124,” Aircraft Guide, accessed August 2026, https://www.aircharterservice.com/aircraft-guide/cargo/antonov-ukraine/antonovan-124.

[93] Roman Pryhodko, “Syria to Turn Russian Bases Into Army Training Centers,” Militarnyi, April 1, 2026, https://militarnyi.com/en/news/syria-to-turn-russian-bases-into-army-training-centers/; “Future of Russian Military Bases in Syria,” Institute for Palestine Studies/IPSC, August 2, 2025, https://peace-ipsc.org/2025/08/02/future-of-russian-military-bases-in-syria/; “Libya’s Al Khadim Airbase Becomes a Hub for Russian Arms in the Sahel,” RFI (Radio France Internationale), June 23, 2025, https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20250623-libya-s-al-khadim-airbase-becomes-a-hub-for-russian-arms-in-the-sahel; and Samuel Ramani, “Why Russia is Moving Military Assets from Syria to Libya,” The New Arab, December 30, 2024, https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-russia-moving-military-assets-syria-libya.

[94] “Analysis: Libya’s LNA and Turkey, from adversaries to allies,” BBC Monitoring, November 10, 2025, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0004wmn; “Turkey Courts Libya’s Rival Factions in Bid to Further Mediterranean Ambitions,” RFI (Radio France Internationale), May 23, 2026, https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20260523-turkey-courts-libya-s-rival-factions-in-bid-to-further-mediterranean-ambitions; “Geopolitical competition escalates in an unstable Libya,” The Soufan Center, June 9, 2025, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-9/; and Mustafa Fetouri, “Turkey’s gambit in Libya: From tactical intervention to regional powerbroker,” The New Arab, September 30, 2025, https://www.newarab.com/analysis/turkey-libya-tactical-intervention-powerbroker.

[95] Brian Katz, Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas Harrington, “The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies,” CSIS, Russia’s Private Military Companies Project, September 2020, https://russianpmcs.csis.org/; Christopher Spearin, “Airpower and Wagner Group’s Expeditionary Operations: Exploring the ‘Exceptionality’,” Defence Studies, August 19, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2025.2547898; “Looking at the Logistics and Following the Money,” New America, November 3, 2021, https://www.newamerica.org/insights/the-abu-dhabi-express/looking-at-the-logistics-and-following-the-money/; Isabella Currie, “Reinforcing Regimes: The Wagner Group and Russia’s Strategy in the Central African Republic and Mali,” International Code of Conduct Association Blog, February 19, 2025, https://blog.icoca.ch/reinforcing-regimes-the-wagner-group-and-russias-strategy-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/; Sarah Shoer, “Proxy Power and Precious Minerals Russia’s Growing Footprint in Africa Through the Wagner Group,” Interpopulum, 2024, https://interpopulum.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Proxy-Power-and-Precious-Minerals-Russias-Growing-Footprint-in-Africa-through-the-Wagner-Group.pdf; Government of the United States, “Treasury Sanctions Illicit Gold Companies Funding Wagner Forces and Wagner Group Facilitator,” Department of the Treasury, June 27, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1581; “Joe Inwood and Jake Tacchi, “Wagner in Africa: How the Russian mercenary group has rebranded,” BBC News, February 20, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230; “Gold, Wagner, Nationalization and Great Geopolitics in Burkina Faso 1732793663,” Metal Market, November 28, 2024, https://www.metalmarket.eu/en/blog/gold-wagner-nationalization-and-great-geopolitics-in-burkina-faso-1732793663; “Wagner Group Allegedly in Deal with Burkina Faso,” ABC News (Australia), December 16, 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-12-16/wagner-group-allegedly-in-deal-with-burkina-faso/101780006; “Sudan: Russia’s Wagner Group and the grab for power and gold,” Deutsche Welle, April 26, 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/pmc-russias-wagner-group-in-sudan-gold-military-junta/a-65439746; “How Russia’s MoD Secures and Exploits Sahel’s Strategic Minerals,” The Lansing Institute, August 15, 2025, https://lansinginstitute.org/2025/08/15/how-russias-mod-secures-and-exploits-sahels-strategic-minerals/; “JNIM expanding geographic reach and staging coordinated attacks in the Sahel,” The Soufan Center, June 5, 2025, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-5/; “Global Conflict Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel; United Nations, “West Africa and the Sahel,” Security Council, Report, November 2025, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-11/west-africa-and-the-sahel-15.php; “The Wagner Group in the Central Sahel,” Counter Extremism Project, December 2023, https://www.counterextremism.com/wagner-group-sahel; and Christopher M. Faulkner and Raphael Parens, “Russia in Africa: Private Military Proxies in the Sahel,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, March 24, 2025, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/global-governance/russia-in-africa-private-military-proxies-in-the-sahel/.

[96] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[97] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[98] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026); Government of the United States, “Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization,” Department of the Treasury, January 26, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1220; Erika Gibson, “Blacklisted Russian Cargo Plane Lands Heavily Loaded in SA, Departs Empty,” News24, October 5, 2025, https://www.news24.com/citypress/news/blacklisted-russian-cargo-plane-lands-heavily-loaded-in-sa-departs-empty-20251004-1276; Dominik Sipinski, “US Sanctions Belarusian Cargo Carriers, Lukashenko’s B767,” ch-aviation, August 12, 2024, https://www.ch-aviation.com/news/143582-us-sanctions-belarusian-cargo-carriers-lukashenkos-b767; and Government of the United Kingdom, “Written Evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry into the Wagner Group,” UK Parliament, accessed July 1, 2026, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/122628/pdf/.

[99] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[100] “Federal State Budgetary Enterprise Special Flight Unit Rossiya of the Administration of the President of Russia,” OpenSanctions, https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-YoC32EUqf8xBzngTtvb6eE/; Government of the United States, “Sanctions List Search, entry ID 43113,” Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, accessed July 1, 2026, https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=43113; “Sanctions List Search, entry ID 40191,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, accessed July 1, 2026, https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=40191; and “Sanctions List Search, entry ID 50222,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, accessed July 1, 2026, https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=50222.

[101] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (accessed 2025–2026). Note that passenger aircraft, such as IL-96-300, have a longer range and did conduct direct flights between Moscow and the capitals in Central Sahel.

[102] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[103] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026); Government of the Russian Federation, “Meeting with President of Burkina Faso Ibrahim Traore,” The Kremlin, May 11, 2025, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76895; “Traore in Focus! Burkina Faso President Attends Victory Day Celebrations in Moscow,” Viory, May 9, 2025, https://www.viory.video/en/videos/a3482_09052025/traore-in-focus-burkina-faso-president-attends-victory-day-celebrations-in-moscow; “Burkina Leader Seeks Stronger Military Ties with Russia,” The Defense Post, May 11, 2025, https://thedefensepost.com/2025/05/11/burkina-faso-military-ties-russia/; “Burkina Faso’s President Ibrahim Traoré Arrives in Moscow as Special Guest of President Putin,” Azania Newswire, May 11, 2025, https://azanianewswire.wordpress.com/2025/05/11/burkina-fasos-president-ibrahim-traore-arrives-in-moscow-as-special-guest-of-president-putin/; “A Russian Assisted Failure: Violent Security Degradation in Western Africa in May 2025,” Defense Archives, June 10, 2025, https://defensearchives.com/news/a-russian-assisted-failure-violent-security-degradation-in-western-africa-in-may-2025/; and United Nations, “Mali Situation Report May 2025,” United Nations Population Fund, June 2025, https://www.unfpa.org/resources/mali-situation-report-may-2025.

[104] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[105] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).

[106] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026); “Russia’s Africa Corps: Wagner’s Successor in Africa (2022-2025),” The Lansing Institute, September 30, 2025, https://lansinginstitute.org/2025/09/30/russias-africa-corps-wagners-successor-in-africa-2022-2025/; and Alexis Arieff, “Russia’s Security Operations in Africa,” CRS In Focus IF12389, Congressional Research Service, January 2, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12389.

[107] FlightRadar24, flight tracking data (January 1, 2025–July 31, 2026).